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Preface  v
PREFACE 
My first publication on the port of Rotterdam is a work made in primary school, now about 19 
years ago. It was hardly scientific, even though in the last chapter ‘interview with a pilot’, I 
used the same research technique as I used in this PhD thesis. Perhaps my grandfather, 
who lived in Rotterdam a large part of his life and had a vivid interest in the port, nurtured my 
interest for ports. Or perhaps my interest in ports was inherited from my father, who 
consulted internationally in the field of ports and transportation. In any case, I started writing 
about ports early. In secondary school, I also wrote an essay on the port of Rotterdam. It 
recommends a strategy to diversify the port that somehow echoes in this PhD. At university, 
I chose to specialize in transport, port and regional economics and wrote several papers on 
the port of Rotterdam. So I think it is fair to say that I am a port specialist by now.  
After finishing my studies, I had the opportunity to become involved in two initiatives to build-
up something from the start. Arjen van Klink offered me a job at the University with a newly 
started venture to attract and carry out externally funded research (ETECA) and later I had 
the opportunity to work together with prof. Harry Welters to develop the chair port 
economics. His ability to care for and act in the interests of others is rather unique in the 
university environment, and perhaps any working environment. I hope his example has 
‘spilled-over’ to some extent to me.  
I also hope we can continue to build a chair in port economics that is valued both by the 
Erasmus University and by the port community. In this respect, I would like to thank the 
Rotterdam Municipal Port Authority and the port association Deltalinqs for their support to 
the chair port economics. I hope they can be satisfied with this PhD and look forward to 
future cooperation. 
After about three years of research an idea for a PhD thesis started to materialize. The 
appointment of Bart Nooteboom as professor in ‘Organizational Dynamics’ at Erasmus 
University was a great opportunity for me, since from his articles it was clear for me that his 
theoretical knowledge on clusters is unique in the Netherlands. I am very grateful for his 
willingness to supervise my PhD. I remember thinking after the first joint meeting with prof. 
Nooteboom and prof. Welters over breakfast in Scheveningen ‘if you mess it up now, you 
only have yourself to blame, because the supervision team is perfect’. This first impression 
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became true over the years. Bart’s vast theoretical knowledge and talent for theoretical 
explorations were very inspiring and his style of supervision pleasant and effective.  
I also would like to thank the members of the ‘small committee’, prof. Bjorn Asheim, prof. 
Leo van den Berg and prof. Eddy van de Voorde, for their valuable comments. 
The empirical part of this PhD consists of three case studies of port clusters. The support of 
prof. Welters for the case in Rotterdam was impressive: simply because I signed my letters 
to ask ‘port experts’ to make time for an interview with ‘thanking you in advance, also on 
behalf of prof. Welters’ virtually all experts, mostly CEO’s of firms in the port, were willing to 
cooperate. For the case study of Durban I would like to thank especially prof. Trevor Jones 
from the University of Natal in Durban. His network in and his knowledge of the port of 
Durban are extensive and contributed substantially to the quality of the case study. I hope 
we can continue to cooperate in the future. Furthermore, I would like to thank Koen Fasten 
for helping to organize the interviews and his support in Durban. I have good memories of 
our time in South Africa. I also would like to thank the ‘Trustfonds’ for their financial 
contribution to the Durban case. 
The case of the ‘Lower Mississippi port cluster’ benefited substantially from the support of 
dr. Renner of the University of New Orleans, another port researcher with a very good 
network in the port cluster. Furthermore, Michiel Nijdam helped organizing the case study, 
assisted in New Orleans and made the experience in New Orleans a pleasant one. I also 
would like to thank the NWO for their financial support for this case study. 
Finally, I would like to thank the more than one hundred ‘port experts’ that participated in this 
research. Their contribution is essential for the type of research carried out in this PhD. I 
hope the results of the cases and implications for policy and management in seaports can 
serve as compensation. 
Since I had to carry out research projects to fund the PhD research, I also would like to 
thank especially Michiel Nijdam, Desir van Enthoven and Larissa van der Lugt for their great 
cooperation in various research projects. And I also would like to thank our clients, such as 
Rotterdam Municipal Port Management, Ministry of Transport, and the National Port Council 
for granting us research projects. The results of these research projects ‘spill-over’ in 
publications, teaching and also in this PhD. 
Preface  vii
The frequent question why I work in a university environment, has never been difficult to 
answer, because frankly speaking, I consider our department as rather ‘hip’ (even though I 
admit it is not really hip to say so). We have a dynamic group of ‘young dogs’ that create 
both a pleasant working environment and some competitive pressure that makes us all 
move forward. Thus, I would like to thank Willem (for being my choir companion) Erik (for his 
defensive soccer skills), Alexander, Paulus, Paolo, Marco (for his DJ skills), Peter (for being 
a pleasant roommate), Peran, (for his unavoidable presence when I was working late –until 
his PhD was finished), Ariane (for being a female soccer expert), Didier (for being a Belgian 
coping up in the Netherlands), Michiel (for good team work), Larissa (for project 
management skills hard to find at universities), Jan-Jaap (for last minute support), and 
Guiliano (for being the most ‘ingeburgerde’ Italian ever). I hope the ‘young dogs’ will remain 
young for some time to come. In this respect, I think it is fair to say that the director of our 
department, prof. Leo van den Berg, sets a very good example.  
I cannot resist the temptation of thanking various persons who strictly speaking did not 
contribute to this PhD, but whose company I greatly value and who keep me mentally and 
physically (reasonably) healthy. So thanks to the 'Ragazzi' (Alex, Berend, Charles, Ed, Eric 
en Maurice), Bart, Klaske en Simone, Tim, my soccer teammates and other friends for 
‘being there’. Thanks also to Marius, Mieke, Matthijs and Marijn, I hope you are proud, and 
thanks Maria, for your love and ‘energy, energy’. 
Rotterdam, November 2003 

Contents  ix
CONTENTS 
Preface v 
1 Introduction 1 
1.1 Research objectives 1 
1.2 Overview of the study 3 
1.3 Scope and limitations of the dissertation 4 
Theoretical part: cluster theory 
2 Clusters as unit of analysis 9 
2.1 Reasons for analyzing clusters 9 
2.2 Defining a cluster 10 
2.3 Constructing clusters 11 
3 The performance of a cluster 19 
3.1 Measuring cluster performance 19 
3.2 Two effects that change the value added in the cluster 20 
3.3 Conclusions 22 
4 Variables of cluster performance 25 
4.1 Relevant theories 25 
4.2 A new analytical framework 31 
5 Cluster structure 39 
5.1 Agglomeration economies 39 
5.2 Internal competition 42 
5.3 Cluster barriers 45 
5.4 Cluster heterogeneity 47 
5.5 Conclusions 50 
6 Cluster governance 53 
6.1 Coordination in a cluster 54 
6.2 Trust 57 
6.3 Intermediaries 58 
6.4 Leader firms 59 
6.5 Collective action regimes 61 
6.6 Can trust, leader firms, intermediaries and CAR’s have negative effects on performance? 66 
6.7 Conclusions: cluster governance and cluster performance 68 
 
The Performance of Seaport Clusters x
Emperical part: three cases of seaport clusters 
7 Analyzing the performance of seaport clusters 71 
7.1 Goals of the empirical research 72 
7.2 A case study approach 72 
7.3 Sources for the case study research 73 
7.4 Selection of the port experts 74 
7.5 Survey structure 76 
7.6 Selection of cases 78 
8 Clustering in seaports 83 
8.1 Literature on port clusters 83 
8.2 The economic specialization of seaport clusters 85 
8.3 Port cluster activities and non-business organizations 85 
8.4 The relevant port cluster region 96 
8.5 The cluster population and port region in Rotterdam 96 
8.6 The cluster population and port region in Durban 100 
8.7 The cluster population and port region in the LMPC 101 
9 Structure, governance and performance in seaport clusters; literature review and 
research issues 105 
9.1 Structure and performance in port clusters; literature review 105 
9.2 Structure and performance in port clusters; research set-up 109 
9.3 Governance and performance in seaports; literature review 111 
9.4 Governance and performance in port clusters; research set-up 119 
10 Structure and performance in seaport clusters; results of the case studies 121 
10.1 Agglomeration economies 122 
10.2 Internal competition 126 
10.3 Cluster barriers 130 
10.4 Cluster heterogeneity 132 
10.5 The importance of the variables of the cluster structure 134 
10.6 Conclusions: cluster structure and performance 136 
11 Governance and performance in seaport clusters; results of the case studies 137 
11.1 Trust 138 
11.2 Intermediaries 139 
11.3 Leader firms 142 
11.4 Collective action regimes 143 
11.5 The importance of the variables related to cluster governance 173 
11.6 Conclusions: cluster governance and performance 175 
12 Analyzing strengths and weaknesses of Seaport clusters 177 
12.1 Strengths and weaknesses of Rotterdam’s port cluster 180 
12.2 Strengths and weaknesses of Durban’s port cluster 184 
12.3 Strengths and weaknesses of the LMPC 186 
Contents  xi
Part three: conclusions 
13 Conclusions for analyzing clusters 191 
13.1 Constructing a cluster 191 
13.2 The theoretical framework 191 
13.3 The role of entry and exit barriers 193 
13.4 Internal competition in clusters 194 
13.5 The role of leader firms in clusters 194 
13.6 The role of intermediaries in clusters 195 
13.7 Collective action regimes in clusters 195 
13.8 A regime manager 196 
13.9 Cluster associations 196 
13.10 Cluster managers 197 
13.11 Relations between the different variables 198 
13.12 Suggestions for further research 199 
14 Conclusions on seaport clusters 201 
14.1 Seaport clusters 201 
14.2 Internal competition in seaports 201 
14.3 The organizational infrastructure in seaports 202 
14.4 Leader firm behavior in seaports 203 
14.5 Collective action regimes in seaports 203 
14.6 Port authorities as cluster managers 204 
14.7 Suggestions for further research 206 
15 Opportunities for policy and management in seaport clusters 209 
15.1 Opportunities to strengthen agglomeration economies and reduce diseconomies 209 
15.2 Opportunities to create internal competition 211 
15.3 Opportunities to reduce cluster entry and exit barriers 211 
15.4 Opportunities to increase the heterogeneity of the cluster population 213 
15.5 Opportunities to increase trust 214 
15.6 Opportunities to increase the role of intermediaries 214 
15.7 Opportunities to encourage leader firm behavior 215 
15.8 Opportunities to improve collective action regimes 216 
15.9 Further research on policy and management in port clusters 217 
References 219 
Appendix 1: The survey 231 
Appendix 2: Cluster experts in the three cases 243 
Appendix 3: BIK codes of port cluster activities 247 
English and Dutch summary 249
 

 1 INTRODUCTION 
Economists have always had an interest in factors that govern economic development. This 
issue has been addressed at different levels, the firm level (Rumelt et al, 1994), regional 
level (Van den Berg, 1987) and national level (for instance Adam Smith’s (1776) classic on 
the ‘wealth of nations’). The economic development of regions receives more and more 
attention. One particular regional environment, to which a relatively prosperous economic 
development is often attributed, is a cluster, defined as a regional concentration of related 
economic activities (Krugman, 1991).      
Scientists and (regional) policy makers have embraced the cluster concept, have identified 
regional clusters, and have developed policies and strategies to enhance the development 
of clusters (Markusen, 1996). A large variety of clusters, each with different characteristics 
(see for instance Van Dijk and Sverrison, 2003), have been identified. Famous examples 
include Italian industrial districts (Brusco, 1982), high tech clusters such as Silicon Valley 
(Saxenian, 1992), and service clusters, such as the financial service cluster in London (Amin 
and Thrift, 1992).  
Surprisingly perhaps, the cluster concept has hardly been used to analyze seaports, even 
though port activities are geographically concentrated in a limited number of regions, mainly 
because geographical conditions are favorable in some regions. These regions attract 
substantial numbers of port related firms. Therefore, ports can be regarded as ‘text-book 
cases’ of clustering (see Fujita and Mori, 1996). Port related economic activities are of 
substantial importance for the regional economy in many port regions. In this dissertation the 
cluster concept is applied to seaports, to enhance the understanding of the performance of 
(seaport) clusters.  
1.1 Research objectives 
This research has two objectives. The first objective is to contribute to the theoretical 
knowledge on the factors that govern the performance of clusters. Even though clusters 
have recently been studied widely, the theoretical knowledge on clusters and factors that 
govern their performance is still fragmented and based on case studies. The objective of this 
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research is to enrich this knowledge by developing a framework to analyze clusters that 
draws from various schools. This framework can also provide a basis for developing policies 
and strategies to improve the performance of clusters. 
The second research objective is to contribute to the theoretical and empirical knowledge on 
seaports, by applying the cluster concept to seaports. Economic geographers and (maritime) 
transport economists have studied ports, but hardly with the use of the cluster concept. The 
cluster perspective can be especially fruitful for analyzing governance in seaport clusters.  
The two objectives lead to two research questions, a theoretical one and an empirical one. 
Both can be split up into three sub-questions. The theoretical research question is:  
How can the ‘performance’ of a cluster be analyzed? 
The related sub-questions are: 
• How can the cluster concept be defined and how can clusters be identified? 
• How can the performance of clusters be measured? 
• What cluster specific variables influence the performance of clusters? 
The empirical research question is: 
How can the ‘performance’ of port clusters be analyzed and what are the results of 
such an analysis for the ports of Rotterdam, Durban and the Lower Mississippi? 
The related sub-questions are: 
• Can activities in ports be analyzed as economic clusters and what activities are 
included in port clusters? 
• How do variables derived from various theories affect the performance of the three 
selected ports? 
• What implications for the governance of port clusters in general and the three ports in 
particular can be drawn? 
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1.2 Overview of the study 
The study consists of an introduction and three parts: a theoretical part, an empirical part 
and a concluding part (see figure 1). The theoretical part, comprising chapters 2-6, answers 
the theoretical research question. In chapter two the cluster concept is discussed and in 
chapter three the issue of the performance of a cluster is addressed. In chapter four a 
theoretical framework to analyze the performance of cluster is presented. Central in this 
framework is a distinction between variables of cluster performance related to the structure 
of the cluster and variables of cluster performance related to the governance of the cluster. 
These are discussed in detail in chapters five and six respectively.   
The empirical part, comprising chapters 7-12, answers the empirical research question. 
Chapter seven presents the research method. Chapter eight deals with port clusters and 
introduces the three case studies. In chapter nine, the research issues for analyzing the 
performance of seaport clusters are identified. In chapter ten, the results of the case studies 
with regard to the effects of cluster structure on the cluster performance are discussed. In 
chapter eleven the results on the relation between cluster governance and performance are 
discussed. Chapter twelve, on strengths and weaknesses of the three port clusters, finalizes 
the empirical part.  
The concluding part consists of chapters 12-15. In each chapter the most important 
conclusions are highlighted and suggestions for further research are presented. In chapter 
thirteen conclusions relevant for analyzing clusters are discussed. Chapter fourteen 
discusses conclusions relevant specifically for seaport clusters. In the final chapter 
opportunities for policy and management in seaport clusters are discussed. Figure 1 shows 
the structure of the research. 
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Figure 1: Research structure 
4.  A framework for analyzing 
cluster performance
1. Introduction
13.  Conclusions for
analyzing clusters 
14.  Conclusions on 
port clusters
Theoretical part Empirical part
8.   Clustering in seaports
7.   Analyzing the performance
of port clusters
10. Cluster structure and
performance in seaports
Conclusions
3.  The performance of a 
cluster 
11. Cluster governance and
performance in seaports
5.  Cluster structure
6.  Cluster governance
9.   Research issues for port
clusters
15.  Policy and management
in seaports
12. Strengths and weaknesses
of the cases
2.  Clusters as unit of analysis 
 
1.3 Scope and limitations of the dissertation 
The research questions are quite broad. Therefore limitations in terms of scope and depth 
are necessary. Five major limitations of the research are recognized.  
The number of factors that influence the performance of a cluster is huge. This study only 
deals with cluster specific variables. A focus on these factors can yield new insights, as it 
has become clear that these variables have a substantial influence on the development of a 
cluster (Porter, 1990). Other variables, such as technological developments and 
(inter)national regulations clearly influence the performance of a cluster, but these are not 
incorporated in the framework. The relevance of external variables is addressed in each of 
the case studies, but they are not incorporated in the theoretical framework.  
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Second, insights from various schools are incorporated in the theoretical framework. These 
insights are included only when they are widely accepted in these schools. No attempt is 
made to critically discuss the different schools. 
Third, the case studies of port clusters test the usefulness of the framework and the validity 
of the variables incorporated in the framework. So far, the only other framework that can be 
used to analyze the performance of clusters is Porter’s diamond framework. However, this 
framework is not well based on existing economic theories and concepts. This study aims to 
provide an alternative framework that incorporates insights from established economic 
theories. However, no ‘test’ is made to evaluate whether the explanatory value of the 
framework developed in this study is better than Porter’s framework. Such a test is hardly 
possible, given the holistic nature of both frameworks. 
Fourth, the framework to analyze the performance of clusters is only applied to seaports. 
Seaport clusters are likely to differ substantially from other clusters. Conclusions based on 
the empirical evidence can therefore not be automatically generalized to all clusters. 
Fifth, the cases give a description of the three port clusters at one moment in time. The 
historical background is only provided when clearly relevant. The performance of the cluster 
over time is not systematically analyzed. 
 

 THEORETICAL PART: CLUSTER THEORY 
 

 2 CLUSTERS AS UNIT OF ANALYSIS 
In this chapter the cluster concept is discussed. First, reasons for choosing clusters as unit 
of analysis are briefly discussed. Second, a definition of a ‘cluster’ is presented and 
discussed. Third, a method to identify and delimit a cluster is developed. 
2.1 Reasons for analyzing clusters 
Clustering of firms in a region can be observed in many countries (see Krugman, 1991 and 
Porter, 1990, for some illustrations). Even though clusters have been widely studied 
recently, the cluster as unit of analysis is still less common than national economies, 
industries, firms or individuals. In fact, some scholars that study clusters take firms as the 
unit of analysis. Taking clusters as unit of analysis adds to the body of economic knowledge 
for at least three reasons.  
First, clustering cannot be fully understood as simply the result of location decisions of 
individual firms. The development of clusters is a path dependent and contingent process 
(see Krugman, 1991 and Arthur, 1994). The cluster as unit of analysis allows for studying 
aspects of clustering that cannot be addressed with a ‘firm level approach’.  
Second, the performance of firms can only be understood when their embeddedness is 
taken into account. The cluster concept allows for this. Economic developments such as 
outsourcing and 'flexible specialization' increase interdependencies and thereby further raise 
the relevance of local embeddedness. These developments have led to increased attention 
for clusters as the unit of analysis (see Piore and Sabel, 1984).  
Third, clusters studies yield relevant insights for policy and management in clusters. This 
practical relevance is increasing because regional specialization increases, (see Krugman 
1991) and as a consequence, competition between regions increases. Thus, many regions 
are in search of ‘growth clusters’ (Van den Berg et al, 2001). In many regions, cluster 
initiatives have developed. The practical relevance explains why cluster studies are in many 
cases policy-oriented (Markusen, 1999).  
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2.2 Defining a cluster 
Various cluster definitions exist, such as ‘a spatially concentrated group of firms competing 
in the same or related industries that are linked through vertical and horizontal relationships’ 
(Porter, 1990, p. 149). We define a cluster as1: 
A population of geographically concentrated and mutually related business units, 
associations and public(-private) organizations centered around a distinctive 
economic specialization. 
First, we regard a cluster as a population (not as an entity). This aspect is important 
because it implies that the internal heterogeneity of clusters has to be taken into account 
(see Rabellotti and Schmitz, 1999). The notion of a cluster population also implies that the 
cluster population can change. Indeed, entry and exit are important mechanisms of 
transformation of the cluster2. 
A second characteristic of a cluster is the geographical concentration of the population. This 
characteristic has been emphasized as cluster analysis progressed3. Even though the 
geographical aspect is widely acknowledged, the delimitation of the relevant cluster region is 
problematic. No matter how a cluster is geographically delimited, firms in the cluster 
population will be strongly linked to firms outside the relevant cluster region. A method to 
delimit the relevant cluster region is discussed in the following section.    
Third, the cluster population consists of business units, associations and public(-private) 
organizations. Business units are more appropriate units than firms, since firms may be 
present in various different clusters. Business units can be part of ‘parent firms’ outside the 
cluster. In the remainder of the paper the term firm is used, even though strictly speaking 
                                          
1  See Markusen, 1996 and Becattini, 1990 for similar definitions. 
2  The term ‘population’ is used in ‘Population Ecology’ to denote groups of similar firms, in most 
cases firms in the same industry. In this definition, the population consists of complementary 
and interrelated firms, located in the same region. Thus, the population is more diverse and the 
majority of the analytical tools from Population Ecology cannot be used to analyze clusters. 
3  Porter, for instance, did not pay much attention to geographical concentration in his early work 
on clusters (Porter, 1990), but gradually recognized the importance of geographical proximity 
(Porter, 1998). 
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business unit is meant. Associations and public (-private) organizations can also be included 
in the cluster population. Associations can be defined as ‘organizations that provide a host 
of collective support services to member firms’ (see McEvily and Zaheer, 1999). 
Fourth, the cluster population consists of related business units, associations and public  
(-private) organizations. Business units are included in the population if they have relatively 
strong (potential) economic links with one or more other business units in the population4. 
Associations are included in the cluster population if the majority of their members are 
included in the cluster population and public (-private) organizations are included if they are 
strongly linked to firms in the cluster. Because linkages are central in the definition of 
clusters, clusters are populations of competing and complementary firms.  
Fifth, the cluster population is centered around a particular economic specialization. This 
specialization is mentioned in most cases in the name given to the cluster, such as ‘the 
shipbuilding cluster’ (Van Klink and De Langen, 2001) and the ‘footwear cluster’ (Rabelotti 
and Schmitz, 1999). A focus on a distinctive economic specialization is necessary to define 
cluster borders, because in principle, chains of economic linkages are endless. Unless a 
core is defined, it is impossible to isolate a component of that chain. 
2.3 Constructing clusters 
Clusters are constructs. Clusters have no natural borders, because clusters are by no 
means ‘isolated islands’ (see Staber, 1996) in the economy. Linkages between firms 
inevitably cross cluster borders. As a consequence cluster borders are to some extent 
arbitrary. Scientists, policy makers and industry professionals construct the ‘borders’ of a 
cluster5. Even though cluster borders are inevitably to some extent arbitrary, it is important 
to provide a method to delimit clusters. A precise delimitation is a step forward, since it 
                                          
4  A firm in a cluster has linkages with some, but certainly not all other firms in the cluster. 
Conceptually, when linkages are absent, firms are ‘potentially linked’: when opportunities arise, 
relations will develop relatively easy, because search costs for partners in the cluster are low.  
5  Constructing a cluster can be useful -for scientists because analyzing clusters enhances the 
understanding of economic processes, for policy makers because clusters can provide a basis 
for economic policies, and for industry professionals because clusters can become platforms for 
effective coordination and cooperation. 
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provides a basis for a precise analysis of the evolution of a cluster in time, it enables a 
detailed comparison between clusters, and it allows for a precise analysis of the influence of 
certain characteristics of a cluster, such as degree of foreign ownership, diversity in the 
cluster and entry and exit in the cluster, on its performance. 
Clusters differ substantially in size, geographic span, core and strength of cluster ties. 
Clusters can overlap and include ‘cliques’ or subclusters of thick and multiplex networks, 
with fewer linkages between subclusters’ (McEvily and Zaheer, 1999 p. 1135). 
Consequently, one business unit can be regarded as ‘member’ of different clusters. A 
method to delimit clusters consists of four steps: 
1. Select an economic specialization and a roughly defined region for which the cluster 
analysis will be made. 
2. Identify economic activities and non-business organizations included in the cluster.  
3. Define the relevant region for the cluster. 
4. Identify the cluster population, consisting of business units, associations and public  
(-private) organizations that are both relatively strongly linked to the cluster core and 
located in the relevant cluster region. 
These four steps are an iterative process. In some cases, the identification of economic 
activities included in the cluster will lead to a modification of the economic specialization. In 
other cases, the analysis of the relevant region will shed new light on the economic activities 
included in the cluster. The four steps of this process remain the same. 
2.3.1 Selecting an economic specialization 
The economic specialization for which the cluster analysis is made can be defined rather 
broadly, such as ‘the high-tech cluster’ or ‘the maritime cluster’. In general, the economic 
specialization should be relatively primary, in the sense that it is not located in a region 
because of the presence of other economic activities, but because the region offers, or used 
to offer location advantages. For instance, instead of taking ‘computer maintenance’ as 
economic specialization, ICT is likely to be better, because in many cases maintenance 
activities follow other activities. Furthermore, it is advisable to take an economic 
specialization that is relatively important in the region. Indicators of geographical 
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concentration include a high ‘localization quotient’ (discussed later), and a substantial 
‘export surplus’ to other regions (see Porter, 1990). 
2.3.2 Economic activities included in the cluster 
A variety of tools can be used to identify economic activities included in the cluster 
(Bergman and Feser, 1999). The combination of different tools should allow for an 
increasingly precise delimitation of economic activities. The final result is a set of industry 
codes (for instance NAICS or SIC) that can be used to identify firms in the cluster.  
A practical tool to start with is an analysis of the presence of a cluster association (see 
Cooke and Morgan, 1998). The membership structure of a regional association of dissimilar 
and complementary firms gives a good first idea of the kinds of economic activities included 
in the cluster. Figure 2 shows a typical ‘association structure’ of a cluster. In this figure, firms 
in a cluster are members of a regional industry association6 and these associations are 
members of the cluster association. 
Figure 2: A cluster association 
Firms in the cluster 
Cluster association
(Regional) associations 
for specific industries
 
A second tool to identify the economic activities in the cluster is input-output analysis. This 
analysis shows the importance of transactions between different economic activities. 
Economic activities that have relatively many transactions with other activities included in 
                                          
6  Or a regional department of a national industry association. 
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the cluster should be included as well. Input-output analysis is in some cases impossible, 
because data on a sufficiently detailed geographical and functional level are lacking. 
A third tool is a qualitative analysis of the structure of a value chain, for instance based on a 
number of expert interviews. Many clusters consist of various economic activities that belong 
to one value chain (Roelandt and Den Hartog, 1999).  Insights in the structure of value 
chains can be used to identify economic activities that are ‘clearly’ part of the cluster. A 
qualitative analysis can reveal the strategic relevance of business transactions. Simple 
‘arm’s length transactions’ are a less compelling reason to include economic activities in a 
cluster than strategic relations. For example, firms that supply specific machinery to 
shipyards are a part of a shipbuilding cluster, while firms that supply ‘general administrative 
services’ are not (see Van Klink and De Langen 2001). A qualitative ‘value chain analysis’ 
based on an analysis of interactions, partnerships, ownership structures and joint R&D 
efforts, is a good tool for analyzing linkages when input-output data are lacking.  
A fourth tool is an analysis of ‘location quotients’ of economic activities in a certain region. 
These quotients show to what extent a region is specialized in these activities. Assuming 
that the cluster as a whole is relatively important in the region, the higher the location 
quotient, the more likely it is that this industry is a part of the cluster. A final tool to identify 
economic activities included in a cluster is through a survey in which the strength of linkages 
between various economic activities is addressed7.  
Unlike firms, non-business organizations are not grouped together in industry classifications. 
Thus, these organizations have to be identified individually, based on expert interviews or 
desk research. Given the limited number of associations, public-private and public 
organizations active in a cluster, this is feasible. Associations are included in the cluster 
population if the ‘members’ for which their services are provided are predominantly included 
in the cluster population, and public (-private) organizations are included if they are strongly 
linked to the firms in the cluster. University departments, knowledge institutes, and schools 
are frequently included in the cluster population, just as are marketing bodies, innovation 
centers and planning boards (see Cooke 1998). 
                                          
7  In general, a survey covers only a sample of all firms in an industry. Only when all potential 
firms of a cluster population are surveyed, can a survey be used to define the cluster population 
directly. This precise ‘bottom-up approach’ to identify clusters is hardly possible in practice. 
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2.3.3  The relevant cluster region 
All clusters have ‘geographical borders’, even though in many cases these are not well 
defined. Many cluster studies simply take regions, provinces or states as relevant cluster 
region (Van Klink and De Langen, 2001).  The tool of a localization analysis can be used to 
create a detailed geographical cluster delimitation. By dividing the number of firms active in 
cluster activities in a municipality (in most cases the most detailed statistical unit) by the 
overall number of firms in the municipality, the relative share of cluster activities in the 
municipality is obtained. Areas with a relatively high share of cluster activities are included in 
the ‘relevant cluster region’8. This method to delimit the relevant cluster region is relatively 
precise. However, the minimum share of cluster activities required for municipalities to be 
included in the cluster region is arbitrary and varies case by case. Figure 3 shows the 
method to delimit the relevant cluster region. 
                                          
8  This concept is similar to the construct of a ‘local labor market area’ (LLMA) that Paniccia (1999) 
uses to geographically delimit clusters and similar to the analysis of the ‘functional urban region’ 
(Van den Berg, 1987). The latter is defined on the basis of commuter flows. 
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Figure 3: Delimiting the ‘relevant cluster region’ 
Share of cluster 
activities as 
percentage of  the 
economic activities 
in the municipality
Municipalities ranked according to the largest share 
of cluster activities
0%
30%
Cluster border
Relevant 
cluster region
Minimum share of cluster 
activities to be included in 
the relevant cluster region
 
 
2.3.4 The cluster population 
As the fourth step, based on both an economical and a geographical delimitation, the cluster 
population can be identified. This population consists of all business units active in economic 
activities included in the cluster and located in the relevant cluster area. Apart from the 
business units, the vast majority of the cluster population, associations and public (-private) 
organizations are included in the cluster population. Figure 4 and Figure 5 summarize the 
issue of delimiting clusters. 
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Figure 4: The four steps to construct a cluster 
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Figure 5: Delimiting clusters 
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 3 THE PERFORMANCE OF A CLUSTER 
In this chapter the issue of an appropriate measure for cluster performance is discussed. 
First, a number of possible indicators are reviewed. It is argued that value added generated 
in the cluster is the most appropriate indicator. Second, two mechanisms leading to a 
change in the value added generated in the cluster are discussed.  
3.1 Measuring cluster performance 
The issue of how the performance of clusters can be measured is important for cluster 
scholars. A variety of indicators of the performance of clusters have been used. Average 
profitability is a problematic indicator, since clustering does not necessarily lead to higher 
profits of firms in the cluster. A prospering cluster does not imply that the clustered firms are 
more profitable than the industry average. Indeed, one could argue that high profitability of 
firms in the cluster indicates a lack of internal competition in the cluster, while some scholars 
argue that internal competition is beneficial for the performance of a cluster over time (see 
Porter, 1990 and Baptista, 2000).  
Productivity (see Maillat, 1998) is no more than a partial measure of cluster performance, 
since it does not capture changes of the cluster population. The performance of a cluster 
with a declining population (for instance because of high land prices) is lower than that of a 
cluster with many new entrants, even if the productivity is equal.  
The share of exports (Porter, 1990) is not suitable because declining export shares can also 
be explained by the location of ‘downstream activities’ in the cluster, with declining exports 
as a consequence.  
Outward foreign direct investment (see Porter, 1990) is not appropriate either, because it 
can be explained by an outflow of capital, value added and employment. Inward foreign 
direct investment is a better, but partial, measure of performance.  
The most complete measure for the performance of clusters is the value added generated in 
the cluster. The value added generated in the cluster is the sum of the value added 
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generated by the members of the population. The value added consists mainly of labor 
expenses, depreciation and profit (before tax). 
A strong increase in the value added in one particular year can have causes that hamper the 
growth of value added in the long run. A cluster where the value added increases because 
wages increased substantially, or profitability is high due to the lack of internal competition, 
are likely to become less competitive in the long run. Therefore, the net present value of the 
future value added generated in the cluster is the best indicator of the performance of a 
cluster. This indicator cannot be calculated. However, once time series of the value added 
generated in a cluster become available, the influence of various variables on the 
performance of clusters can be analyzed. For instance, variables such as expenses for 
innovation, and the number of new establishments are likely to influence the future value 
added generated in the cluster. The value added generated in year t can be written as: 
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Where: 
VA is the total value added of a population P consisting of n firms, 
Vai is the value added of firm i in the cluster P. 
The performance of the cluster can be written as: 
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Where r is the discount rate used to calculate the net present value over the period t to n.  
3.2 Two effects that change the value added in the cluster 
The value added generated in the cluster changes over time because of two effects: an 
‘incumbent performance effect’ and a ‘population effect’. The first effect stems from changes 
of the value added generated by the firms present in the cluster at the end of a period (t+1) 
and at the beginning of a period (t). Developments such as new investments, employee lay-
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offs or increased profitability affect the value added generated in the cluster. This effect can 
be termed the ‘incumbent performance’ effect, since it is related to the behavior and 
performance of incumbent firms. The second effect stems from changes in the population, 
because firms enter and leave the cluster. Because of this population effect, the cluster 
population in the beginning of a period (t) differs from the population at the end of a period 
(t+1). These two different mechanisms are common knowledge among ‘population 
ecologists’: 
Organizational worlds transform over time in two sharply different ways. Some 
individual organizations adjust their routines (…). But another key mechanism 
operates as well –populations of organizations evolve because some existing 
organizations perish and other (sometimes novel) organizations emerge (Hannan 
and Freeman, 1977, p.4). 
Both effects can be expressed in formula form: 
)()()( tVAPtVAItVA ppp ∆+∆=∆  
Where: 
∆VAIp (t) is the incumbent performance effect, measuring (in value added) the 
changes in value added generated by the population in a period. 
∆VAPp (t) is the population effect, measuring in value added the effects of 
entrants to and exits from the cluster in a period. 
3.2.1 Population effect 
Some economic activities ‘leave’ a cluster while others establish offices in this cluster. 
Furthermore, the cluster population changes because of bankruptcies and start-ups. The 
population effect is the sum of four mechanisms through which the population changes, 
given in Table 1. 
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Table 1: Four ways in which cluster population changes 
 Population growth Population decline  
Birth/mortality effect Start-ups Bankruptcies Net birth effect 
Shift effect Entrants Exits Net migration effect 
Sum of effects New members Lost members Total population effect 
 
An in-depth analysis of the population effect has to address changes in the value added 
caused by each of those four mechanisms (start-ups, bankruptcies, entrants and exits). 
3.2.2 Incumbent performance effect 
The incumbent performance effect (over the period from t-1 to t) can be measured by taking 
the population of firms present in the beginning and the end of the year and comparing the 
value added generated by those firms in different years: 
)1()( −−= ∗∗∗ tVAtVAVAI ppp  
Where P* denotes the firms in the population in the beginning and the end of a period. 
The sum of the population effect and incumbent performance effect give the overall 
development of the value added in the cluster. In different clusters the relative importance of 
both effects is likely to differ substantially; some clusters (mostly in mature capital-intensive 
industries) are mainly affected by the performance of incumbents, while clusters of firms in 
knowledge intensive and growing industries change mainly because the population 
changes. 
3.3 Conclusions 
In this chapter a variety of alternative indicators of the performance of a cluster were 
discussed. It was argued that the development of the value added generated in the cluster is 
the most appropriate indicator of the cluster performance. Changes in the value added 
generated in a cluster stem from two different effects: the incumbent performance effect and 
the population effect.  
 
Chapter 3 - The Performance of a Cluster  23
In this chapter formulas were developed to calculate the performance of a cluster. In 
practice, attempts to measure the performance of clusters are very scarce. Thus, data to 
analyze how various variables influence the performance of a cluster are lacking.  
Nevertheless, a theoretical underpinning of the measurement of the performance of a cluster 
is useful. Policy makers and associations can start to calculate the performance of clusters. 
Furthermore, the theoretical clarity of the issue of the performance of a cluster provides a 
basis for developing a framework with variables that influence the performance of a cluster. 
This issue is addressed in the next chapter. 
 

 4 VARIABLES OF CLUSTER PERFORMANCE 
In this chapter a framework with variables of cluster performance is developed. First, four 
different schools that have addressed this issue are reviewed. Second, a new framework for 
analyzing cluster performance is presented.  
4.1 Relevant theories 
In this section we first discuss the issue of integrating insights from different schools. The 
number of variables that influence, directly or indirectly, the performance of a cluster is huge 
if not infinite. Most economic theories/schools concentrate on one or a few variables, thus 
giving only a partial explanation. Given the multitude of variables, the performance of 
clusters cannot be explained with insights from one economic school only.  
An analytical framework that incorporates insights from different schools is required to 
understand the performance of clusters. The development of such a framework does not 
require an all-encompassing theory. Such an integrative theory cannot be made because 
insights from different schools have been developed on the basis of different sets of 
assumptions, that cannot be united9 (see Groenewegen and Vromen, 1996). Rather, the 
framework incorporates insights that are not contradicting themselves (such as effects of 
internal competition or the presence of intermediaries). Combining those different insights 
leads to a more complete analytical framework and a better understanding of the 
performance of clusters. Porter (1990) develops a holistic analytical framework (discussed in 
the following sections), but hardly incorporates research findings of others in his framework. 
An alternative framework that is based on existing insights is developed in this study.  
                                          
9  Different schools are not perfectly complementary, but make contradictory assumptions, for 
instance about the behavior of firms. Combining insights from theories with contradictory 
assumptions leads inevitably to some extent to an ‘ad-hoc framework’. It is difficult, if not 
impossible to include all relevant insights, or to justify why certain insights are incorporated and 
others are not. Therefore, in the cases cluster experts were asked to evaluate the framework 
and suggest improvements. 
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4.1.1 Four relevant schools 
Clusters have frequently been studied from many different perspectives. Cluster scholars 
apply existing theories to study (aspects of) clusters (see Becattini, 1990 who argues that 
approaches as industrial organization, (new) institutional economics, organization science 
and sociology all can be used to analyze clusters). However, many scholars use one set of 
theories and do not combine or integrate different theoretical approaches.  
The economic literature related directly or indirectly to the performance of clusters can be 
classified in four ‘stylized’ schools10. These schools and some leading scholars are given in 
Table 2. We discuss these schools and use the insights of each of these schools to develop 
a framework to analyze the performance of clusters. 
Table 2: Different schools, their focus and some leading authors 
School Leading author(s) Focus of school 
‘Diamond 
School’ 
Porter (1990 and 1998), 
Rugman et al (1995) 
A holistic approach to understand the competitiveness 
of national industries. 
New Economic 
Geography 
Krugman (1991) and Fujita, 
Krugman and Venables (1995) 
Spatial equilibrium of forces leading to and opposing 
spatial concentration. 
Industrial 
District School 
Piore and Sabel (1984) Staber 
(1998), Harrison, (1992), 
Becattini (1990) 
Explaining the characteristics of industrial districts and 
the relative success of this organizational mode. 
Population 
Ecology 
Metcalfe (1998), Hannan and 
Freeman (1989) 
Population dynamics.  
 
4.1.2 The ‘Diamond School’ 
The Diamond School has been developed by Michael Porter (Porter, 1990). Even though 
the title of his book (The Competitive Advantage of Nations) suggests an analysis of 
competitiveness at the national level, his framework is developed to analyze particular 
clusters. Porter regards the presence of internationally competitive clusters as key 
determinants of the competitiveness of nations, since each nation specializes in a few 
                                          
10  These are the main schools, not all cluster studies fit perfectly in one of these schools.  
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clusters/industries (see Auerbach and Skott, 1995). The ‘diamond framework’ shows 
variables that influence the competitiveness of clusters. Figure 6 shows Porter’s diamond. 
Figure 6: Porter’s diamond 
Firm strategy,
structure and 
rivalry
Demand 
conditions
Factor 
conditions
Related and
supporting 
industries
Chance
Government
 
Source: Porter, 1990, p.72  
 
The diamond consists of four elements that are - in Porters view - mutually reinforcing. 
Demand conditions influence the development of products. Porter argues that a 
sophisticated and demanding home market creates good conditions for success abroad. 
Critics have argued that Porter overemphasizes the importance of the domestic - or home - 
market (see Dunning, 1993, pp. 9-10) but the positive influence of the presence of critical 
demand in a location on the attractiveness of that location -or cluster- is widely shared.  
Factor conditions are related to production factors, such as natural resources, capital and 
infrastructure (Porter 1990, p. 73-74). Porter acknowledges the mobility of production factors 
across locations, but assumes that relative differences in factor availability persist even if 
some of these factors are mobile. Porter argues that advanced factors have to be improved 
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continuously and selective disadvantages are beneficial if they ‘send the right signals’, e.g. if 
other firms ultimately have to face similar disadvantages11. 
The third element of the diamond is firm strategy, structure and rivalry. Many variables are 
grouped under this heading. The most important variable (according to Porter) is the 
presence of internal competition. Porter argues that internal competition in the cluster leads 
to such strong competitive pressures that firms become more dynamic and innovate more.  
Porter discusses institutional issues, such as the education system and social norms 
(Porter, 1990, p. 109) under this heading. However, Porter neither uses the term 
‘institutions’, nor insights of institutional economic theories. Harrison (1994) argues that 
Porter does not fully incorporate institutions in his framework and therefore does not 
manage to grasp the influence of institutions on competitiveness.    
The fourth element of the diamond is ‘related and supporting industries’. This element deals 
with the presence of local suppliers. This presence enhances competitiveness, because 
local suppliers facilitate coordination and information exchange, which contributes to 
innovation and upgrading of products and services. 
Apart from the four elements of the diamond, Porter mentions the role of government, as 
well as the role of chance. The role of chance is especially important in the ‘initial formation’ 
of an industry. Government influences each of the four elements of the diamond. Porter’s 
framework incorporates many important aspects of clusters, as illustrated by the following 
quote:  
The cluster becomes a vehicle for maintaining diversity and overcoming the 
inward focus, inertia and inflexibility and accommodation among rivals that slows 
or blocks competitive upgrading a new entry. The presence of a cluster helps 
increase information flows, the likelihood of new approaches and new entry from 
spin-offs, downstream, upstream and related industries (Porter, 1990, p. 151).  
                                          
11  Porter does not fully develop this idea because it would require a more detailed study of change 
processes. Such an analysis requires a dynamic approach and Porter’s approach is essentially 
static. 
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In this quote, Porter discusses a number of relevant issues: the role of diversity in a cluster, 
common mental maps in clusters, interaction in clusters, the role of entry in a cluster and the 
role of information flows in a cluster. All these aspects are relevant, but Porter does not 
develop them in much detail. Furthermore it remains unclear how exactly performance is 
influenced by the elements of the diamond (Martin and Sunley, 2003).  
4.1.3 New economic geography 
New Economic Geography starts from the observation that clustering - also termed 
agglomeration - can be widely observed (see Krugman, 1991). This clustering of activities in 
particular locations has remained largely unexplained by (mainstream) economists. 
Incorporating space in economic models would therefore, according to Krugman, be a step 
forward in (mainstream) economics. Krugman, referring to Marshall (1890) identifies three 
general agglomeration economies: the presence of a labor pool, the presence of suppliers 
and clients, and knowledge spillovers. We discuss these forces more in detail in the next 
chapter.  
Such agglomeration economies are ‘centripetal forces’ (Fujita, Krugman and Venables, 
1999), forces that promote spatial concentration (clustering). These forces are opposed to 
agglomeration diseconomies, ‘centrifugal’ forces that oppose concentration, such as 
congestion and high land prices. In New Economic Geography an analysis of the equilibrium 
- and changes in the equilibrium - between these two forces is center stage. When 
agglomeration economies dominate, clusters will develop. If such economies become less 
relevant in an industry, this leads to spatial deconcentration. New Economic Geography 
focuses on processes of agglomeration in general and does not deal with specific clusters 
and the question how these clusters evolve over time. 
4.1.4 The Industrial District School 
The Industrial District School analyzes local production systems. These consist of various, 
mainly small and medium sized firms that are embedded in their environment and cooperate 
with other firms. In the school relatively much attention is given to behavioral aspects of 
industrial districts, such as the development of trust, social embeddedness of firms in the 
region and governance issues in industrial districts. The school argues that clusters are 
characterized by a specific institutional structure and a specific culture and furthermore, that 
such variables influence the performance of a cluster (Harrison, 1992). Industrial district 
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scholars can be regarded as belonging to ‘new regional science’ (Cooke, 1998). Apart from 
a focus on behavior, this school has the following characteristics: 
• Focus on regions as important variables in firm competitiveness. 
• Emphasis on the importance of institutions. 
• Attention for (informal) networks that foster the building of trust. 
• Appreciation of the importance of proximity. 
• Attention for the importance of an institutional and organizational learning propensity. 
The theme of behavior related to learning and innovation has been widely discussed in the 
‘ID school’ (see among others Best, 1990 and Cooke, 1998). The ID school argues that 
regional concentration fosters innovation, because actors in clusters are more likely to 
develop trust and because (in many cases unplanned) face-to-face contacts foster 
innovation. However, at least by some authors in the Industrial District School (Pouder and 
St. John, 1996) argue that embeddedness in regional networks can make firms blind to 
developments outside the cluster. The ID school recognizes the importance of cluster 
specific institutions for the performance of this cluster.  
Even though the ID school shows the importance of institutional and behavioral aspects of 
clusters, a general framework to analyze behavior is lacking. A large part of the literature 
consists of case studies that are insightful but not generalized in one analytical framework.  
4.1.5 Population Ecology 
Population Ecology does not deal with clusters, but recent cluster scholars have started to 
regard clusters as populations (see Staber, 1998 and Belussi and Gottardi, 2000). Clusters 
are populations of a diverse set of firms. Not only are firms in the same industry included in 
the population, but also firms from complementary industries. Thus, it cannot be argued that 
all firms in the population face the same selection pressure. On the contrary: the success of 
firms in the population has positive effects for the other firms in the cluster. Therefore, 
models developed in Population Ecology cannot be applied directly to clusters. Even though 
the models developed in Population Ecology cannot be applied to clusters, some of the 
basics of ‘population thinking’ can be applied. 
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First, regarding clusters as a population allows for exploring the importance of the variety of 
the population. Such variety is regarded as beneficial for the population as a whole: 
Diversity of organizations may enable societies to adjust quickly to changing 
environments. As environments change, particular types of organizations may be 
favored and others may fall into disfavour (…). The greater the variety of 
organizations available, the wider is the range over which the forces of socio-
economic selection can operate (Tisdell, 1996, p.321). 
Clusters consist of a variety of firms, and the characteristics of the population in this respect 
are relevant for the performance of the population:  
Industrial districts may follow different paths of growth because they are formed by 
a different population of economic agents (Belussi and Gottardi, 2000, p. 16). 
Second, entry and exit barriers are relevant in Population Ecology. The concept of barriers 
to entry or exit can also be applied to cluster populations. Cluster barriers, e.g. barriers to 
enter and exit the population (see Staber, 1998) influence the development of clusters. Such 
barriers differ between clusters.  
4.2 A new analytical framework 
4.2.1 Shortcomings of the four schools for analyzing the performance of clusters 
Economists heavily criticize Porter’s diamond framework. Krugman argues that the diamond 
framework is ‘a clever didactic device, but (…) difficult for an economist to work with, 
because the logic of the linkages is somewhat unclear’ (Krugman, 1995, p. 464). Many of 
the variables included in Porter’s diamond are relevant and studied by other scholars. 
However, the theoretical underpinning of Porter’s model is weak. A second point of criticism 
is that theoretical insights are neglected and consequently the framework is based on old-
fashioned or even wrong assumptions (see for instance Auerbach and Skott, 1995 and 
Dunning, 1993). Thus, Porters framework is not satisfactory for analyzing the performance 
of clusters. 
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New Economic Geography is based on a sophisticated theoretical framework, but this 
framework cannot be used to analyze the performance of particular clusters. The following 
quote clearly illustrates the limits of the ‘new economic geography’ theories: 
Why are aircraft manufactured in Seattle (…)? The logic of increasing returns 
mandates that aircraft production must be concentrated somewhere and Seattle 
just happens to be where the roulette wheel came to stop (Krugman, 1991, p.2). 
New Economic Geography is not interested in particular clusters, but focuses on processes 
of agglomeration in general. This has led to important insights, for instance to explain 
international trade and the differences in economic development between regions, but is not 
sufficient for explaining the performance of particular clusters.  
Population Ecology addresses the issue of the evolution of a population over time. However, 
this school deals with populations of similar and consequently competing firms. Thus, this 
school cannot be applied to populations of complementary firms. Furthermore, Population 
Ecology also does not pay much attention to particular characteristics of populations.  
New Economic Geography and Population Ecology do not include behavior in the analysis12, 
even though behavior is clearly relevant for the performance of individual clusters. The 
Diamond School takes behavioral aspects into account, but is not particularly sophisticated 
on institutional issues.  
The Industrial District School, finally, pays attention to behavior and is interested in the 
performance of particular clusters. However, no coherent framework has emerged from the 
ID literature. A large part of the studies are ‘success stories’ of clusters that cannot be 
generalized. Another part of the literature addresses specific topics and does not intend to 
address the issue of the performance of clusters.  
In the literature discussed above, a distinction can be made between theories related to 
structure and behavior. New Economic Geography and Population Ecology do not deal with 
behavior. Both schools focus on the influence of structural characteristics, on the 
agglomeration of industries and the evolution of populations.    
                                          
12  In the sense that behavior ‘matters’ and cannot be reduced to rational choice models. 
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Behavioral factors also influence the performance of a cluster. Economic actors are rational, 
but only boundedly so (see Simon, 1965 and Hodgson, 1998). Therefore, apart from 
(rational choice based) structural factors behavioral factors influence the performance of 
clusters. The ‘boundaries’ of rationality originate from uncertainty, imperfect information and 
routine behavior (Nelson and Winter, 1982). Analyzing behavior leads to attention for 
processes of change. Such processes differ substantially between firms, countries and 
clusters.  
The central behavioral issue in a cluster is the interaction of firms in the cluster13. This 
interaction affects the performance of the cluster. The term cluster governance can be used 
to describe how actors in the cluster interact.  
The distinction between structure and governance allows for classifying variables as either 
structure variables or governance variables. Both variables influence the performance of the 
cluster. Furthermore, the structure and the governance of a cluster are interdependent. The 
structure influences the governance and vice versa. The basic framework is given in Figure 
7. 
 
                                          
13  The behavior of particular firms in the cluster is not taken into account, for two reasons. First, it 
is impossible to analyze the behavior of all firms in the cluster. Second, most firms in clusters 
are subsidiaries of parent companies outside the cluster. Thus, their behavior is only partially 
cluster specific.  
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Figure 7: Structure, governance and performance of clusters 
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4.2.2 Cluster structure 
The cluster structure influences the performance of the cluster. The effect of such ‘structural’ 
variables on cluster performance differs in different environments. From all four schools 
discussed in the preceding paragraph, one or more ‘stylized facts’ with regard to the 
influence of the structure of a cluster on the performance of the cluster are widely 
acknowledged. These are given in Table 3.  
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Table 3: Stylized facts on cluster structure and performance 
School Stylized facts with regard to cluster structure 
Diamond School Internal competition enhances cluster performance. 
The presence of a ‘critical demand’ enhances cluster performance. 
New economic 
geography 
Presence of agglomeration economies (presence of suppliers and a labor market 
and knowledge spillovers) enhances cluster performance. 
Presence of agglomeration diseconomies (congestion, land rents) hampers cluster 
performance. 
Population Ecology Heterogeneity of cluster population enhances performance. 
Spatial entry, start-up and exit barriers influence cluster performance.  
Industrial District 
School 
Small firms that cooperate in local production systems are competitive vis-à-vis 
large multinationals. 
 
We discuss these stylized facts more in detail in the next chapter, where the influence of the 
structure of a cluster on its performance is center stage. 
4.2.3 Cluster governance 
Cluster governance can be studied with the use of institutional economic theories. When 
analyzing cluster governance, attention should be paid to learning (Montgomery, 1995), 
since learning is necessary to change existing routines and capabilities, and institutions (see 
Amin and Thrift, 1992). The term institution is rather broad and includes both formal and 
informal ‘rules of the game’. In change processes institutions play an important role, both on 
the firm level (see Beckert, 1999) and for aggregated levels such as clusters, networks and 
industries (see Scott, 1988). Table 4 shows the ‘stylized facts’ of the four schools with 
regard to the influence of cluster governance on performance. These stylized facts are 
explored in some more detail in chapter 6.  
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Table 4: Stylized facts on the relation between cluster governance and performance 
School Stylized facts with regard to cluster governance 
Diamond School Clusters are ‘vibrant environments’, where benefits flow between actors in 
the cluster. 
The presence of a support infrastructure enhances cluster performance. 
New economic geography Knowledge spillovers are a force towards clustering. 
Population Ecology - 
Industrial District School The cooperation of clustered firms among themselves and with the local 
government adds to the performance of clusters. 
The presence of trust adds to the performance of clusters. 
The behavior of ‘leader firms’ adds to the performance of clusters14. 
 
4.2.4 The relation between structure and governance 
The governance of firms in a cluster influences the structure of the cluster and the 
governance is influenced by the structure of the cluster (for general literature on the relation 
between structure and agency, see Beckert, 1999), this distinction has not been applied to 
clusters). Lambooy and Boschma (2001) argue that: 
It is not only the given structure that influences actors, the actors (especially the 
innovators) also change the structure (Lambooy and Boschma, 2001, p. 114). 
The structure also influences governance: in a different population of firms, different forms of 
governance develop. Central in this respect is the presence or absence of potential ‘leader 
firms’ (Albino et al, 1999) that can play an active role in the governance of a cluster. The 
level of internal competition also influences the governance in the cluster. Table 5 shows the 
stylized facts on the relation between structure and governance. 
                                          
14  Traditionally, the ID school focused on small and medium sized firms. However, the term ‘leader 
firm’ does not imply firms are large multinationals. The concept is used to describe firms that are 
especially important in clusters. 
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Table 5: Stylized facts on the relation between structure and governance in clusters 
School Stylized facts with regard to the relation between structure and governance 
‘Diamond School’ Governance can enlarge agglomeration economies. 
Cluster governance affects the intensity of internal competition.  
Institutional inertia is more likely to develop in a cluster predominantly 
serving a local market. 
New economic geography - 
Population economics - 
Industrial District School SME’s have relatively good coordination skills. 
 
4.2.5 Feedback effects 
Apart from the effects of structure and governance on performance, feedback effects from 
performance to both structure and governance exist. For example, a bad performance 
changes the structure of a cluster because firms leave the cluster population. Furthermore, a 
bad performance can lead to changes in cluster governance, because a ‘sense of crisis’ 
develops and governance mechanisms are changed. We acknowledge these effects, but do 
not study them in the cases.  
4.2.6 The environment 
Cluster structure and cluster governance variables are incorporated in the framework. Both 
types of variables are cluster specific: they have to be analyzed at the cluster level. The 
performance of clusters is also affected by changes in the ‘environment’ of a cluster. For 
instance, the development of a new solar technology might deeply affect the development of 
a chemical cluster. Five important effects from changes in the ‘environment’ on the 
performance of a cluster can be distinguished:  
• The nation effect 
• The industry effect 
• The policy effect 
• The resource effect 
• The technology effect 
'Nation specific variables’ lead to a ‘nation effect’, on the performance of clusters. Relevant 
nation specific variables include the judicial structure (North and Douglas, 1990), national 
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culture (Fukuyama, 1996) and the overall national economic development. Second, ‘industry 
effects’ affect the performance of a cluster. In general clusters in growing industries perform 
better than clusters in mature industries. An information technology cluster is more likely to 
grow rapidly than an agricultural cluster, regardless of the performance relative to other 
clusters, simply because the growth of the industry. Another example of an  ‘industry effect’ 
is changes in consumer behavior in an industry. 
The ‘policy environment’ also influences the performance of a cluster. Non-cluster specific 
local and national (public) policies affect the development of a cluster. A fourth effect is the 
‘resource effect’. Changes in availability and prices of resources (such as labor and physical 
resources) also affect the development of a cluster. The ‘technology effect’ finally, is relevant 
when a technological breakthrough impacts the performance of a cluster. An example is the 
development of ‘mini-mills’ that reduce the minimum efficient scale, for instance for 
producing steel. 
These effects are relevant for the performance of clusters, but the focus of this study is on 
the influence of the cluster specific variables on the performance of clusters15. In the case 
studies, the existence of the ‘environment effects’ is acknowledged and explored, but the 
focus is the same. In the next two chapters, these variables are discussed in detail.  
                                          
15 A practical justification of this choice is that actors in the cluster can influence the cluster specific 
variables, but this is much more problematic for the other effects. 
 
 5 CLUSTER STRUCTURE 
In this chapter we discuss the influence of four variables related to the structure of a cluster 
on the performance of a cluster. The importance of the variables is not discussed, since this 
is cluster specific. Figure 8 shows the four cluster structure variables, derived from the four 
schools discussed in the preceding chapter (see Table 5 in chapter 4). 
Figure 8: Four variables related to the cluster structure 
Cluster structure
Agglomeration effects
Internal competition 
Cluster barriers
Heterogeneity
Cluster 
performance
Cluster 
governance
 
5.1 Agglomeration economies 
The study of agglomeration economies started with Marshall who argued that the existence 
of ‘external economies’ leads to the concentration of activities. Marshall defines external 
economies as ‘economies arising from an increase in the scale of production, dependent on 
the general development of the industry’ (Marshall, 1890 p. 266). Marshall further argues 
that ‘external economies can often be secured by the concentration of many small 
businesses of a similar character in particular localities’ (Marshall, 1890 p. 266).  
The term ‘agglomeration economies’ (see Asheim, 1994) is used for all external economies 
that foster geographical concentration. A widely accepted distinction divides agglomeration 
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economies in ‘localization economies’, for specific industries and ‘urbanization economies’, 
forces towards the concentration of economic activities in cities. Examples of urbanization 
economies include the presence of business services and a large (consumer) market.  
For clusters, the localization economies are more relevant, since clusters are concentrations 
of activities with a distinctive economic specialization. However, since the distinction 
between localization economies and urbanization economies is not crystal clear, we stick to 
the term agglomeration economies. In line with Krugman (1995), we discuss three 
‘Marshallian’ agglomeration economies.  
A first agglomeration economy already discussed by Marshall is a shared labor market. In a 
geographical cluster, labor is widely available because of the presence of a variety of firms 
with a similar labor demand. Marshall terms this a ‘constant market for skill’ (Marshall, 1890, 
p. 271). Skilled workers are attracted to the cluster and clusters also provide a sufficiently 
large scale for providing specific types of education and training. Because of the ‘constant 
market for skill’, it is relatively attractive for workers to invest in specific training and 
education. Search costs to find qualified labor are relatively low, because of the large labor 
pool. Intermediaries that specialize in recruiting labor arise in many cases. 
A final relevant aspect is the costs of firing labor. Since alternative employment opportunities 
inside a cluster are relatively high, employees are in general less dependent on one 
particular employer and therefore firing costs in general are likely to be relatively low. In 
clusters, job mobility is generally speaking high (see Panniccia, 1999 and for the case of 
Silicon Valley, Saxenian, 1994). 
The second agglomeration economy is the presence of customers and suppliers within a 
cluster. Locating in a cluster is attractive for firms ‘downstream’ in the value chain, when 
other firms in the cluster can provide specialized inputs. For firms ‘upstream’ in the value 
chain, the presence of (potential) customers is attractive. The presence of suppliers and 
customers is an advantage since ‘trade costs’ are higher for transactions with firms outside 
the cluster. Furthermore, a concentration of similar firms allows for specialization of firms in 
the cluster. Specialization enhances the performance of a cluster since firms in the cluster 
are offered better, tailor-made products and services.  
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The third agglomeration economy is termed ‘knowledge spillovers’ (see Marshall, 1890, p. 
271 and Krugman, 1995)16. Knowledge and information is cheaper and earlier available 
inside clusters than outside, because it flows more easily locally. This factor has been widely 
discussed and has become popular among regional policy makers.  
Empirical research has demonstrated the positive effect of clustering on innovation (see 
Baptista and Swann, 2000, Audretsch and Feldman, 1996 and Nooteboom, 1999) and the 
positive effect of clustering on knowledge diffusion (Baptista, 2000). Audretsch and Feldman 
(1996, p. 637) empirically prove that ‘industries where new economic knowledge tends to 
play a more important role have a higher propensity to cluster together’. This demonstrates 
that knowledge spillovers are an agglomeration economy17.  
Apart from the agglomeration economies, ‘dispersion forces’ exist. Without these forces all 
activities would be concentrated in one place. Two dispersion forces are widely 
acknowledged: land scarcity and congestion (see Fujita and Thisse, 1996). Agglomeration 
forces foster concentration. Since space is limited, land in clusters becomes scarce. This 
leads to high land prices. Such high land prices in a cluster decrease the attractiveness of 
locating in a cluster. High land prices - even though they reflect the strength of 
agglomeration economies - are a dispersion force.  
Congestion is a second dispersion force. In general, clusters need investments in transport 
infrastructure. Given the scarcity of land and concentration of economic activities, 
congestion is likely to develop. This decreases the attractiveness of a cluster, compared to 
locations without congestion. Table 6 shows the above-mentioned three agglomeration 
economies and two dispersion forces. 
                                          
16  The argument that proximity influences the diffusion of knowledge does not really fit in 
Krugman’s neo-classical framework, because this is hard to reconcile with arguing that distance 
influences the diffusion of innovations, since ‘transport costs’ are irrelevant for the diffusion of 
ideas, information and knowledge. The importance of proximity is thus at odds with the 
assumptions of rational actors and perfect information. 
17  Even though these spillovers are beneficial for the cluster, they are not necessarily beneficial for 
firms in the cluster. In many cases, firms would rather control and limit the spillover of their 
knowledge. In clusters this is difficult because information is ‘in the air’. 
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Table 6: Agglomeration and dispersion forces  
Agglomeration forces Dispersion forces 
Labor pool Land rent 
Suppliers Congestion  
Knowledge spillovers  
Source: based on Fujita et al, 1999, p. 346 
 
The presence and importance of the three agglomeration economies enhance the 
performance of a cluster. Such economies increase the attractiveness of locating in a 
cluster. The presence and importance of dispersion forces in a cluster reduces cluster 
performance. The balance between these two opposing forces changes over time. When the 
importance of agglomeration forces increases, the performance of a cluster improves, a 
growing effect of the dispersion forces reduces the performance of a cluster18. 
The strength of these forces differs between clusters and changes over time. For instance, 
land scarcity depends on expansion projects and congestion depends on initiatives to 
improve the transport infrastructure.  
5.2 Internal competition   
Competition fosters efficiency and is an important engine for growth and change19. With 
regard to clusters, the distinction between internal competition (competition between firms 
located in the same cluster) and external competition (competition between a firm in the 
cluster with other firms outside the cluster) is relevant. Porter has strongly emphasized the 
                                          
18  The balance between these forces is partially caused by developments in the environment of 
the clusters. We do not take these effects into account, since these are not cluster specific but 
‘industry specific’ (for instance changes in the minimum efficient size of production) or the result 
from changing policies (such as international trade regulations (see Krugman, 1995) or 
changing trade costs (including transport costs). These effects are not caused by the cluster 
structure, but by the cluster environment. 
19  Competition and cooperation can co-exist in a cluster. Competition in clusters is discussed in 
this section, cooperation in a cluster in the next chapter.  
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effect of internal competition ‘Among the strongest empirical findings from our research is 
the association between vigorous domestic20 rivalry and the creation and persistence in an 
industry’ (Porter, 1990, p. 117). Porter’s argument is that internal competition leads to 
dynamism in the cluster:  
The nature of economic competition is not ‘equilibrium’ but a perpetual state of 
change. Improvement and innovation in an industry are never ending processes 
(…). Today’s advantages are soon superseded or nullified. At the core of 
explaining national advantage in an industry must be the role of the home nation 
in stimulation competitive improvement and innovation (Porter, 1990, p. 70). 
Porter bases this conclusion on a variety of case studies, but does not provide quantitative 
empirical results. He focuses on the effects of internal competition on innovation. We 
develop three arguments for the positive effects of internal competition on cluster 
performance, one of which is Porter’s ‘vibrant environment argument’.  
The first argument for the positive effect of internal competition is that internal competition 
lowers ‘switching costs’ for customers. Internal competition allows firms to shift to an 
alternative supplier in the same cluster. In general, these switching costs are lower than 
switching costs to a supplier outside the cluster, because of higher transaction costs. The 
importance of switching costs varies between industries. Relatively high switching costs give 
firms in the cluster the opportunity to appropriate ‘economic rents’, by charging higher 
prices. This threat by itself reduces the attractiveness of a cluster for potential customers.  
Second, internal competition fosters specialization (see Baptista, 2000 p. 516). Internal 
competition is competition on a perfect level playing field (or to put it differently: cost curves 
are similar). Competitors face the same regulation, have the same labor market conditions, 
the same trade costs and the same supplier base. In such a competitive environment 
specialization of products and services is more likely to develop than when competitors 
operate in a different environment, because specialization reduces competition and 
                                          
20  Porter generally speaks about domestic rivalry and the home nation because he does not pay 
attention to the issue of delimiting the relevant cluster region. This is not problematic for small 
countries but it is problematic for large countries. In such countries, competition between firms 
in different locations cannot be termed internal competition.  
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therefore can lead to a higher profitability21. This argument can be related to the work of 
Hotelling (1929) who argues that competition between services provided at different 
locations is by nature ‘oligopolistic’ because of the importance of transport costs. The 
location itself is a ‘source’ of specialization.  
Differentiation and specialization enhance the performance of the cluster as a whole 
because in a cluster with internal competition customers can purchase products and 
services that match their specific demand.   
Third, internal competition enhances cluster performance because it provides a firm with a 
‘vibrant environment’ (see Porter, 1990). Porter argues that: 
‘Pride drives managers and workers to be highly sensitive to other companies 
(…). Domestic rivals fight not only for market share but for people, technical 
breakthroughs and, more generally, ‘bragging rights’ (Porter, 1990, p. 119).  
Porter claims that internal competition has a positive effect on the performance of firms 
because domestic rivalry is highly visible and ‘in the air’ (see also Marshall, 1890). As a 
consequence, it fosters innovation. Therefore, the presence of a vibrant environment adds to 
the performance of a cluster22. 
For these three reasons internal competition contributes to the performance of a cluster. 
Internal competition is likely to arise as a result of market forces in most cases. Two special 
conditions can prevent internal competition. First, a small market size relative to the minimal 
efficient scale (MES) can prevent internal competition. Internal competition can only exist in 
clusters with a large market size relative to the MES. Second, regulations can prevent 
internal competition, for instance because the right to provide services is tendered to one 
firm.   
                                          
21  Porter (1990), stresses the effect of local competition on internationalization. This is explained 
by the drive to create economies of scale, when the domestic market is not sufficiently large. 
Expansion helps in this case to increase competitiveness locally.  
22  Some scholars have argued that fierce internal competition leads to shared mental maps (see 
Pouder and St. John, 1996). This is not a convincing argument. Shared mental maps can 
perhaps result from dense local interaction, not from fierce internal competition. Instead, 
competition generally leads to specialization and the development of distinctive capabilities. 
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The presence of internal competition in a cluster can be analyzed with the concentration 
ratio. An analysis of the MES, the regulatory regime and the level of switching costs 
provides insight in the effects of the absence of internal competition and opportunities to 
increase internal competition. 
5.3 Cluster barriers 
With the term ‘cluster barriers’ we mean barriers to enter or exit the cluster, or to start a new 
venture in a cluster. Thus, cluster barriers differ from ‘industry barriers’. The barriers to shift 
from one industry to another are in general higher than the barriers to shift from one cluster 
to another (while staying in the industry). Cluster barriers are location specific barriers for 
firms that ‘intrinsically’ want to leave, or enter the cluster or start-up in the cluster, but face 
cluster specific barriers that complicate entry or exit23. 
The effects of entry, start-up and exit barriers on economic performance are widely 
acknowledged (see Geroski, 1995). Specifically for clusters, Staber (1996) argues that start-
ups and bankruptcies reflect dynamism and that dynamism improves the performance of a 
cluster. Entry and start up barriers reduce competitive pressure for firms in the cluster and 
prevent the inflow of (human and financial) capital and knowledge. Therefore, both entry and 
start-up barriers reduce performance.  
5.3.1 Entry barriers 
Entry barriers are defined here in a narrow sense, to separate them from start-up barriers. 
Entry barriers are barriers for firms outside a cluster that intend to establish activities in this 
cluster. Given this perspective, cultural entry barriers are relevant, because these influence 
the accessibility of local tacit knowledge and networks. When access to both resources is 
difficult, entry barriers are high, because ‘new’ firms need ‘local tacit knowledge’, for 
instance knowledge about public organizations, characteristics of local markets and the 
labor market.  
                                          
23  Economic entry barriers such as economies of scale and ‘image’ (Geroski, 1995) are not taken 
into account, since these simply make entry unattractive from an economic point of view. Legal 
entry barriers are not taken into account because these are in general not cluster specific. 
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Such tacit knowledge can be acquired by ‘learning by doing’, but this is costly. Alternatively, 
this tacit knowledge can be acquired through ‘learning by interaction’. This learning 
mechanism depends on the willingness of actors with local tacit knowledge to transfer this 
knowledge. This willingness differs between clusters. A low willingness to share local tacit 
knowledge can be regarded as a barrier to entry (see Silverberg, Dosi and Orsinigo, 1988). 
The access to networks depends on the legitimacy of entrants (Hannan and Carrol, 1992). 
Clusters with inaccessible networks have high entry barriers.  
Thus, clusters can range from ‘entry prone’ to ‘entry-adverse’. In entry prone clusters, 
cultural entry barriers are low (entrants have easy access to local tacit knowledge and 
networks). In entry adverse clusters, the cluster is ‘closed’ for outsiders and cultural entry 
barriers are substantial. 
5.3.2 Start up barriers 
With regard to start-up barriers, two barriers are widely recognized: administrative barriers 
and the availability of venture capital24 (Schenk, 1998). Administrative barriers are 
predominantly influenced by national legislation and therefore not taken into account. The 
availability of venture capital can differ between clusters, because of the presence of ‘local 
capital’ in clusters (Dei Ottate, 1994). Venture capital for start-ups (especially small ones) is 
to a large extent provided by ‘informal investors’ instead of banks or formal investment 
companies. The presence of such informal investors in a cluster lowers start-up barriers. 
5.3.3 Exit barriers 
For exit barriers the issue is more complex than for entry and start-up barriers (see Clarke 
and Wrighly, 1997). When applied to clusters, the term exit barriers might be misleading, this 
term is associated with barriers to leave a certain industry. Cluster exit barriers are barriers 
to move (leave the cluster). The term footloose is used to indicate the level of barriers to 
move. Examples of footloose firms include many service firms, such as consultants. Other 
                                          
24  The distinction between start-ups and ‘spin-offs’ is relevant in this respect. Spin-offs in general 
do not face the problems that start-ups face, because they benefit from the networks (and in 
some case financial support) of the firm that spins them off. The role of leader firms in creating 
dynamism by encouraging spin-offs is discussed in the next chapter.  
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firms are ‘sticky’ to their location: their spatial exit barriers are high. Factors that increase 
such stickiness to a location are the immobility of their labor force, the immobility of 
investments (such as plants) and the presence of a huge supplier and client base in a 
certain place. Thus, these factors are cluster exit barriers. 
One effect of the presence of high exit barriers is that they reduce uncertainty: firms with 
high exit barriers are unlikely to leave. The presence of firms strongly tied to the cluster 
increases the durability of cluster and reduces the uncertainty about the development of a 
cluster. For this reason, firms are more likely to make (further) cluster specific investments in 
clusters where considerable cluster specific investments have already been made. Thus, 
exit barriers increase the performance of a cluster.  
This argument does not imply that barriers for firms to invest outside the cluster would be 
beneficial for the cluster. There is a huge difference between investing elsewhere and 
ending business activities in the cluster. Investments outside the cluster, for instance to 
relocate activities to locations with a lower cost level, are in many cases beneficial for the 
cluster performance, because they increase the competitiveness of firms in the cluster. 
Three exit barriers can be identified. First ‘immobile assets’ (such as plants, buildings and 
specialized local knowledge) are exit barriers. Second, ‘sticky labor’ (see Markusen, 1996) is 
an exit barrier. Labor is not perfectly mobile. The ‘stickiness’ of labor varies between 
clusters. Entry barriers are high in clusters where labor is relatively sticky. Third, the 
presence of a strong local base of suppliers and clients is an exit barrier, because relocating 
outside the cluster implies that trade costs (including transport costs and transaction costs) 
with firms in the cluster will increase.  
5.4 Cluster heterogeneity  
The central argument in this section is that variety25 of firms in a cluster adds to 
performance. Arguments to substantiate the positive effects of variety on performance are 
discussed first, followed by a discussion of relevant dimensions of variety. We finalize with a 
brief discussion of the issue of resource variety. 
                                          
25  The terms heterogeneity, diversity and variety are used interchangably. 
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5.4.1 Firm variety and performance 
Firms are learning agents with different capabilities (see Nelson, 1994). ‘Firms - even within 
the same industry - differ in terms of their propensities to commit resources to innovation’ 
(Dosi and Marengo, 1994, p. 158). Faced with large amounts of information, and high costs 
of processing information, economic agents do not use all potentially available information, 
but operate on the basis of ‘taken for granted rules’ and routines. Firms are not only 
boundedly rational, but also have a selective rationality (Simon et al 1992). Choices about 
what information is relevant and what not are based on past search and processing 
procedures. Paquet (1998) terms this a ‘reference framework’. Such frameworks ‘filter’ 
information, and influence the interpretation of information. Thus, capabilities are grounded 
on firm specific cognitive frames. In general, a fit exists between cognitive frames, 
capabilities and market environments. However, since a firm’s logic is deeply embedded in 
routines and human capital, firms cannot smoothly change from one frame to another and 
consequently cannot change from one set of capabilities to another.  
Value chains (or production networks) consist of actors with different capabilities. Business 
units specialize in different activities that require different capabilities and related cognitive 
frames. As a consequence of specialization, a ‘cognitive division of labor’ arises: value 
chains consist of networks of firms with different capabilities and related cognitive frames26. 
Bellussi and Gottardi argue that ‘the cognitive division of labor operates on a system level 
within each industrial structure [and is thus] an interfirm division of labor27 (Bellussi and 
Gottardi, 1999, p.14).  
Thus, the cluster population can be regard as a collection of capabilities and related 
cognitive frames. In this perspective, three arguments substantiate the positive effect of 
                                          
26  The ‘cognitive division of labor’ can be explained with arguments derived from transaction cost 
economics: costs of coordinating activities with different cognitive frames inside a firm are 
relatively high, compared to market coordination. 
27  The cognitive division of labor is related to the concept of cognitive distance (Nooteboom, 
1992). A high cognitive distance potentially yields much novelty, but the transferability is low, 
precisely because cognitive distance is high. A low cognitive distance leads to a high 
transferability but yields little novel information. This concept can be used to explain why a 
cognitive division of labor arises.  
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variety in a cluster.  First, diversity of capabilities enhances the opportunities for cooperation 
in the cluster. A diverse cluster is a ‘fertile’ environment for new alliances. In a relatively 
homogeneous cluster, firms are more likely to develop alliances with actors outside the 
cluster and such external linkages do not (or to a lesser extent) generate positive effects for 
firms in the cluster.  
Second, clusters with a diverse population are less vulnerable for external shocks. Changes 
(technological, managerial, or social) affect some firms negatively, while others benefit from 
changes. Such winners do not necessarily have superior strategies and capabilities, but can 
also incidentally be well positioned to react to changes. The likeliness of the presence of 
‘winners’ is larger in a diverse cluster. This argument for the positive effect of variety on 
performance is termed ‘Fisher’s Principle’ by (some) evolutionary economists (see Metcalfe, 
1994, p. 64).  
A third argument for the positive effect of variety on performance is that diversity enhances 
opportunities for innovation. Diversity is an important source of ‘Schumpeterian new 
combinations’ (Nelson, 1994). More diversity leads to a more diverse information and 
knowledge base, which promotes innovation.   
Even though the importance of diversity is widely shared, the issue of measuring diversity 
and its effects on performance has hardly been addressed. With regard to clusters, studies 
of the importance of heterogeneity are lacking: 
As research on industrial districts enters a more mature phase, exploring the 
internal heterogeneity further seems a critical next step (Rabellotti and Schmitz, 
1999, p. 106).  
5.4.2 Dimensions of firm heterogeneity 
Firm heterogeneity can be measured on a large number of dimensions. Three relatively 
unambiguous firm dimensions that can in be analyzed relatively easy are ‘economic activity’ 
‘size’ and ‘international scope’.  
The presence of firms engaging in different activities makes a cluster less vulnerable for 
external shocks, and provides a fertile environment for ‘new combinations’ and cooperation. 
The three arguments discussed above also apply to diversity of size. Large and small firms 
are in general complementary. Small firms are more flexible and co-operate relatively 
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frequently in networks, whereas large firms possess the scale to engage in ‘fundamental 
R&D’. This provides a good basis for cooperation and joint innovation projects.  
International scope is relevant for the three above-mentioned reasons as well. Variety of 
international scope leads to a higher information inflow because information and knowledge 
diffuses faster within firms than across markets. Therefore the presence of business units in 
a cluster with establishments (for instance a parent company) outside the cluster enhances 
the likeliness of relatively early adoption of innovations. Variety of international scope also 
increases the likeliness of the ‘export’ of innovations that were successfully applied in the 
cluster (Albino et al, 1999). The reaction to external shocks also differs between firms with a 
different ‘international scope’. 
5.4.3 Resource variety28 
Porter (1990) argues that variety of resources adds to cluster performance, because a 
variety of resources reduce the vulnerability to external shocks. A cluster chiefly dependent 
on one resource is likely to be strongly affected when either the importance of that resource 
reduces or the availability (in terms of price/quality) deteriorates. A mining cluster is an 
example of a cluster with a small resource base. Resources of which the availability can 
differ between clusters include knowledge and information, labor and raw materials.  
5.5 Conclusions 
In this chapter four variables of cluster performance, related to the structure of a cluster 
were discussed. The effects of the variables were analyzed, predominantly based on 
existing literature. Some additional or more precise arguments were developed, in order to 
understand better how the structure of a cluster influences cluster performance. Table 7 
summarizes the effects of cluster structure on cluster performance that were identified in this 
chapter. These will be tested in the empirical part.   
 
                                          
28  Resource variety is not incorporated in the theoretical framework, since it is not really cluster 
specific. 
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Table 7: The effects of cluster structure on cluster performance 
Element of cluster structure Effect on cluster performance. 
A shared labor pool attracts firms to the cluster. 
The presence of customers and suppliers attracts firms to the cluster. 
The presence of knowledge (spillovers) attracts firms to the cluster. 
Land scarcity and high land prices ‘disperse’ firms from the cluster. 
Agglomeration economies 
Congestion disperses firms from the cluster. 
Internal competition prevents monopoly pricing. 
Internal competition leads to specialization. 
Internal competition 
Internal competition promotes innovation. 
Entry barriers (such as inaccessible networks) and start-up barriers (such as 
non-availability of local venture capital) reduce competitive pressure and 
prevent the inflow of (human) capital. 
Cluster barriers 
Exit barriers (such as  ‘sticky labor’ and cluster specific investments) reduce 
uncertainty for firms in the cluster.  
Cluster heterogeneity enhances opportunities for innovation. 
Cluster heterogeneity enhances opportunities for cooperation. 
Cluster heterogeneity 
Cluster heterogeneity reduces vulnerability for external shocks. 
 

 6 CLUSTER GOVERNANCE 
In this chapter the influence of cluster governance on the performance of clusters is 
discussed. We define cluster governance as the coordination of activities in a cluster29. 
Clusters are characterized by frequent interaction and coordination. Different coordination 
mechanisms are used, market coordination included. Based on a literature review, four 
variables related to the governance of clusters are distinguished (see Figure 9). 
Figure 9: Four governance variables 
Cluster 
structure
Cluster 
performance
Cluster governance
Presence of intermediaries
Level of trust 
Embedded leader firms
Solutions to collective 
action problems
 
 
A framework to analyze coordination in a cluster is developed in the first paragraph. The four 
variables are discussed in the following four paragraphs and a concluding section finalizes 
the chapter. 
                                          
29  Jessop (1997, p. 95) defines governance as ‘collaborative interaction between stakeholders’. 
Our definition is more ‘Williamsonian’: starting from an analysis of the roles of different 
mechanisms of ‘collaborative interaction’. Issues such as the risks of ‘hold-up’ and ‘hostages’ 
(Nooteboom, 1999A) are not discussed.  
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6.1 Coordination in a cluster 
The need for coordination in clusters is undisputed amongst cluster scholars (see Harrison, 
1994). Cluster scholars frequently regard clusters as special solutions to a coordination 
problem. In this stream of literature (the flexible specialization literature, see Piore and 
Sabel, 1984) clusters are regarded as networks of (small) firms that cooperate based on 
trust and cooperation. This ‘mode of production’ is an alternative to production by large 
conglomerates. Other scholars question this particular definition of clusters (Markusen, 
1996) but acknowledge the importance of coordination in a cluster. 
Different modes of coordination (or to use the terminology of Williamson: modes of 
governance) can play a role in clusters (see Hollingsworth et al, 1994). We distinguish six 
general modes of coordination (see Campbell et al, 1991, Hollingsworth and Boyer30, 1997, 
and Williamson, 1985): markets, firms, interfirm alliances, associations, public-private 
organizations and public organizations31. 
None of the different modes of coordination is ‘structurally superior’, each mode has 
advantages and disadvantages. Consequently, different modes of coordination are used in a 
specific domain32, to solve different coordination problems. In Table 8, an overview is given 
of different modes of governance, their advantages, disadvantages and ‘domain’.  
                                          
30  Hollingsworth and Boyer (1997) identify six modes of governance, five of which (firms, markets, 
interfirm alliances, associations and public organizations) are included in this study. Public-
private organizations are added and ‘communities’ are omitted, because communities are not 
designed to coordinate specific activities.   
31  Campbell et al (1991) argue that government has such special abilities (such as changing 
property rights, allocating resources and serving as gatekeepers) that it cannot be analyzed as 
merely an alternative governance mechanism. Hollingsworth and Lindberg (1985) and 
Hollingsworth and Boyer (1997) do analyze the state as a governance mechanism. We include 
public organizations in the analysis of governance when they provide public services (such as 
education). The legislative role of the government is not included in the analysis. 
32  This is a ‘Williamsonian approach’, because each mode of governance has a ‘structural 
domain’, based on its advantages and disadvantages. However, this does not imply that all 
modes of governance develop automatically in their ‘structural domain’. Thus, this framework is 
not sufficient to analyze governance regimes in full detail, but a useful starting point. 
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Table 8: Characteristics of modes of governance 
Governance 
modes 
Advantages Disadvantages Domain Capable of 
solving 
collective action 
problem 
Mechanisms of  
pressure 
Firms Smooth 
coordination 
 
Limited set of 
capabilities, 
limited flexibility 
Coordination of 
strongly related 
economic 
activities 
Not suitable  Market 
competition 
Shareholders/ 
stakeholders 
Market Flexibility and 
selection 
pressure 
 
Coordination 
beyond price is 
difficult 
Exchange of 
alternatively 
available 
products 
Not suitable33 Market 
competition 
(exit) 
Inter-firm 
alliances34 
Relatively 
effective  
coordination  
Reduced 
flexibility 
Coordination of 
complementary 
activities that 
require different 
capabilities 
Only suitable 
for small groups 
of firms35.  
Market 
competition 
Association Pursuing 
collective 
goals 
Free rider 
behavior 
Pursuing 
collective goals 
Suitable, but 
problem of 
incentives 
Voice of 
members 
 
Public/private 
organization 
Combination 
of public and 
private 
competencies 
Limited 
selection 
pressure, 
limited 
accountability 
Projects in the 
public interests 
that require 
private 
involvement  
Suitable, but 
risk of 
opportunism 
 
Private and 
public voice  
 
Public 
organization 
Capable of 
acting in the 
‘public 
interest’ 
No clear 
incentives, no 
selection 
pressure 
Pursuing public 
interests 
Suitable, but 
information 
problems and 
lack of 
incentives 
Public 
monitoring 
 
 
Table 8 also shows whether or not the six governance modes are capable of solving a 
collective action problem (this issue is discussed in more detail later) and under what 
conditions the coordination modes adapt (or are adapted). 
                                          
33  Contracts to solve a collective action problem are very costly to specify and monitor. 
34  The term interfirm alliance is used instead of the term networks. Interfirm alliances are more 
narrowly defined (Nooteboom, 1999A). 
35  Interfirm alliances are ‘exclusive partnerships’ with a limited number of partners, and thus not 
suitable for solving collective action problems for the cluster as a whole. 
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Various case studies of clusters (such as Mistri, 1999) suggest that the quality of 
governance in a cluster (quality so defined that a higher quality leads to a better 
performance of the cluster) can differ between clusters. However, no satisfactory framework 
to analyze the quality of coordination in a cluster has been proposed. Based on a 
comprehensive literature review, we develop the framework to analyze the quality of cluster 
governance given in Figure 10.  
Figure 10: The quality of coordination in a cluster 
Trust Leader firms
Inter-
mediaries
Collective
action regimes
Sub-variables
-Infrastructure for collective action
-Role public organizations
-Community argument
-Voice
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Low coordination
costs
Scope of coordination
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Quality of
cluster governance
 
  
Two factors determine the quality of governance. First, the level of coordination costs, or 
transaction cost. These costs include the costs of searching for partners, the costs of 
specifying contracts, the costs of ‘monitoring’ performance, and the ‘pure’ interaction costs 
such as time and travel expenses (Williamson, 1985). Clusters do not ‘by nature’ have low 
transaction costs, but it is frequently claimed that transaction costs in clusters can be 
relatively low (Albertini, 1999).  
Second, the quality of coordination in a cluster depends on the ‘scope’ of ‘coordination 
beyond price’.  Examples of coordination beyond price include setting of standards, 
investing in the labor pool, cooperation in innovation projects and information sharing. For at 
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least three reasons, coordination beyond price (in this section coordination is used for 
coordination beyond price) does not develop ‘spontaneously’ even when the overall benefits 
of coordination are higher than the overall costs (Olson, 1971). First, an unequal distribution 
of benefits can prevent coordination. If one or a few firms are worse off they will obstruct 
efforts to increase the scope of coordination. Second, opportunistic behavior, such as ‘free 
riders’ can obstruct coordination (Olson, 1971). Third, uncertain benefits prevent 
coordination, because firms are risk-averse when confronted with uncertainty.  
These three reasons explain why the scope of coordination in clusters is generally speaking 
too limited, assuming that collusion is prevented by regulation36. The performance of 
clusters where firms manage to enlarge the scope of coordination will increase. Figure 10 
shows four variables that both reduce the level of coordination costs and enlarge the scope 
of coordination beyond price. The four variables are discussed in the following sections. 
6.2 Trust 
The level of trust influences the level of transaction costs. In clusters where the level of trust 
is high, (average) transaction costs are relatively low, because of low costs to specify 
contracts and low monitoring costs37. Many cluster studies argue that clusters are ‘high trust 
environments’ and that this contributes to the performance of clusters (see Harrison, 1994). 
Williamson (1993) claims that ‘blind trust’, in the sense of non-rational trust, is not likely to 
survive and that therefore the notion of trust is not relevant for transaction cost economics. 
Nooteboom (2000) rejects this argument by claiming that trust can be based on experience, 
                                          
36  The question whether the scope of coordination can be too large perhaps deserves more 
attention. We acknowledge that cooperative arrangements can become obsolete and reduce 
rather than increase the performance of a cluster. Such arrangements can be hard to dismantle, 
because of vested interests and routines developed over time. However, this does not imply the 
scope of coordination is too high, it shows cooperation is not effective, or in other words, 
cooperation costs are too high.  
37  An additional positive effect of trust is that specific investments are viable when partners trust 
each other but not viable when the risk of opportunistic behavior is high. Thus, specific 
investments for partners are more likely to occur in ‘high trust clusters’.  
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and changes through learning. Therefore trust does not have to be blind but whether it is 
rational or not to trust potential exchange partners depends on the (cluster) environment.  
In cluster where the level of trust is high, the scope of coordination beyond price is larger 
than in ‘low-trust clusters’, because uncertainty is reduced and the threat of opportunistic 
behavior is lower.  
The level of trust in a cluster is influenced by the importance of reputation effects in a 
cluster. If reputation effects are strong, abusing trust has negative effects and therefore it is 
worthwhile for firms to build a trustworthy reputation. Because of this, the culture of trust is 
sustainable. This reputation effect has both an economic and a social aspect: firms strive for 
a good reputation because it yields positive returns, managers strive for a good reputation 
because it yields personal career opportunities.  
Thus, in clusters where the reputation effect is strong, the likeliness that one can trust a 
potential exchange partner, even when such a partner has an opportunity and an incentive 
to damage one’s interests (this is Nooteboom’s (1996) definition of intentional trust) is high. 
In such ‘high trust clusters’, transaction costs are relatively low. 
6.3 Intermediaries 
The presence or absence of intermediaries also influences the quality of coordination in the 
cluster. Intermediaries reduce coordination costs and expand the ‘scope of coordination 
beyond price’. Three reasons substantiate the positive effect of intermediaries38. First, they 
provide a ‘bridging tie’ (McEvily and Zaheer, 1999) between two or more otherwise not 
connected exchange partners. Intermediaries lower search costs for firms looking for 
exchange partners, and literally ‘bridge’ gaps between potential exchange partners. Second, 
intermediaries reduce coordination costs because they ‘connect cognitions’. Firms operate 
in specific markets and develop both capabilities and a cognition matching their market 
environment. Intermediaries reduce transaction costs because they can bridge cognitive 
differences between firms that operate in very different market environments. This role of 
connecting cognitions is especially important in clusters given the fact that clusters are 
characterized by a ‘cognitive division of labor’ (Belussi and Gottardi, 2000).  
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Third, intermediaries can reduce cooperation costs by managing cooperative projects. 
Especially when cooperation is temporal, intermediaries are used to reduce coordination 
costs. Intermediaries reduce the costs of starting and disentangling relationships 
(Nooteboom 1999A), for instance because of their skills and experience in devising complex 
contracts.  
The above-mentioned reasons are the ‘raison d’etre’ of intermediaries in the first place. They 
arise when there is a market for their services. However, intermediaries are relatively 
footloose, and a large part of them operate internationally. The presence of an intermediary 
in a cluster is advantageous because the costs are lower and they are better situated to act 
as a bridging tie.   
6.4 Leader firms 
Lorenzoni and Badenfuller (1995, p. 147) define leader firms as ‘strategic centers with 
superior co-ordination skills and the ability to steer change’. We define leader firms as 
follows:  
Leader firms are firms that have - due to their size, market position, knowledge 
and entrepreneurial skills - the ability and incentive to make investments with 
positive externalities for other firms in the cluster.  
A distinction can be made between network externalities (Economides, 1996) and cluster 
externalities. Cluster externalities spread to all firms in the cluster, network externalities 
spread only to firms included in a relatively closed interfirm network39. Leader firms have 
such a strong market position that they have incentives to create positive external effects40 
for other firms in the network/cluster, because a large part of the benefits of a more 
                                                                                                                                                    
38  See Nooteboom (1999A) for a discussion of the roles of intermediaries.  
39  Clusters consist of large numbers of firms, both complementary and competing, both with actual 
interfirm relations and with potential relations. Thus, cluster externalities are more general than 
network externalities. 
40  It can be argued that in these cases, the positive effects are not truly externalities. However, 
firms in the network/cluster benefit and only a part of those benefits are channeled back on to 
the leader firm. The positive effects are at least partially external effects. 
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competitive network/cluster end up ‘in their pockets’.  It is important to note that there is no 
‘mechanic’ relationship between firm size and leader firm behavior. Small firms can also 
behave as leader firms and multinationals are not necessarily embedded in clusters. Leader 
firm behavior also strongly depends on the location of the head office and management 
philosophy of the CEO.  
Leader firms have incentives to enlarge the scope of coordination beyond price and to 
reduce coordination costs. Investments of (leader) firms with substantial network 
externalities include investments in innovation and internationalization. The benefits of both 
innovation and internationalization spread to all ‘members’ of the network. Albino et al 
(1999) stress the importance of a leader firm for the development of other firms in the 
cluster. Leader firms can be enablers for the internationalization of other firms in the 
clusters. On the basis of ‘many cases’, they argue that ‘leader firm internationalization can 
be considered the main impulse for district internationalization’ (Albino et al 1999, p. 57). 
Leader firms act as ‘launching customers’ for the internationalization of their suppliers or sell 
products from the cluster in foreign markets.  
Three investments with substantial cluster externalities are identified: investments in training 
and education, knowledge and information infrastructure, and an infrastructure for collective 
action. Leader firms have incentives to enlarge the scope of coordination beyond price so 
that these investments take place. Table 9 shows four important leader firm effects. 
Table 9: Leader firm effects on clusters 
Most important effects of leader firm behavior 
Leader firms invest to improve coordination of innovation networks. 
Leader firms coordinate internationalization of firms in the cluster 
Leader firms co-invest to improve the infrastructure for training, education and knowledge exchange  
Leader firms invest to improve the organizational infrastructure in the cluster  
 
Table 9 shows that when firms in a cluster behave as leader firms, the cluster as a whole 
benefits. The extent to which potential leader firms actually behave as leader firms differs 
between clusters. Thus, the presence of ‘true’ leader firms adds to the quality of governance 
in clusters. 
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6.5 Collective action regimes 
6.5.1 The problem of collective action 
The ‘problem’ of collective action (Olson, 1971) is relevant for all clusters. Even though 
cooperation to achieve common goals (such as marketing and education) would be 
beneficial for all organizations involved, such cooperation does not always develop 
spontaneously. Individual firms can ‘free-ride’ on the cooperative efforts of other firms. Thus, 
collective action does not arise. The performance of clusters where collective action 
develops - collective action problems are solved - is better than that of clusters where 
collective action problems are not solved. 
In clusters, a number of collective action problems (CAP’s) is present. For each specific 
CAP a ‘collective action regime’ (CAR) arises (see Mossberger and Stoker, 2001)41. In this 
context, a regime can be defined as a ‘relatively stable collaborative agreement that 
provides actors with the capacity to overcome collective action problems’ (see Mossberger 
and Stoker, 2001, for a similar definition).  
CAR’s are not by definition ‘efficient’ and do not automatically adapt. Inefficient collective 
action regimes reduce the performance of a cluster, but there is no process of ‘selection and 
adaptation’ that leads to the survival of effective regimes only. A regime is path dependent 
and relatively stable over time42, because first, energy and capital have been invested in a 
regime and these investments are ‘sunk costs’ that prevent adaptations of a regime (see 
Westlund, 1999) and second, a regime defines the ‘rules of the game’ and becomes taken 
for granted. Consequently, collective action regimes differ substantially between countries, 
                                          
41  Even though governance regimes differ, a dominant governance style exists at a cluster level 
(see Campbell et al, 1991). With a ‘bottom-up approach’ similarities of the different regimes in a 
cluster will become clear, while such an approach allows for taking into account the possibly 
large differences between different regimes.  
42  Campbell et al (1991) argue that ‘When actors have already established associations (…) and 
thus the capacity for selecting far sighted cooperative strategies, they can more easily devise 
new multilateral governance mechanisms than actors from a sector where shortsighted bilateral 
mechanisms dominate the governance regime’ (Campbell et al 1991, p. 331). This illustrates 
the path-dependence of regimes  
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industries and clusters (see Hollingsworth et al, 1994). Hollingsworth et al (1994) even argue 
that differences in regimes are central in the competition between clusters: ‘economic 
competition is increasingly becoming competition over different systems of production’  
(Hollingsworth et al 1994, p. 38).  
6.5.2 The roles of modes of governance in collective action regimes 
Collective action arises when a large number of firms in a cluster cooperate. Consequently 
the role of markets, individual firms and interfirm alliances in CAR’s is limited (see also Table 
8). Associations, public private partnerships and public organizations are governance modes 
better equipped to solve collective action problems.  
Associations act in the interests of their members. Associations are ‘vehicles’ for collective 
action. The ‘domain’ of associations is the provision of collective goods, goods with benefits 
of which firms cannot be excluded, that are specific for the members of an association43. An 
example of a collective good is interest representation and cluster marketing. Associations 
can only play a role when their membership base is sufficiently large. If the membership 
base is low (because many firms ‘free ride’) an association loses legitimacy and costs for 
(remaining) members go up. 
Set up costs for associations are high, because members have to invest substantially in time 
and capital to establish an association. In general, the free-rider problem prevents the 
spontaneous development of associations, unless groups are small, even though collective 
action would be in the interest of all actors involved. Since in small groups the collective 
interest is more closely related to individual interests, associations of small groups are more 
likely to develop. Olson (1971) distinguishes three kinds of groups: privileged, mediate and 
latent groups: 
The small privileged group can expect that its collective needs will probably be 
met one way or another, and the fairly small (intermediate) group has a fair 
chance that voluntary action will solve its collective problems, but the large latent 
                                          
43  Public goods such as safety are in the domain of public bodies (see Streeck and Schnitter 
[eds.], 1985). 
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group cannot act in accordance with its collective interests so long as members of 
the group are free to further their individual interests (Olson, 1971, p. 58). 
In the ‘latent group’ the problem of free riding prevents the development of an association. 
Latent groups can become ‘mobilized’ when potential members have an incentive to 
become members. Offering sufficient individual incentives is crucial in ‘mobilizing’ latent 
groups (Olson, 1971), because individual incentives motivate firms to join an association 
and, as a side effect, firms also support the ‘production’ of collective goods. Providing 
complementary services is a method to create individual incentives for membership (Bennet, 
1998). Examples of complementary services are the inclusion in networks, the accessibility 
of information (Sako, 1996), entrance to training and education programs (Rusaw, 1995) 
and benefits from collective bargaining agreements with suppliers. 
Apart from the individual incentive motive, ‘sense of community’ triggers firms to join an 
association44. 
Membership of a local Chamber appears to depend on two different ways in 
which businesses evaluate this cost benefit relationship, one emphasizing local 
community and collective benefits, a second emphasizing specific service 
benefits largely excludable from non-members (Bennet, 1998 p. 512)  
The ‘sense of community’ argument regards the membership of an association as a 
‘communitarian’ act. The ‘community argument’ is used frequently with regard to clusters. 
Associations face only limited ‘selection pressure’, since they do not face market 
competition. The threat of ‘exit’ of members and the ‘voice’ raised by members are the two 
mechanisms of adaptation. However, firms only use their voice when it is not costly and time 
consuming (see Olson, 1971) and firms are unlikely to ‘exit’ when satisfied or moderately 
dissatisfied.  
The ‘domain’ of public private organizations consists of activities that are both in the public 
and in the private interest and are best pursued jointly. Activities are best pursued jointly 
when public capabilities (such as planning, accountability and consistency) and private 
                                          
44  A third method to transfer latent groups in mobilized ones could be through developing a 
federative structure (see Olson, 1971, p. 165).  
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capabilities (such as efficiency and focus on common goals) are required and when both 
public and private actors are willing to contribute financially to the activities of public private 
bodies. Examples of this include knowledge and education projects and innovation and 
knowledge diffusion projects. 
Public private bodies have relatively high set-up costs and uncertain pay-offs. Therefore, 
they develop only when governments provide substantial support. Public-private bodies are 
only exposed to weak selection pressures, because competition is absent and clear 
performance monitoring is difficult. Public and private ‘voice’ creates pressure to adapt.  
The domain of public organizations is limited to those activities where private initiative is not 
likely to yield socially desirable outcomes and regulations also do not lead to socially 
desirable outcomes. Activities such as safety and planning are generally regarded as inside 
the ‘public domain’. 
Selection pressures for public bodies are limited, since competitive pressure is absent and 
voice is limited. Furthermore, public organizations in general have relatively strong 
‘procedural inertia’ that reduces the effectiveness of voice. Figure 11 summarizes this 
overview of modes of governance and their role in a collective action regime. 
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Figure 11: The role of various coordination mechanisms in a regime 
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6.5.3 The quality of a collective action regime 
We identify five (cluster specific) variables of the quality of a regime. First, the presence of 
an infrastructure for collective action adds to the quality of a regime, because such an 
infrastructure provides opportunities to solve CAP’s. The infrastructure for collective action 
consists of three kinds of organizations: associations, public-private organizations and public 
organizations. Associations are well equipped to solve CAP’s since they act in the interest of 
all their members. Public organizations can contribute to solve CAP’s because they aim to 
generate collective benefits and public-private partnerships also can help overcoming 
CAP’s45. Associations and public-private organizations do not develop automatically, but 
when they exist, they provide a fertile ground for solving CAP’s. 
                                          
45  Public-private organizations and public organizations can be regarded as elements of the 
infrastructure for collective action (of a cluster) if they are established to generate cluster 
specific collective benefits. 
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Second, the role of public organizations in a regime influences the efficiency of a regime. 
Public organizations can play a role in solving CAP’s, but unlike private institutions they are 
not primarily driven by economic incentives. Public organizations can be ‘prospective 
partners’ capable and willing to contribute to solving CAP’s but can also be organizations 
with a very modest involvement in solutions to CAP’s.  
Third, voice (see Hirschmann, 1970) of firms is important because associations, public and 
public-private organizations do not adapt automatically. They face only limited ‘selection 
pressure’ and as a consequence, adaptation is more likely when firms use their voice. Since 
adaptations improve the quality of a regime46, voice adds to the quality of a regime. 
Fourth, the validity of a community argument adds to the quality of a governance regime 
(Bennet, 1998), since a higher willingness to invest in the ‘community’ enables better 
solutions for CAP‘s. Fifth, the role of leader firms increases the quality of the regime, 
because leader firms have incentives and resources to invest in CAP’s. 
6.6 Can trust, leader firms, intermediaries and CAR’s have negative 
effects on performance? 
In the preceding four paragraphs the four variables of cluster governance were discussed. 
The influence of all four is positive: more trust, more intermediaries, and more leader firm 
behavior improve the quality of the governance of the cluster. The same applies to the 
quality of the regimes: more infrastructure for collective action, more leader firms behavior, 
more involvement of public actors, more sense of community and more voice lead to better 
collective action regimes.  
This leads to the following question: is the influence of these variables always positive? 
Could there not be a moment where ‘more’ actually reduces performance. The principle of 
                                          
46  Campbell et al note with regard to changing a regime: ‘Actors eventually select a new 
governance regime as streams of action intermingle in complex ways. Trial and error learning 
as the result of spontaneous interaction may predominate in some instances (…). In this sense, 
selection is very much a process of muddling through. In other cases, deliberate coordination 
among organizations will take the place of, or supplement, trial and error’ (Campbell et al 1991, 
p. 331). This illustrates that adaptation of regimes is far from spontaneous. 
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‘diminishing returns’ applies here. For instance, more voice is especially likely to contribute 
to the quality of governance when voice is hardly raised. Theoretically speaking, at some 
moment the decreasing returns can become negative returns: when a substantial number of 
firms already raise their voice, additional voice might have a negative effect. Such 
possibilities cannot be ruled out, but unless there are reasonable theoretical arguments, why 
‘more’ could lead to a worse performance, such eventualities cannot be incorporated in the 
theoretical framework in a meaningful way. We claim no convincing arguments support the 
negative influence of any of the four variables. 
More trust lowers coordination costs as well as the scope of coordination. Trust in clusters 
can be an entry barrier, because ‘outsider firms’ are not trusted and as a consequence, 
entry is difficult. However, there is no convincing argument why new firms could not build a 
reputation, for instance by hiring trustworthy managers.  
There is also no convincing argument to claim that leader firm behavior has a negative effect 
on governance. Leader firms can have dominant positions in clusters and strive to maintain 
those positions. Thus, they might try to prevent entry of competitors. However, such efforts 
cannot be regarded as leader firm behavior as defined in this study; in fact, all firms strive to 
reduce competition. A lack of internal competition is incorporated in the framework. It may 
be that dominant firms do not face internal competitors. This has a negative effect on the 
performance of the cluster, but it is not related to leader firm behavior. 
The presence of intermediaries has positive effects since they enable cooperation and 
reduce transaction costs. Arguments for the negative effects of intermediaries on 
governance are also lacking: intermediaries have to serve a market, when there is no 
demand they will cease to exist. The argument that intermediaries can add transaction 
costs, because they somehow manage to occupy a position between supply and demand, 
does not apply in general: whenever firms can ‘cut costs’ by by-passing intermediaries they 
will do so.  
Finally, with regard to the variables of the quality of a collective action regime, similar 
arguments apply: the positive effect of the variables is based on arguments that apply in 
general. It can be questioned whether this general positive relationship also applies in 
‘extreme situations’, but a basis for arguing that the variables have a negative effect is 
lacking.  
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6.7 Conclusions: cluster governance and cluster performance 
In this chapter, arguments for the influence of four governance related variables of the 
performance of a cluster were presented. Table 10 summarizes the variables that influence 
the quality of cluster governance.  
Table 10: Variables for the quality of cluster governance 
Elements of cluster 
governance 
Effects on cluster performance 
Trust lowers coordination costs because costs to specify contracts decrease. 
The presence of 
trust  Trust increases the scope of coordination beyond price, because the risk of free 
riding decreases. 
The presence of 
intermediaries 
Intermediaries lower coordination costs and increase the scope of coordination 
beyond price because they specialize in managing coordination. 
Leader firms generate positive external effects for firms in their network, mainly by 
encouraging innovation and promoting internationalization. 
The presence of 
leader firms Leader firms generate positive external effects for firms in the cluster, mainly by 
organizing investments in the training and education infrastructure, the innovation 
infrastructure and the infrastructure for collective action. 
Quality of 
collective action 
regimes 
The more resources are invested in collective action regimes, the better the 
performance of a cluster. Five variables influence the amount of invested resources: 
the role of leader firms, the role of public organizations, the presence of an 
infrastructure for collective action, the presence of a community argument and the 
use of voice. 
 
This chapter completes the analytical framework to analyze the performance of clusters. The 
framework, summarized in Table 7 and Table 10, is tested in the empirical part. The 
framework provides a basis for an assessment of strengths and weaknesses of the structure 
and the governance of a cluster. Opportunities for improving the performance of a cluster 
can be derived from these strengths and weaknesses. 
 
 EMPIRICAL PART: THREE CASES OF SEAPORT CLUSTERS 
 

 7 ANALYZING THE PERFORMANCE OF SEAPORT 
CLUSTERS 
In the empirical part the framework developed in the theoretical part and summarized in 
Table 7 and Table 10, is applied to ports. Figure 12 shows the contents of the empirical part. 
Figure 12: Contents of the empirical part 
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In this chapter, research goals of the empirical part are presented, the selection of cases 
and research methods are discussed. Furthermore, some basic information of the three 
cases, Rotterdam, Durban and the ‘Lower Mississippi Port Cluster’ (LMPC) is provided. In 
chapter 8 clustering in seaports is analyzed in general and the three port clusters are 
described. Chapter 9 discusses the research issues with regard to port clusters, based on 
the theoretical framework and a review of existing literature on ports and port clusters. The 
results of the case studies with regard to the relation between cluster structure and cluster 
performance are presented in chapter 10 and the results with regard to the relation between 
cluster governance and cluster performance are given in chapter 11. In Chapter 12, 
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strengths and weaknesses of the three port clusters are discussed and these are related to 
available data on the performance of the three cases.  
7.1 Goals of the empirical research 
The goals of the empirical part are as follows:  
• To improve understanding of the size, composition and relevant region of port clusters.  
• To test whether the variables of cluster performance discussed in the theoretical part 
are relevant and analyze how they affect the performance of a port cluster.  
• To identify and discuss opportunities to improve cluster performance in the three cases. 
• To improve the analytical framework developed in the theoretical part on the basis of 
empirical results. 
7.2 A case study approach 
Data to test the validity of the (holistic) theoretical framework developed in the theoretical 
part (for instance cluster performance data and indicators of the identified variables) are 
lacking. Therefore, a case study approach is appropriate. Where available, quantitative data 
are used in the case studies. 
The case studies can be regarded as experiments to test the usefulness of the framework. 
Three case studies increase the ‘robustness’ of the results, compared to only one case 
study (see Yin, 1994). The goal of the case studies is analytical generalization: (provisional) 
acceptance, rejection or moderation of theories (see Yin, 1994, p.36), not empirical 
generalization. The three cases are three different experiments, not a sample of three 
observations. Even though all three cases are port clusters, an analytical generalization to 
clusters in general can be made. Therefore the results can be fruitful for further cluster 
research.  
With regard to the comparison between cases, this research is explorative. Differences in 
performance are likely, because the (economic, social, institutional) environment of the 
cases differs. Differences between the cases are analyzed, but no theoretical explanations 
are suggested beforehand. 
 
Chapter 7 – Analyzing the Performance of Seaport Clusters  73
7.3 Sources for the case study research 
Four kinds of sources are used. The combination of these different types of data allows for 
cross checks on consistency. First ‘quantitative data’ such as statistics from the economic 
census, input output data and port statistics are used. These data are used to ‘construct’ the 
port clusters, but are not useful for analyzing the performance of port clusters, because they 
are not sufficiently detailed. 
Second, reports, studies, newspaper articles and annual reports are studied. This source is 
important for understanding the issues at stake in ports, especially for understanding the 
‘regimes’ in a port.  
Third, a series of expert interviews are conducted. In each port, over 35 port experts were 
interviewed. Their opinions are an important source, especially for understanding the factors 
influencing port performance. 
Fourth, a survey was held among the port experts. The survey questions were explained 
and respondents were asked to explain their answers. Therefore answers were ‘checked’ so 
that when respondents had a different interpretation of the questions or were not sufficiently 
informed to answer the questions, their answers were not taken into account47. The survey 
questions are given in appendix 1. The different survey questions have different ranking 
scales. In some cases, experts were asked to make rankings of variables in order of 
importance. In other case, they were asked to indicate one aspect (such as importance or 
quality) on a scale from 1 to 5. Finally, for the evaluation of the variables, they were asked to 
use a scale from –5 to +5. This complicates reading, but the different scales improve the 
                                          
47  The experts were asked to answer the survey questions in our presence. In a number of cases 
experts indicated, or if became clear otherwise that the respondents were not sufficiently 
knowledgeable to provide informed answers to all questions. In these cases questions were 
skipped or the answers were not included in the data set. Even though some subjectivity is 
involved, this approach is the best way to identify the expert opinion: only informed answers 
should be included in the data set.   
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quality and reliability of the results48. The results of the survey are given in tables; below 
each table the scale used is given.   
7.4 Selection of the port experts 
The quality of port experts is crucial for the quality of the outcomes of the empirical research. 
The survey questions require an ‘informed opinion’. Only a limited number of all individuals 
working in the port cluster qualify as experts. We identified industry experts on the basis of 
three criteria: 
• Job position: individuals with a job that requires an understanding of the cluster are 
likely to be knowledgeable with regard to cluster issues. The majority of the industry 
experts have senior positions with port firms of substantial size, port specific 
associations and the (public) port authority. 
• Experience in the industry: newcomers to the industry are not likely to have 
accumulated sufficient knowledge. Therefore, the majority of industry experts are 
experienced in the industry. Newcomers are only included in the ‘expert list’ if 
suggested by other experts. 
• Involvement in cluster governance: individuals that are involved in cluster governance, 
for instance through membership of steering committees etc. are more likely to be 
knowledgeable with regard to cluster issues. The majority of the experts were either 
involved in governance at the moment of the survey or had been a member of one or 
more boards of associations before (see Table 11). 
The number of industry experts in a port cluster cannot be determined. A ‘hierarchy’ of 
experts exists, with senior managers at cluster associations and the management board of 
important public organizations (especially the port authority), senior managers of the largest 
                                          
48  For instance: a scale from –5 to +5 is more useful when asking an assessment of quality (the 
quality can be bad or good, nil is a ‘neutral score’). A ranking from 1 to 5 is better for an 
assessment of the importance of a variable. 
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firms in the cluster and senior managers of ‘embedded small and medium sized firms’ at the 
top of the hierarchy49.  
For each of the three case studies we developed an ‘initial expert list’ of about 20-30 
industry experts, on the basis of internet sources (board members of associations, CEO’s of 
firms in the cluster) and suggestions from one ‘embedded academic’. Prof. Welters identified 
experts in Rotterdam, Prof. Jones in Durban, and Dr. Renner in the LMPC.   
The initial list was expanded during the case study by asking industry experts to add new 
experts, if they felt the list was incomplete. Individuals that were suggested by at least two 
experts were added to the list50. 
Table 11: Port experts in the three cases  
Case Number of 
initial 
experts 
Additional 
experts 
Participating 
experts and 
‘response rate’ 
Percentage experts 
involved in cluster 
governance51 
Average number of 
years experience in 
cluster 
Rotterdam 41 8 N=43, 88% 90% 20 
Durban 32 5 N=34, 92% 68% 17 
LMPC 26 12 N=31, 80% 71% 19 
 
In all the three cases, the response rate was very high: the vast majority of all the experts 
that were identified did participate in the study. For this reason, we are confident that the 
                                          
49  Since the focus is on cluster performance the vast majority of experts works in firms in the port. 
Other stakeholders, such as environmentalists or regional planners are less important given the 
research set-up.  
50  Since the initial list in all three cases consists of experts with different backgrounds (from public 
and private organizations and associations, and from firms engaging in different cluster 
activities), and since the cluster ‘community’ has a dense network of relations (all experts know 
the vast majority of the other experts), a biased expert list is unlikely. 
51  The experts were asked to indicate whether were actively involved in projects in the interests of 
the cluster. For instance, all experts serving at the board of an association are considered to be 
involved in governance. 
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survey results do reflect the expert opinion52. Furthermore, due to the fact that all survey 
questions were answered during the interviews, so that unclear questions could be 
explained, the interpretation differences between the experts are very limited. This makes 
the expert opinion more reliable. 
The port cluster consists of five components: cargo handling, transport, logistics, 
manufacturing and trade (these are discussed later). The experts had to indicate in which 
component(s) their organization was active. The background of the experts is given in Table 
12.  
Table 12: Background of experts 
Component Durban Rotterdam LMPC Total three cases 
Cargo handling 24 % 27% 32% 27% 
Transport 30 % 29% 34% 30% 
Logistics 31 % 29% 24% 28% 
Manufacturing 11% 9% 4% 9% 
Trade 4% 5% 7% 6% 
  
Experts with a background in the cargo handling industry are over represented in the sample 
of experts. Experts with a manufacturing background are somewhat underrepresented.   
7.5 Survey structure 
The survey consists of four sets of questions:  
1. Questions to assess the embeddedness and linkages of the respondent’s organization in 
the cluster.  
                                          
52  Most of the sample size logic and ‘statistical significance’ issues are less relevant in this 
research, since the survey is not a random sample of a large population of industry experts. We 
claim to have surveyed the (vast) majority of cluster experts. Statistical significance tests are 
used, but not with the purpose of demonstrating that the expert opinion is ‘representative’. 
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2. Questions to find out the opinion of the respondents with regard to a number of 
propositions, derived from the theoretical framework. The experts are asked to indicate 
whether or not they agree with the propositions. In some cases the propositions are 
relatively obvious53. These propositions were added for the sake of completeness - all 
the variables of the framework are tested this way - and because what is obvious for 
certain academics might not be obvious for industry professionals. When possible, 
alternative propositions were tested (as suggested by Yin, 1994). 
3. Questions to assess the relative importance of the various variables of cluster 
performance. Apart from the validity of a variable, the survey questions address the 
issue of the importance of a variable, compared to other variables.  
4. Questions to compare the strengths and weaknesses of the case study port with 
competing port clusters. These results can be compared with reports and studies to 
cross check for consistency and to assess the quality of governance, compared to 
competing ports. This provides a basis for analyzing which governance arrangements 
are effective.   
The survey results are used to identify expert opinions in a port cluster. We test whether 
expert opinions differ between the port clusters or are the same across the three cases54. In 
the latter case, expert opinions do not depend on the local context and can be expected to 
be the same in all (port) clusters55. 
A division of experts can be made between experts with over 20 years of experience in the 
port industry and experts with less experience, and experts working for small organizations 
                                          
53  An example is the proposition: ‘A culture of trust increases the quality of the governance 
because it lowers transaction costs and enables co-operation’. 
54  Comparing cases should be done with precaution: cultural differences (instead of ‘real’ 
differences) might explain different responses. We claim this cultural ‘distortion’ is of minor 
importance, given the international nature of the port industry and the fact that all three cases 
are ‘western’. 
55  Yin (1994) objects against adding surveys from different cases, because it implies a study is a 
survey instead of a case study, is acknowledged. However, adding the surveys offers an 
opportunity to test whether it is plausible that hypotheses hold for (port) clusters in general.  
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vis-à-vis experts working with large organizations. When relevant, an analysis of differences 
in responses of both groups is made.  
7.6 Selection of cases 
The empirical part consists of three cases. This enables comparison between the cases to 
find out to what extent results are related to the ‘local context’ and to what extent they can 
be generalized. Since the three case studies are in different environments, results that hold 
for these three cases can be regarded as ‘stylized facts’ that hold for other cases of port 
clusters as well. The case selection was based on criteria other than cluster performance, to 
avoid a focus on ‘cluster success stories’ that dominate in the empirical research (Markusen, 
1999). 
Three criteria have been used to select the cases. First, the port clusters should be located 
in different environments. Thus, port clusters had to be located in different port ranges (such 
as the Hamburg-Le Havre port range). Second, a case study should be feasible, given 
limitations imposed by language (English or Dutch). Third, the cases should be ‘substantial 
clusters’, in the sense that port activities are of substantial size, both in absolute terms and 
in terms of their importance in a regional economy. Ports in very large cities, such as New 
York and Bombay are not selected, because the port cluster is a small component of the 
regional economy. As a consequence, the heterogeneity of the cluster population is small 
compared to the heterogeneity of the urban region, the cluster labor market is strongly 
dependent on the metropolitan labor market and cluster specific agglomeration economies 
and diseconomies are also subordinate to metropolitan agglomeration forces. Fourth, the 
ports should have a ‘transit function’. In such ports, competition with other ports is relevant.  
On the basis of these criteria, the port clusters in Rotterdam, Durban and The Lower 
Mississippi were selected. The port of Singapore could also have been selected on the basis 
of the criteria, but this port was not included, because difficulties were expected with the 
survey instrument, in terms of ‘finding the right experts’ and ‘getting realistic answers’ 
because cultural differences might lead to different (less outspoken) answers and the 
questions require a ‘self critical attitude’ which was thought to be more questionable in the 
Singaporese context, where governmental organizations are very important.   
It can be argued that the three selected port clusters are the largest of their continents. 
Rotterdam and The Lower Mississippi are the largest in throughput volume. Both have a 
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diverse traffic base and relatively many activities related to cargo handling. Durban is the 
port with the second highest throughput of Africa, and has a much more diverse traffic base 
than the largest African port, Richards Bay, where coal is by en large the dominant 
commodity.  
Furthermore, these three ports are important for the regional economy. All three generate 
substantial employment (about 8-15 % of all jobs) in the region. The port and related 
industries are clearly a ‘specialization’ of the three regions involved.    
Finally, all three ports are located in urban regions of similar size. The regions are relatively 
small in relation to the cargo throughput. All three ports serve large hinterlands: Rotterdam 
serves North West Europe, Durban serves South Africa and Southern Africa and The Lower 
Mississippi serves the mid-west of the United States. Thus, all ports have a transit function. 
Table 13 shows three characteristics of these three cases.  
Table 13: Three characteristics of the cases (2002) 
Port Total throughput Container throughput Estimate of inhabitants in the 
metropolitan region 
Rotterdam About 320 million tons About 6 million TEU About 1.2 million inhabitants 
Durban About 48 million tons About 1.2 million TEU About 1.2 million inhabitants 
Lower 
Mississippi  
About 381 million tons (420 
million metric tons) 
About 0.3 million TEU About 1.4 million inhabitants 
Sources: RMPM (2003) Louisiana Ports Association (2003) National Port Authority of South Africa 
(2003) 
 
7.6.1 The port of Rotterdam 
The port of Rotterdam is located centrally in the Northwest of Europe. The port is situated at 
the end of the rivers Rhine and Maas, Europe's most important inland waterways. Inland 
connections by inland waterways, rail, highway and pipeline are well developed. The port 
serves a large hinterland, including parts of Germany, Austria and Switzerland. 
Rotterdam is by far the largest port in the Netherlands: about 75% of the total throughput of 
the Netherlands is handled in Rotterdam and about 45% of all value added in Dutch 
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seaports is generated in Rotterdam (Nationale Havenraad, 2003). Table 14 shows the 
throughput figures of Rotterdam. 
Table 14: Throughput in the port of Rotterdam (2002) 
Commodity Throughput * 1000 ton 
Dry bulk 83,427 
Liquid bulk 155,925 
Ro-Ro 9,669 
Containers 65,849 
General Cargo 7,235 
Total 322,107 
Source: RMPM (2003) 
 
7.6.2 The port of Durban 
Durban is situated in the South East of South Africa in the province of Kwazulu-Natal. The 
port is predominantly a general cargo port and handles 20% of South Africa's total port 
traffic. The port of Durban serves a large hinterland: cargo with origin or destination in other 
regions of South Africa as well as other countries such as Zimbabwe and Botswana are 
handled in Durban. The majority of imports for and exports of Gauteng (the most 
industrialized and populated region of South Africa, in the proximity of Johannesburg and 
Pretoria) move through the port of Durban. The size of the port area, the diversity of port 
facilities, the size and diversity of its traffic base, and the large support network of ancillary 
industries make Durban the leading port of Southern Africa and the largest port of Africa56. 
Durban's Container Terminal is the busiest in Africa and handled more than 1.200.000 TEU 
in 2002 (National Port Authority of South Africa, 2003). 
                                          
56  In terms of throughput volume Richard’s Bay is larger, but Richard’s Bay is a pure bulk port, 
over 90% of the cargo is handled by one coal terminal.  
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7.6.3 The Lower Mississippi Port Cluster 
The Lower Mississippi Port Cluster is located in the South of the U.S.A, in the state of 
Louisiana and strategically located at the mouth of the Mississippi river. The vast majority of 
cargo is transit cargo to inland destinations, mostly in the Mid-West of the USA. The lower 
Mississippi port complex is not administered by one port authority, but by five public port 
authorities each with a jurisdiction over a part of the river system. All port activities along the 
river are so closely related that they form one port system, the ‘lower Mississippi port cluster’ 
that encompasses five port authorities. Table 15 shows the ports included in the ‘Lower 
Mississippi port cluster’ and explains why other major Louisiana ports are not included.  
Table 15: Ports included in the ‘Lower Mississippi port cluster’ 
Port Included in the Lower Mississippi Port Cluster 
Port of New Orleans Included, the largest general cargo port of the port cluster. 
Port of Greater Baton Rouge Included, the most upstream port of the lower Mississippi port complex. 
Port of South Louisiana Included, the largest port by volume, especially strong in liquid bulk 
cargo base. 
St. Bernard Port, Harbor and 
Terminal District 
Included, the smallest port in the port cluster. 
Plaquemines Parish Port, 
Harbor and Terminal District 
Included, the most downstream port of the port complex, with primarily 
purely private terminals on private land. 
Port of Lake Charles Not included, not located on the Mississippi. 
Port Fourchon Not included, not located on the Mississippi, predominantly used by the 
offshore industry. 
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Table 16 shows the throughput figures of the five port administrations in 1999: 
Table 16: Throughput figures of the five port administrations in 1999 
Port authority Parishes in 
Jurisdiction 
Annual 
volume 
199957 
River mileage Major commodities 
Plaquemines Plaquemines 59.900.000 From the mouth of 
the river to 100 
miles inland 
Liquid bulk 
St Bernard St Bernard Small volume Small jurisdiction General cargo 
New Orleans New Orleans, 
Jefferson 
90.800.000 From mile 100 to 
mile 114.9 
General cargo, especially 
containers, steel and 
coffee 
South 
Louisiana 
St James, St. 
Charles, St. 
John 
217.700.000 From mile 114.9 to 
mile 168.5 
Dry and liquid bulk 
Baton Rouge West Baton 
Rouge 
65.600.000 From mile 169 up to 
mile 243 
Steel, fruit, containers 
Source: Louisiana Ports Association (2003) 
                                          
57  Volumes are given in long tons. A long ton is about 8% less than the metric tons that are used 
internationally. 
 
 8 CLUSTERING IN SEAPORTS 
In this chapter the cluster concept is applied to seaports. The method discussed in chapter 
two to ‘construct’ a port cluster is used. First, the relevant literature on ports is discussed. 
Second, the core specialization of a port cluster is identified and third the economic activities 
included in the port cluster are identified. Fourth, associations and public (-private) 
organizations included in port clusters are identified. Fifth, the cluster population of the three 
cases, and sixth, the relevant port region of the three cases is discussed. 
8.1 Literature on port clusters  
Various research topics in port economics can be identified. Three of these topics are 
related to this study. A major topic is the competitiveness of ports as parts of (intermodal) 
transport chains. In these studies the analysis of port competition is limited to competition for 
cargo58. Important contributions include Hayuth (1981), Kreukels and Wever (1997), and 
Baird (1996). These scholars emphasize the importance of the geographical location of a 
port. Others in the same research tradition, such as Notteboom (1997), and Winkelmans 
and Notteboom (2001) argue that geographical conditions do not completely explain port 
performance and add factors such as hinterland connections, terminal productivity and a 
port’s reputation. 
A second topic is the economic impact of ports (see for instance Waters, 1977 and Musso et 
al 2001). These studies focus on economic effects, which arise to a large extent outside the 
cluster, both regionally and functionally. Furthermore, most economic impact studies 
concentrate on the impact of one specific infrastructure project.  
A third relevant topic is the spatial dynamics of port-related economic activities. Especially 
the work of Slack (Slack, 1988, 1989, and 1999) has improved the understanding of spatial 
                                          
58  When regarding the port as a cluster, ports not only compete for cargo with other ports, but also 
with other regions to attract investments, for instance in manufacturing, warehousing, and trade. 
The ‘classical’ notion of port competition is thus of limited use.  
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processes that take place in seaports. Slack was the first scholar to pay attention to location 
decisions of the port service industry. He shows that physical proximity to the terminals 
becomes less important for the port service industry (Slack 1988). Van Klink (1995) explains 
the decline of employment in ports by the relocation of logistics activities59. He terms this 
process ‘maritime deconcentration’.  
The cluster approach has hardly been used to analyze ports. Perhaps the best quantitative 
port cluster study is the annually repeated study of Antwerp’s port cluster, by the Bank of 
Belgium. In this study, a cluster population of about 1000 firms, including logistics and 
industrial firms is identified. The development of the value added of this cluster is calculated. 
However, this study does not explain the performance of cluster. 
Haezendonck (2001) is the first scholar who uses the term ‘port cluster’ and draws from 
cluster theories. She defines a port cluster as ‘the set of interdependent firms engaged in 
port related activities, located within the same port region and possibly with similar strategies 
leading to competitive advantage and characterized by a joint competitive position vis-à-vis 
the environment external to the cluster’ (Haezendonck, 2001, p. 136).  
Haezendonck analyzes the performance of a port cluster with an adapted version of Porter’s 
diamond framework (Porter, 1990, Rugman et al, 1995). She identifies 14 factors that 
influence the competitiveness of seaports, including internal competition, internal 
cooperation, client relationships in the cluster, the presence of related and supporting 
industries and the behavior of (different levels of) the government. This study is a major 
contribution to understanding port clusters, but has the following shortcomings: 
• The issue of identifying firms in the cluster is not addressed. This is relevant since the 
question of what actually is a port cluster is still unclear.  
• A focus on two commodity groups: containers and breakbulk. An analysis of the 
competitiveness of a complete port cluster is still lacking. 
                                          
59  Van Klink’s work is a shift towards analyzing ports as clusters of economic activities, but he 
does not use the term cluster, or the literature on clusters. The same is true for Winkelmans 
(1984). His work can be regarded as a port cluster study ‘avant la lettre’.  
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• Throughput volume is used as performance indicator. This indicator is at best a partial 
indicator of performance. It might be a good indicator for the performance of the cargo 
handling industry, but the port cluster encompasses many activities whose performance 
is not directly related to cargo throughput.  
• The use of Porter’s work that, even though widely used in practice, is criticized by 
economists for being simplistic. 
This study aims to build on the work of Haezendonck and others, by addressing the issues 
discussed above and by comparing three port clusters.  
8.2 The economic specialization of seaport clusters 
The first step to construct a cluster is to identify the economic specialization of the cluster. In 
the case of seaports the core specialization is the arrival of goods and ships. All activities 
related to the arrival of goods and ships are included in the port cluster.  
The importance of favorable geographical conditions, such as the presence of a navigable 
river and deepwater shelters and the structure of the seabed, combined with economies of 
scale of port facilities, explain the concentration of the arrival of ships and goods in a limited 
number of ports (instead of a ‘scattered’ distribution of terminals along the coast). All 
economic activities that are required to enable the loading and unloading of cargo and ships 
are included in the port cluster. These activities include terminal handling, pilotage and 
towage. The arrival of ships and goods attracts related economic activities. For this reason 
Fujita et al (1999) and (Krugman 1995) mention the role of ports as drivers of agglomeration 
in cities.  
8.3 Port cluster activities and non-business organizations 
The port cluster consists of all economic activities related to the arrival of goods and ships. A 
first impression of port cluster activities stems from the analysis of cluster associations. In 
one of the three cases, Rotterdam, a port cluster association exists. The structure of this 
association (Deltalinqs) is given in Figure 13. 
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Figure 13: The port cluster association in Rotterdam 
Deltalinqs
Port cluster association
Firms in cargo handling, transport, logistics and trade 
Associated in SVZ
Regional associations 
for specific industries
VRC: ship’s agents
VRMO: bulk stevedores
VRS: stevedores
FENEX: forwarders
LRR: pilots
TLN: transport and logistics
VEROCOG: grain traders & forwarders
VAB: other port related firms
National associations, 
located in Rotterdam
CBRB: inland shipping
NVS: ship suppliers
Manufacturing firms 
Associated in EBB
-Chemicals
-Contractors
-Utilities
-Oil refining
 
 
Deltalinqs is the best example of a port cluster association, but in other ports associations 
that unite various port related firms exist as well. In Rotterdam, the Rotterdam Port 
Promotion Council (RPPC, http://www.rppc.nl), in the Lower Mississippi, the Mississippi 
River Trade and Transport Council, and in Durban, the Durban Port Liaison Committee, are 
examples of associations with different port related members.  
On the basis of this preliminary evidence, five broad groups of port cluster activities are 
identified: cargo handling activities, transport activities, logistics activities, manufacturing 
activities and trading activities. Further analysis should provide a basis to identify port cluster 
activities in more detail.  
The first step is a ‘qualitative value chain analysis’. Transport activities are part of a port 
cluster, since a port is a part in a transport chain. Most cargo is transported further by means 
of inland modes, such as road, rail and inland waterway. Thus, (branches of) transport firms 
are located in ports and are so strongly related to the arrival of goods and services that they 
are included in the port cluster. This applies to all firms involved in freight transport.  
Logistics activities, such as storage, re-packing and assembling are included in a port 
cluster, because goods are stored in ports. Differences in the scale of ships and inland 
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modes make storage necessary (Rijsenbrij, 2000). This necessity of storage is a reason for 
locating logistics activities (such as blending and re-packing) in seaports. A second reason 
is that by locating in a port transport costs can be reduced. Both reasons explain the 
presence of logistics activities in ports and show that these activities are strongly related to 
the arrival of goods and ships in seaports. Thus, all logistics activities are included in the 
port cluster. 
In the three case studies port experts were interviewed and answered a set of survey 
questions. One of the survey questions addressed the strength of linkages between the five 
groups of port related activities. The results are given in Table 17. 
Table 17: Integration of the five components in the cluster (N=99) 
Component Integration in cluster 
Cargo handling 3.9 
Transport 4.0 
Logistics 3.5 
Manufacturing 3.1 
Trade 2.9 
Figures on a scale from 1 (not integrated) to 5 (very integrated) 
 
The following conclusions can be drawn from these figures: 
• Firms in cargo handling, transport and logistics are the most integrated in the cluster 
• Trade is less integrated in the cluster.   
• Not all firms have strong relations with activities in other components; the web of 
relations is relatively dense. 
Further evidence for the strength of relations between cargo handling, transport and logistics 
stems from a survey question to find out more about the activities of the firms of port 
experts. The vast majority of firms that provide cargo handling, also provide transport and 
logistics services. This also shows the strength of linkages.  
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Table 18 shows the activities of the 62 firms included in the survey that are engaged in 
cargo handling. 
Table 18: Portfolio of activities of firms engaging in cargo handling (N=62) 
Economies activities Number of firms 
Cargo handling, transport and logistics 34 
Cargo handling and transport 12 
Cargo handling and logistics 7 
Only cargo handling 9 
 
On the basis of both results of the case studies, the conclusion can be drawn that all 
activities in cargo handling, transport and logistics, that are located in the port region, are a 
part of the port cluster. This does not apply to activities in manufacturing and trade. Only a 
specific set of manufacturing firms are strongly related to the arrival of goods and ships in 
seaports: those that get their raw materials from the port and are located in the port in order 
to reduce transport and logistics costs. A specific set of trading activities is included in the 
port cluster as well. Trading and storage (in a port) are closely linked. Commodity trade is, 
for some commodities, still related to storage and cargo handling.  
The first indicator for the likeliness that manufacturing activities are located in seaports is the 
expenditure on water transport as a percentage of the value added created by the 
manufacturing activity (see Table 19). Figures from the US were used because of the 
availability of reliable statistics for this country. 
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Table 19: The importance of water transport as input for manufacturing activities (1999) 
 Industry (SIC) 
Water transport as 
% of value added 
 Relative importance 
water transportation1 
 Petroleum refining and related products  2.6% 11.47 
 Crude petroleum and natural gas  1.9% 8.32 
 Agricultural fertilizers and chemicals  1.7% 7.39 
 Primary iron and steel manufacturing 1.6% 6.95 
 Plastics and synthetic materials  1.2% 5.38 
 Food and kindred products  1.0% 4.44 
 Gas production and distribution (utilities)  1.0% 4.36 
 Coal mining 0.7% 3.32 
 Stone and clay products  0.5% 2.38 
 Electric services (utilities)  0.5% 2.05 
 Industrial and other chemicals  0.3% 1.51 
 Metallic ores mining  0.3% 1.46 
 General industrial machinery and equipment 0.015% 0.07 
 Tobacco products 0.005% 0.02 
1The average importance is 1 and calculated as an average of all manufacturing activities Source: US 
Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis (2003) 
 
Table 19 shows that water transport is especially important for refining activities and other 
manufacturing related to oil or chemical products and iron and steel manufacturing. All of 
these require huge volumes of raw materials.  
Further evidence to identify manufacturing and trading activities strongly related to the 
arrival of goods and services is provided by a ‘localization analysis’. For a number of 
manufacturing and trade activities, as well as activities in cargo handling, transport and 
logistics, the concentration in seaports is analyzed. For this purpose, the number of firms in 
17 metropolitan regions with large seaports of the United States of America is counted60 and 
                                          
60  These metro regions are selected by taking the 25 largest ports of the USA and analyzing 
whether they are part of a metro-area, so that statistics can be collected. Excluded are the 
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compared with the nationwide number of firms. About 5.7% of all business establishments in 
the US are located in these 17 metropolitan areas. Thus, when for example 11.4% of all 
establishments of a certain economic activity are located in the port regions, the localization 
quotient is two61. The same calculation is made for Rotterdam compared with the national 
average62.  
Table 20 shows the NAICS codes63 of all economic activities included in the port cluster and 
their localization quotient. In some cases, activities are included in the set of port cluster 
activities, even though they are not concentrated in port regions. In these cases the 
concentration analysis is not precise enough64, and there are other arguments for including 
these activities in the set of port cluster activities. These arguments are given at the bottom 
of the table.  
                                                                                                                                                    
largest US metro areas (such as New York, LA, and Chicago) because even though these cities 
have ports, they are by no means port cities. The remaining port regions are Baton Rouge, 
Beaumont, Charleston, Corpus Christi, Duluth Superior, Galveston, Houston, Huntington, Lake 
Charles, Mobile, Naples, New Jersey City, New Orleans, Norfolk Harbor, Pittsburg, St Louis and 
Tacoma.  
61  In formula form, this can be expressed as LCi = 17.5* Fiport regions  /FiUSA, where LCi is the 
localization quotient of industry i and Fi is the number of firms in that industry, in the 17 port 
regions respectively in the entire USA. The constant of 17.5 is explained because the overall 
number of firms in the USA is 17.5 times higher than the overall number of firms in the 17 port 
regions). 
62  The specialization quotient is based on a comparison of the Rotterdam port region with the 
national average. Since the Netherlands as a whole is specialized in ports, maritime activities 
and logistics (Policy Research Corporation, 2001) comparing Rotterdam to the European 
average would have been better, but data on a European level are lacking. 
63  The corresponding BIK code, a Dutch classification system, is given in appendix 3. 
64  For instance because the activities are related to commodities that are handled only in a 
number of the 17 ports, or when only a part of the firms in the industry a port related. In both 
cases the concentration analysis does not show economic relations. 
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Table 20: Concentration of port cluster activities by NAICS code (2002)  
Component NAICS 
code 
Description Total 
establishments 
17 port regions 
Localization 
quotient 
48833  Navigational Services to Shipping 316 6.8 
48832  Marine Cargo Handling 163 4.8 
 Cargo handling 
48831  Port and Harbor Operations 49 4.4 
483111  Deep Sea Freight Transportation 245 9.7 
483211  Inland Water Freight Transportation 113 5.1 
48839  Other Support Activities for Water Transportation 210 4.4 
483113  Coastal and Great Lakes Freight Transportation 120 4.0 
486  Pipeline Transportation  323 2.1 
4889  Other Support Activities for Transportation 123 1.5 
42271  Petroleum bulk stations and terminals 526 1.4 
 Transport 
48412  General Freight Trucking, Long-Distance1 1746 0.9 
49319  Other Warehousing and Storage 128 1.9 
4885  Freight transportation arrangement 1339 1.6 
49311  General Warehousing and Storage 339 1.4 
541614  Process, Physical Distribution, and Logistics Consulting Services2 254 1.0 
 Logistics 
49312  Refrigerated warehousing and storage2 60 0.7 
336611  Ship Building and Repairing 170 4.5 
3251  Basic Chemical Manufacturing 348 2.6 
3252  Resin, Synthetic Rubber, and Artificial and Synthetic Fibers and Filaments Manufacturing 113 2.2 
33111  Iron and steel mills 115 1.5 
324  Petroleum refineries 186 1.5 
3314  Nonferrous Metal (except Aluminium) Production and Processing 73 1.4 
 Manufacturing 
31121  Flour milling & malt mfg3 21 0.8 
4215  Metal & mineral (except petroleum) whsle 1184 1.8 
42272  Petroleum and Petroleum Products whsle 321 1.7 
4226  Chemical product wholesalers 1381 1.6 
42186  Transportation Equipment and Supplies Wholesalers 282 1.4 
 Trade 
42251  Grain and Field Bean Wholesalers4 144 0.4 
Source: United States Department of Commerce Census Bureau (2003) 
1  The majority of long distance trucking firms are not concentrated in ports. However, those firms that 
are located in port regions are included in the port cluster, because they transport port cargoes. 
2  Refrigerated warehouses and logistics consultants that are located in port regions are likely to be 
strongly linked to firms in the port cluster, and included in the cluster. 
3  When floor milling is located in ports, it is closely related to the arrival of raw material in the port. 
4  When grain wholesalers are located in ports, they do so because grain arrives and is stored in 
seaports. Thus they are included in the cluster.   
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This table shows that especially cargo handling and transport activities are concentrated in 
port regions. Logistics activities are less concentrated in port regions. This is also found in 
Rotterdam: 
Table 21: Concentration of cluster activities in Rotterdam (2002) 
 Component  Activity description Localization 
quotient 
 Marine Cargo Handling 7.7  Cargo handling 
 Port and Harbor Operations 4.7 
 Freight Transportation arrangement 4.6 
 Inland Water Freight Transportation 4.0 
 Coastal freight transportation 3.8 
 Other Support Activities for Water Transportation 3.7 
 Pipeline Transportation of Crude Oil 3.5 
 Transport 
 Deep Sea Freight Transportation 3.2 
 European distribution centers 3.1 
 Support activities for transportation 3.0 
 Logistics 
 Process, Physical Distribution, and Logistics Consulting Services 0.7 
 Industrial gas manufacturing 4.9 
 Pipeline Transportation of Crude Oil 3.5 
 Petroleum refineries 3.4 
 Petrochemical Manufacturing 3.1 
 Petroleum and Petroleum Products Wholesalers 1.8 
 Basic chemical manufacturing 1.7 
 Flour milling and malt manufacturing 0.7 
 Manufacturing 
 Iron and steel mills 0.6 
 Petroleum and Petroleum Products Wholesalers  1.8 
 Chemical products wholesalers 1.4 
 Metal & mineral (except petroleum wholesalers 1.0 
 Trade 
 Grain and Field Bean Wholesalers 1.0 
Source: Bureau van Dijk (2003) 
 
The inclusion of manufacturing and trade activities is based on the concentration figures in 
the 17 large US ports, and the ‘value chain analysis’. All manufacturing activities that use 
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raw materials and are somewhat concentrated in port regions (a localization share of 1.4 is 
taken as minimum) are included in the port cluster. Trade activities for commodities handled 
and stored in ports are included when the localization quotient is more than 1.4 as well.  
Activities in manufacturing and trade that are not concentrated in port regions are not 
included in the port cluster, unless there is a convincing reason for including them. Table 22 
shows the localization quotients of some activities that are not included in the port cluster.  
Table 22: Localization quotient of some manufacturing activities not included in the port cluster (2002) 
  NAICS  
 code 
Activity Localization 
quotient 
 3259  Other Chemical Product and Preparation Manufacturing 1.3 
 3312  Steel Product Manufacturing from Purchased Steel 1.3 
 3255  Paint, Coating, and Adhesive Manufacturing 1.2 
 234  Heavy Construction 1.1 
 22111  Electric Power Generation 1.1 
 3313  Aluminium Production and Processing 0.9 
 33611  Automobile and Light Duty Motor Vehicle Manufacturing 0.8 
 3315  Foundries 0.8 
 3254  Pharmaceutical and Medicine Manufacturing 0.8 
 Manufacturing 
 3361  Motor Vehicle Manufacturing 0.7 
 52313  Commodity Contracts Dealing  0.7  Trade 
 52314  Commodity Contracts Brokerage 0.6 
Source: United States Bureau of Census (2003) 
 
With regard to associations, regional ‘horizontal’ business associations for instance for cargo 
handling, forwarding, and transport are frequently present in seaports. Apart from those 
industry associations, port marketing and promotion associations (see Van Klink and Van 
Winden, 1999) and port cluster associations exists in some seaports. 
Public-private organizations strongly linked to the core of the cluster and thus included in the 
cluster population include innovation centers, and labor pools. Public organizations included 
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in the cluster include traffic control, custom activities, education centers, pilotage services65 
and a port authority. Table 23 shows the associations, public-private organizations and 
public organizations included in the cluster in the three cases. 
Table 23: Associations, public-private and public organizations included in the three case studies 
 Durban LMPC Rotterdam 
Asso-
ciations 
Container Lines 
operating Forum 
(CLOF), Bulk lines 
operators forum 
(BLOF), South African 
Association of freight 
forwarders (SAAF), 
Durban branch, 
Durban Port Liaison 
committee (DPLC), 
Maydon Wharf 
Leaseholders 
Association, 
Association of Ship’ 
Agents and brokers of 
SA (ASABOSA), 
Durban branch, 
Association of 
Shipping Lines 
New Orleans Board of 
trade, Mississippi river 
maritime association, World 
trade center of New 
Orleans, transport 
committee, International 
freight forwarders and 
customs brokers 
Association of New 
Orleans, Steamship 
association of south 
Louisiana, Mississippi 
valley trade and transport 
council, Greater New 
Orleans barge fleeting 
association 
Port cluster association (Deltalinqs), Dutch 
association for inland waterway operators, based 
in Rotterdam (CBRB), Association for forwarders, 
regional branch (FENEX), Dutch association for 
container repair companies, based in Rotterdam 
(HCRA), Dutch association for ship suppliers, 
based in Rotterdam (NVS), Association of pilots 
operating in Rotterdam (RLRR), Association of 
transport and logistics firms in the Netherlands 
(TLN), regional branch, Association of ship 
agents in Rotterdam (VRC), Association of 
container companies in Rotterdam (VRCB), 
Association of independent grain control and 
measurement companies in Rotterdam 
(VEROCOG), Association of ‘mechanical’ 
terminal operators in Rotterdam (VRMO), 
Association of terminal operators in Rotterdam 
(VRS), Association for port marketing of 
Rotterdam, with over 300 members (RPPC), 
Association of trade centers and trading 
companies located in Rotterdam (RITCA) 
Public 
private 
organi-
zations 
No port related public 
private organization 
Maritime cluster initiative, 
associated with Metrovision 
(a public private economic 
development partnership) 
Organization aiming to enhance the ICT usage in 
the port (Port Infolink), Organization aiming to 
enhance the knowledge infrastructure in 
Rotterdam (KMR), Portal for the port of 
Rotterdam (PortofRotterdam.com) 
Public 
organi-
zations 
Portnet, port 
operations Durban, 
Portnet training 
academy 
Five port authorities along 
the river, New Orleans 
Public Belt Railroad, US 
army corps of engineers 
Rotterdam Municipal Port management  (RMPM), 
Customs, Specialized school for shipping 
transport and port vocational education (STC) 
 
                                          
65  In some ports private pilots exist, and the public role is limited to regulating private pilots. 
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Table 24 summarizes all firms and non-business organizations included in the cluster. For a 
small number of firms, identification on the basis of an industry classification, such as NAICS 
is not possible, because the classification does not distinguish these firms. The firms have to 
be identified ‘bottom up’ on the basis of industry sources.  
Table 24: Cluster activities with relevant industry classifications 
 Component Description according to NAICS code 
 Cargo handling Port and Harbor Operations (48831), Marine Cargo Handling  (48832)  
Navigational Services to Shipping1   (48833), Terminal suppliers, Port engineering (No code) 
 Transport  Pipeline Transportation of Refined Petroleum Products (48691)  
Pipeline Transportation of Crude Oil (48611), Petroleum Bulk Stations and Terminals (42271)  
Other Support Activities for Water Transportation (48839), Line-Haul Railroads (482111)  
Inland Water Freight Transportation (483211), Freight Trucking, Long-Distance (48412)  
Deep Sea Freight Transportation (483111), Coastal Freight Transportation (483113).  
 Logistics Freight Transportation arrangement3   (4885), Refrigerated Warehousing and Storage (49312)  
General Warehousing and Storage (49311), Other Warehousing and Storage (49319)  
Process, Physical Distribution, and Logistics Consulting Services (541614). 
 Manu- 
 facturing4 
Ship Building and Repairing2   (336611), Petroleum refineries (324) 
Basic chemical manufacturing (3251), Flour milling and malt manufacturing (31121)  
iron and steel mills (33111), Metal processing (3314) 
Artificial and synthetic fibers manufacturing (3252) 
Specialized suppliers of manufacturing firms (No code). 
 Trade Transportation Equipment and Supplies (except Motor Vehicle) Wholesalers (42186)  
Petroleum and Petroleum Products Wholesalers (42272)  
Metal & mineral wholesale (4215), Grain and Field Bean Wholesalers (42251)  
Chemical product wholesalers (4226), Commodity related trade intermediaries (No code). 
 Associations Port cluster association, business associations, for instance for cargo handling, survey, inland 
shipping and container repair, marketing and export promotion associations. 
 Public-private  
 organizations 
Organizations enhancing knowledge development, sustainable production, port labor pool. 
 Public   
 organizations 
Educational organizations, customs, traffic control, pilotage (in come cases private) and port 
authorities.  
1 Towage is regarded as part of cargo handling, other firms as transport. 
2 Only ship repair is included in the cluster. 
3 Logistics service providers and forwarders are classified as ‘logistics’, ship’s agents as transport. 
4 Only activities located at ‘deepwater sites’ or otherwise closely related to the port cluster (for instance, 
by pipeline infrastructure to the port, or the ownership of a terminal in the port). 
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8.4 The relevant port cluster region 
Cargo handling is located in the primary port area (quays and terminals). Other cluster 
activities are not necessarily located in the primary port area. For instance, some services 
are located in the central business district of the port city and distribution activities near 
transport infrastructure to the hinterland. Van Klink (1995) shows that other transport nodes 
and logistics zones are functionally strongly related to the port. Thus, the relevant cluster 
region of the port is larger than the primary port area. 
The size and structure of the relevant port region differs between ports. The concept of a 
relevant region implies that beyond a certain distance, municipalities are not included in the 
relevant port region. The relevant region includes municipalities that meet two conditions: 1) 
in the proximity of the seaport, and 2) a high concentration of port related activities. The 
relevant region generally includes: 
• The primary port area. 
• The business district of the port city (see Slack 1988). 
• Secondary nodes in the proximity of the primary seaport (see van Klink 1995).  
• Municipalities in the vicinity of the port with a concentration of port service activities. 
8.5 The cluster population and port region in Rotterdam 
The cluster population of Rotterdam can be analyzed with the use of firm statistics 
registered by the Chambers of Commerce in the Netherlands. Registration is obligatory, so 
all firms are included in this dataset. Some of the firms in the dataset are merely ‘legal 
entities’ created for fiscal reasons. Therefore the number of ‘real’ firms is overestimated. 
This shortcoming is not important for the purposes of this study, because the general picture 
of Rotterdam’s cluster is fairly reliable. 
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Table 25: Firms in Rotterdam’s port cluster (2002) 
 Share total 
number of firms 
Activity Number of 
firms 
Loading, unloading and transhipment activities   179* 
Pilotage 3 
Port engineering: No code, figure based on expert opinion 20 
Cargo handling 6% 
Crane construction, No code, expert opinion 1 
Shipping services  171 
Inland shipping services 985** 
Salvage services  24 
Ship brokers  10 
Rail transport  3 
Pipeline transport 3 
Transport 
  
36% 
Trucking services  101 
Transport intermediaries  1,321* 
Warehousing and storage  221 
Logistics 45% 
Logistics consultancy services, No code expert opinion 50 
Oil refining  11 
Flour milling  8 
Cokes manufacturing  1 
Basic chemical manufacturing  46 
Other chemical manufacturing  14 
Production of iron and steel  3 
Shipbuilding and repair, no code, expert opinion  10 
Automobile manufacturing, expert opinion 0 
Manufacturing 4% 
Specialized suppliers to port industries, No code, expert opinion 50 
Trade intermediaries in chemical products (511203)   29 
Trade intermediaries in metals and ores (511202)   18 
Fuel wholesalers (51512) 110 
 Grain wholesalers (51211) 33 
Metal and ores wholesalers (51521) 14 
Mineral oils wholesalers (51513)  73 
Trade intermediaries in raw products for food industry (511105)  21 
Trade 9% 
Trade intermediaries in oil and fuels (511201)  26 
Total   3,559 
Source: Bureau van Dijk (2003) 
* Overestimated as most firms consist of various ‘judicial entities’ 
** Most operators are ‘captain owners’, owning and operating their own vessel 
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Even though the number of manufacturing firms is no more than 4% of the total number of 
firms in the cluster, these firms generate more than 24% of the value added generated in the 
cluster (Nationale Havenraad, 2003). This is because of the large size of firms in this sector. 
The opposite applies to transport and logistics. 
The size of the primary port area in Rotterdam is about 26,000 acres (10,500 hectares). This 
area consists of waterways, quays and dry port area. The Rotterdam Municipal Port 
Management66 (RMPM) manages the primary port area. Figure 14 shows the primary port 
area. 
Figure 14: The primary port area in Rotterdam 
 
Secondary port areas in the Rotterdam port cluster are Moerdijk and Dordrecht. Moerdijk 
has an annual throughput of over 9 million tons and Dordrecht of about 2 million ton. The 
port facilities in both ports are complementary to Rotterdam: private firms are active in 
different ports and public port administrations cooperate closely. 
 
                                          
66  The Rotterdam municipal port authority (RMPM) is a public landlord port, owned by the city of 
Rotterdam. The organization operates autonomously. The ‘mission’ of the port authority is ‘To 
strengthen the position of Rotterdam’s port and industrial complex in a European context, in the 
short and long run’ (RMPM, 2001, own translation). 
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The share of port related firms as a percentage of the total number of firms in the 
municipality provides a basis to draw a - to some extent arbitrary - cluster border. Table 26 
shows the concentration of port activities in the municipalities surrounding Rotterdam. 
Table 26: The port cluster region in Rotterdam (based on data for 2002) 
Municipality Total number of firms Cluster firms Concentration-index 
Moerdijk 537 115 6.6 
Rhoon/Portugaal 1,744 224 4.0 
Zwijndrecht 3,214 409 4.0 
Lekkerkerk/ Krimpen aan de ijssel 2,345 200 2.6 
Hardinxveld Giessendam 1,629 128 2.4 
Ridderkerk 3,947 290 2.3 
Maasland 1,105 80 2.2 
Papendrecht 2,163 146 2.1 
Alblasserdam 1,343 88 2.0 
Krimpen a/d Lek 1,305 79 1.9 
Rozenburg 567 34 1.9 
Barendrecht 3,168 185 1.8 
Rotterdam 55,986 3,253 1.8 
Dordrecht 9,082 525 1.8 
Hendrik Ido Ambacht 1,660 93 1.7 
Spijkenisse 3,424 183 1.7 
Capelle a/d IJssel 5,617 235 1.3 
Brielle 1,414 59 1.3 
Geervliet 1,025 42 1.3 
The Nederlands 1,417,506 45,656 1.0 
Source: based on data from Bureau van Dijk, 2003 
 
All municipalities with a ‘concentration index’ of 1.7 and more (bold in the table) are included 
in the cluster region. Rotterdam has a relatively low concentration index, because the city 
has a large number of residents and as a consequence a large number of service firms, 
such as shops and restaurants. As a result, the concentration of cluster activities is less 
pronounced than in other smaller municipalities. 
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8.6 The cluster population and port region in Durban 
A precise identification of the cluster population in Durban is impossible, because firm data 
are not available. The tax register is the only data source and for reasons of confidentiality 
not publicly available. The most reliable data set is the Yellow Pages directory. Most firms 
are included in the Yellow Pages. Compared to the analysis in Rotterdam and the LMPC, 
the number of firms in Durban’s port cluster is underestimated, because a listing in the 
Yellow Pages is not compulsory and especially holdings or administrative entities are not 
listed. 
Table 27: Firms in Durban's port cluster (most data for 2002) 
Cluster 
component 
Share of firms 
in the cluster 
Category Number 
Stevedores 7 
Tanks & containers repair  14 
Dredging firms 1 
Cargo Handling 7% 
Freight auditors 28 
Road transport firms 105 
Container manufacturing, rentals, conversion &sales 23 
Containerized freight, depot & transport service 9 
Fleet management firms  12 
Marine equipment suppliers  12 
Marine and offshore services 21 
Ship & cargo brokers 7 
Ship chandlers 7 
Shipping lines & agents 71 
Surveyors & assessors & marine consultants 20 
Transport 48% 
Truck dealers and repair services 29 
Customs clearing shipping & forwarding 95 
Distribution consultants 20 
Distribution and packing services 24 
 Logistics 28% 
Warehousing & storage 48 
Ship repair and maintenance 45 
Manufacturing firms using commodities as resources About 20 
 Manufacturing 13% 
Specialized suppliers of manufacturing activities About 10 
Commodity traders About 20 Trade 4% 
Port related trade agents About 10 
Total 100%  About 680  
Source: Jones, 1999, Durban Yellow Pages 2002 
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Only data on levy payers are available to identify the relevant cluster region. In this data 
source firms are grouped in a number of industries. These are not detailed enough to single 
out port related manufacturing and trading firms, but good enough to identify cargo handling, 
transport and logistics firms. The concentration analysis is based on these firms alone. The 
results of the concentration analysis are given in Table 28. The municipalities with a 
concentration index of 1.7 of higher (bold in the table) are part of the port cluster region.   
Table 28: The port cluster region in Durban (based on data for 2002) 
Municipality Share cluster activities in municipality 
Chatsworth 6.0% 
Inanda 4.1% 
Durban 3.5% 
Camperdown 2.8% 
Pinetown 2.7% 
Umzintu 1.7% 
Umlazi 0.9% 
 
8.7 The cluster population and port region in the LMPC 
The cluster population of the LMPC can be determined relatively well, because US Census 
publishes detailed establishment statistics. Table 29 shows the cluster population of the 
LMPC. 
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Table 29: the cluster population of the LMPC (data for 2002) 
Cluster 
component 
Share total firms 
in cluster 
Description Number of 
firms 
Port and Harbor Operations 20 Cargo handling 8% 
Marine Cargo Handling 76 
Petroleum Bulk Stations and Terminals 54 
Line-Haul Railroads 8 
Deep Sea Freight Transportation 63 
Navigational Services to Shipping 86 
Other Support Activities for Water Transportation 61 
Coastal and Great Lakes Freight Transportation 81 
Inland Water Freight Transportation 63 
General Freight Trucking, Long-Distance 114 
Pipeline Transportation of Crude Oil 20 
Transport 47% 
Pipeline Transportation of Refined Petroleum Products 2 
Freight Transportation arrangement 159 
General Warehousing and Storage 22 
Refrigerated Warehousing and Storage 6 
Other Warehousing and Storage 20 
Logistics 19% 
Process, Physical Distribution, and Logistics Consulting 
Services 16 
Ship Building and Repairing (only repair) 52 
Flour milling & malt mfg 3 
Petroleum refineries 9 
Industrial gas mfg 19 
Petrochemical Manufacturing 17 
Manufacturing 10% 
Primary metal mfg 10 
Metal & mineral (except petroleum)  Wholesalers 84 
Transportation Equipment and Supplies Wholesalers 58 
Grain and Field Bean Wholesalers 17 
Trade 16% 
Petroleum and Petroleum Products Wholesalers  28 
Total   1,168 
Source: US Bureau of Census (2003)  
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The availability of data to analyze the relevant cluster region for the LMPC is relatively good. 
Apart from the port facilities in the LMPC, port infrastructure exists in other Louisiana 
Counties. Therefore, we have limited the analysis of the relevant cluster region to the 
counties located at the banks of the Mississippi river. Table 30 shows the results of a 
concentration analysis for different counties.  
Table 30: The relevant cluster region of the LMPC (based on data for 2002) 
County Total 
number of 
firms 
Share cluster 
activities 
Specialization 
index 
Plaquemines 
Of which: cluster 
activities 
737 86 11.7% 8.2 
West Baton- Rouge 430 38 8.8% 6.2 
Lafourche 1,836 155 5.9 8.4% 
St James 313 21 6.7% 4.7 
St. John 626 37 5.9% 4.2 
St. Charles 884 52 5.9% 4.1 
Iberville 542 28 5.2% 3.6 
Terrebonne 2,698 108 4.0% 2.8 
St. Bernard 1,191 41 3.4% 2.4 
Ascension 1,518 45 3.0% 2.1 
Jefferson 12,842 337 2.6% 1.8 
Orleans 10,619 220 2.1% 1.5 
Assumption 248 4 1.6% 1.1 
Livingston 1,228 19 1.5% 1.1 
St Tammary 4,634 68 1.5% 1.0 
East Baton Rouge 11,499 164 1.4% 1.0 
Source: US Bureau of Census (2003) 
 
The counties with a specialization index of more than 1.5 are included in the cluster region. 
The counties Orleans and Jefferson, with by far the largest number of port related firms, 
have a relatively low specialization index. As in Rotterdam, this is explained by the presence 
of large numbers of service firms in these metropolitan areas.  
 

 9 STRUCTURE, GOVERNANCE AND 
PERFORMANCE IN SEAPORT CLUSTERS; 
LITERATURE REVIEW AND RESEARCH ISSUES  
In this chapter relevant research on ports is discussed and used to develop survey 
propositions and research issues for the interviews and desk research.  
9.1 Structure and performance in port clusters; literature review 
In the theoretical part, four performance variables related to the structure of a cluster were 
identified. For each of those the port specific literature is reviewed.  
9.1.1 Agglomeration economies 
A number of studies have dealt with the particular agglomeration (dis)economies 
(knowledge, labor pool, presence of customers and suppliers, land prices and congestion), 
but not with reference to the term agglomeration economies. Furthermore an analysis of all 
(dis)economies is lacking. 
The effects of a presence of customers and suppliers in ports on the attractiveness of a 
seaport have not been studied. The ‘agglomerating effect’ of knowledge is acknowledged 
(see Slack 1988 and Haynes et al 1997), but empirical studies are lacking. The effect of the 
presence of a shared labor pool on the attractiveness of a seaport has not been studied. 
Various studies and reports deal with the changing size of port labor requirements and labor 
transition problems (Dinwoodie, 2000, Van Driel, 1988)). Whether or not the presence of a 
labor pool increases the attractiveness of a port cluster has not been studied. Studies do 
show that port labor is relatively expensive (De Langen et al, 2003).  
Musso et al observe that ‘many (port) industries, suffering from the relative scarcity and/or 
high prices of space, (…) have moved to regions where these inputs are available at better 
conditions’ (Musso et al p. 283). They also mention the diseconomy of congestion in 
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seaports. However, an analysis of the level of land prices and/or congestion in seaports and 
its effects on the attractiveness of seaports is lacking. 
Van Klink’s (1995) work is the most sophisticated study on agglomeration in seaports. He 
identifies factors that influence the attractiveness of ports. These are given in Table 31, 
together with the ‘supply profile’ of the port of Rotterdam. 
Table 31: Van Klink’s assessment of Rotterdam’s agglomeration (dis)economies 
Agglomeration (dis)economy Supply profile Rotterdam 
Logistics know-how *** 
Costs of land * 
Labor climate (including training and work attitude) * 
Efficiency of road network * 
Source: Van Klink, 1995 
*: weakness of Rotterdam, ***: strength of Rotterdam 
 
According to van Klink, knowledge is an agglomerating force for Rotterdam’s port cluster. 
The scarcity of land and congestion are agglomeration diseconomies in Rotterdam. Van 
Klink regards the labor climate as a force towards deconcentration of port related activities, 
because of high wages and limited flexibility of port work. In the economic geography 
school, the quality of labor is regarded as a force towards concentration.  
9.1.2 Internal competition  
The port specific literature on competition mostly deals with external competition: 
competition between different ports (Verhoeff, 1981). The issue of internal competition in 
seaports has been discussed for a number of port activities, such as towage (see Atkin and 
Rowlinson, 2000). Internal competition in cargo handling and port services is limited, or even 
absent in many seaports (World Bank, 2000, Goss and Stevens, 2000). This stems from the 
fact that the ‘minimum efficient scale’ of these activities is large compared to the market 
size. Haezendonck (2001), relying on Porter’s framework (Porter, 1990), regards the 
presence of internal competition as beneficial for the competitiveness of a seaport. 
Haezendonck’s survey results show that industry experts regard the presence of internal 
competition in Antwerp as a factor enhancing the competitiveness of this port cluster. 
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In the theoretical part, three arguments for the positive effect of internal competition on 
cluster performance were discussed. Studies on internal competition in seaports deal only 
with the monopoly rent argument; the specialization argument and vibrant environment 
argument have not been studied.  
Following the monopoly argument, the importance of internal competition depends on the 
fierceness of external competition. When external competition is perfect, the absence of 
internal competition does not affect the performance of the cluster. External competition in 
cargo handling is perfect in two cases67: 
• When all shippers can switch cargo without costs to different ports. This is the exception 
rather than the rule: in most ports, industries related to the port generate substantial 
cargo volumes; these cannot be switched without costs to another port. 
• When the captive hinterland (where switching costs are high, see Sardent, [1938]) is 
relatively small compared to the contestable hinterland (where switching costs for 
shippers are low) and terminal handling companies cannot charge different prices for 
cargo, depending on whether cargo is captive or not. In this case the terminal operator 
does not increase revenues by raising prices, because the ‘substitution effect’ (shippers 
who switch cargo to a different port) is larger than the ‘price effect’ (revenue increase 
because of higher prices).  
If the contestable hinterland is relatively large, or terminal operators can charge different 
prices for cargo in the different segments68, external competition is imperfect. In container 
shipping, terminal operators cannot segment the market. As a consequence, external 
competition is sufficient to prevent monopoly pricing unless ports have a large captive 
                                          
67  These specific cases are only relevant when entry barriers prevent entry of new firms. Legal 
entry barriers exist in the majority of ports, especially in the cargo handling and port services 
industries. Furthermore, high specific investments are required in the terminal handling industry 
and physical conditions limit possibilities for entry. In general, entry barriers are relatively high in 
the above-mentioned industries. 
68  This segmentation is conceivable when terminal operators have contractual agreements with 
shippers but impossible when they have agreements with shipping lines because shipping lines 
can shift relatively large amounts of cargo easily between ports.  
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hinterland. In other cargo handling markets, where shippers have contracts with terminal 
operators, monopoly pricing for captive customers is possible.  
Even when the ‘monopoly argument’ is not valid, internal competition does add to the 
performance of a port cluster when at least one of the other two arguments - the vibrant 
environment argument and the specialization argument - hold. These arguments for 
promoting internal competition are not (widely) used in the port industry. This issue is 
addressed in the interviews with experts. 
9.1.3 Cluster barriers 
The influence of cluster entry and exit barriers on performance has not been studied in port 
clusters69. Nevertheless, the European Union directive (The port package, European 
Commission, 2001) emphasizes the importance of market access in seaports. The 
commission argues that market access is limited in many European seaports.  
9.1.4 Heterogeneity of the cluster population 
The issue of firm heterogeneity in port clusters has not received serious academic attention. 
Winkelmans (1984) touches on the issue when he argues that: 
It is important to acknowledge that a port and the port region are one entity (…). 
When one part is not, or not sufficiently present, the whole entity functions less 
well. The commercial function is a good example: one easily ignores the fact that 
the attractiveness of a port is largely influenced by the presence of trading 
companies, banks, insurance companies and auctions. Such activities are, on top 
of that, more difficult to develop than the traditional port infrastructure 
(Winkelmans, 1984, p 6 translation Peter de Langen). 
In Winkelmans' words, ‘the sum is more than the individual components’. Winkelmans does 
not provide a theoretical argument to substantiate this claim, the arguments provided in the 
theoretical part of this study are not explicitly mentioned, but are in line with Winkelmans’ 
claim.  
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9.2 Structure and performance in port clusters; research set-up 
Table 32 shows the research set-up used for the cases. The survey propositions are derived 
from the literature review in the preceding section. Some issues receive special attention in 
the expert interviews and desk research, because they are relevant in seaports, but have 
not been addressed in the literature. 
                                                                                                                                                    
69  Haralambides et al (2002) deal with terminal concessions, but not with reference to the issue of 
entry barriers. 
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Table 32: Research findings, survey questions and issues related to the structure of port clusters 
Issue Relevant 
research 
Survey propositions (P1 to P16) and additional survey 
questions 
Issues for expert 
interviews and 
desk research 
Agglo-
meration 
eco-
nomies 
Knowledge 
and 
information 
are 
concentrated 
in ports (Slack 
1988) 
Congestion 
and high land 
prices can be 
observed in 
some ports 
(Musso et al, 
2000). 
P1: The presence of a labor pool is a reason for firms to 
locate in a seaport. 
P1a: Because the port labor pool is relatively overpaid and 
unionized, firms prefer to locate outside seaports. 
P2: The presence of suppliers and customers is a reason for 
firms to locate in a seaport. 
P3: The presence of (specific) knowledge and information is a 
reason for firms to locate in a seaport. 
P4: Relatively much congestion in and around seaports 
causes a relocation of firms to locations outside the seaport 
cluster. 
P5: Relatively high land prices and office rent prices in a 
seaport cluster causes a relocation of firms outside the 
seaport cluster. 
How important is 
the presence of 
knowledge and 
information? 
Internal 
com-
petition 
Internal 
competition 
contributes to 
the 
competitivene
ss of a port 
(Haezendonck
, 2001) 
P6:Internal competition reduces ‘switching costs’ for port 
users.  
P7: The presence of internal competition fosters specialization 
P8:Internal competition is characterized by social involvement 
and pride. This increases the fierceness of competition  
Respondents are asked to assess the fierceness of internal 
competition in five markets. 
What are the 
effects of fierce 
internal 
competition?  
 
Cluster 
barriers 
European 
Commission 
(2001) claims 
market access 
in European 
seaports is 
limited. 
P9: The access to (tacit) knowledge and networks is a ‘cluster 
specific barrier’ for entry and start-up  
P10: The unavailability of ‘local capital’ is a cluster specific 
barrier for start-up 
P11: The presence of labor that is ‘sticky’ to the port cluster is 
a cluster specific exit barrier  
P12: The presence of port specific investments is a cluster 
specific exit barrier 
P13: Barriers that prevent firms from ‘leaving the cluster 
increase the performance of port clusters 
P13a: High cluster exit barriers have a negative effect on the 
performance of that cluster in the long run, because they 
reduce the pressure to renew the economic base of that 
cluster. 
What is the 
‘dynamic effect’ of 
exit barriers?  
Hetero-
geneity 
No studies, 
Winkelmans 
(1984) states 
that the sum 
of the port 
cluster is more 
than its 
individual 
components. 
P14: The heterogeneity of the cluster population enlarges 
opportunities for cooperation and innovation 
P14a: Cooperation between firms inside clusters is of minor 
importance compared to cooperation between firms in 
clusters and others outside clusters.  
P15: Heterogeneity of the cluster population reduces the 
vulnerability of a cluster for external shocks. 
P16: Heterogeneity of the resource base of a cluster reduces 
the vulnerability for external shocks.  
Respondents are asked to indicate the importance of three 
dimensions of heterogeneity. 
Do firms 
cooperate with 
partners at a 
relatively large 
‘cognitive 
distance’? 
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9.3 Governance and performance in seaports; literature review 
In the theoretical part, four performance variables related to the governance of a cluster 
were identified. For each of those, the port specific literature is reviewed.  
9.3.1 The relation between cluster governance and cluster performance 
The concept ‘cluster governance’ has not been applied to seaport clusters; it is a new 
approach for analyzing seaports. The role of port authorities70 has been studied extensively 
(Goss, 1990A and 1990B, Stevens, 1999). Notwithstanding the important roles of port 
authorities71, limiting the analysis of cluster governance to an analysis of the port authority is 
shortsighted, because it neglects the roles of other actors in the governance of a port 
cluster. The behavior of the port authority is conditioned by the behavior of other actors in 
the cluster and port authorities are ‘responsive’ to initiatives from the private sector. This 
implies that the role of the private sector should receive attention when analyzing 
governance in port clusters.  
9.3.2 Trust 
Even though the notion of a port community has been dealt with (Fleming, 1987) the issue of 
trust in clusters has not been analyzed. Haezendonck (2001) shows that both cooperation 
within the cluster and cooperation with actors outside the cluster are relevant; she does not 
analyze what factors influence cooperation or the role of trust in enabling cooperation. 
                                          
70  Stevens (1999) for instance analyzed the institutional position of port authorities in seaports, but 
nevertheless the title of his book is ‘the institutional position of seaports’.  
71  Drewry Shipping Consultants put it like this: ‘The modern port can be described as a community 
of independent enterprises tied together by a common interest in maritime affairs. Central to this 
community is an entity known as the port authority, always a regulator, usually a landowner, 
often a developer and sometimes a terminal operator’ (Drewry Shipping Consultants, 1998, p 
6). 
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9.3.3 The presence of intermediaries 
The changing position of intermediaries in the (trans)port industry has been analyzed by 
Verhoeff (1980), but not with reference to their role in governance. Haezendonck (2001) 
identifies the presence of intermediaries as a potential source of competitive advantage and 
finds that the presence of intermediaries, more specifically forwarders and shipping agents, 
adds to the competitiveness of Antwerp’s port cluster. At least six intermediaries play a role 
in the port cluster:  
• Forwarders, mediating between shippers and providers of transport services. 
• Non-asset based logistics service providers, mediating between shippers and providers 
of logistics services, such as storage, quality control and assembling. 
• Ship brokers, mediating between shipowners and providers of shipping services. 
• Ship’s agents, mediating between shipowners and providers of port services and 
mediating between shipowners and shippers. 
• Commodity traders, mediating between producers of commodities and buyers of those 
commodities. 
• Associations. This is a different kind of intermediary, because its aim is to promote the 
interests of its members, but is included in the analysis of intermediaries, since it has an 
important mediating role, for instance between different members, between members 
and the government and between members and research institutes. 
9.3.4 Embedded leader firms 
In the theoretical part we defined leader firms as ‘firms with the ability and incentives to 
make investment with positive effects for other firms in the cluster’. Studies on the presence 
and behavior of such firms in the port industry are lacking. The only actor that has been 
attributed a role of a leader firm is the port authority (Drewry Shipping Consultants, 1998 and 
Winkelmans and Notteboom, 2001). De Langen and Nijdam (2003) analyze leader firm 
behavior in the maritime cluster, and show that leader firms do create substantial benefits for 
other firms in the cluster. Callahan (1981) analyzes the role of ‘port barons’ in Rotterdam in 
the 19th century.  
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9.3.5 Collective action regimes 
A variety of firms, such as terminal operators, towage firms, pilots, inland shipping service 
providers and transport intermediaries contribute to a joint port service. Shippers decide 
whether or not to use ports on the basis of the quality of the ‘total port product’. Investments 
to improve the port service thus have benefits for various firms in the port cluster. When 
investments have benefits for a large number of firms in the cluster and these benefits 
cannot be priced (internalized) effectively, a collective action problem (CAP) is present.  
Innovation is a first CAP in seaports. Innovation regimes72 influence the size of ‘knowledge 
spillovers’ (see Edquist, 1997, Cooke 1998 Asheim, 1996 and Paniccia, 1999). Innovation 
regimes differ between clusters and these differences affect performance (Belussi and 
Gottardi, 2000). Associations can play a role as knowledge intermediaries. Public-private 
knowledge institutes and public research centers can also play a role in an innovation 
regime. Innovation regimes in seaports have not received attention. 
Training and education is a second CAP73. Associations can provide education and 
collective bargaining for education. Furthermore, associations monitor the quality of the 
‘education and training infrastructure’, consisting of public and public-private education 
institutes. Even though education in the maritime industry has been discussed, (Dinwoodie, 
2000) these studies do not analyze ‘education regimes’ in seaports. 
Internationalization is a third CAP. Internationalization of firms is predominantly a market 
driven process, but the local embeddedness of firms in a cluster74 can be a barrier for 
internationalization. This barrier arises because of ‘lock-ins’, ties that ‘blind’ (Pouder and St. 
John, 1996) and a closed inward orientation (Porter, 1990 terms such clusters ‘insular 
clusters’). Internationalization requires firms in clusters to be included in external ‘open’ 
                                          
72  Cooke (1998) uses the term ‘regional system of innovation’, Brackzyk et al (1998) the term 
‘regional innovation systems’. 
73  Since labor is mobile, all firms in a cluster benefit indirectly from investments in training and 
education.  
74  Albertini (1999) argues that internationalization is indeed to some extent a ‘collective process’: 
‘the main transformation process can be identified in the evolution of the district from closed 
contextual ‘community networks’ to ‘semantic’ and ‘market’ networks –that are open and 
integrated with the global economy’ (Albertini, 1999, p. 113). 
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networks (Blackburn et al, 1993). External networks guarantee that a cluster remains open 
for new developments. Such networks increase the ‘propensity to change’ (see Best, 1990).  
Associations can play a role in an internationalization regime, for instance by providing 
information, by monitoring export regulations, by organizing collective representation and by 
acting as a ‘bridging tie’. A public port authority can engage in similar activities to reduce the 
barriers to internationalization. The internationalization of terminal operators has been 
analyzed, but arrangements to support the internationalization of firms in a port cluster have 
not been studied.   
Marketing and promotion is a fourth CAP. Marketing and promotion activities in seaports can 
have two goals: first, to attract companies to the port cluster; and second, to attract cargo to 
the port. Both activities have collective good characteristics: firms benefit indirectly from 
these marketing efforts, but these benefits cannot be priced (in advance). Van Klink and Van 
Winden (1999) have analyzed the ‘port marketing regime’ in Hamburg and Rotterdam. In 
Hamburg a collective marketing organization integrates services of the different associated 
firms into ‘packages’ for potential customers. In Rotterdam, the marketing organization plays 
a much more limited role (Van Klink and Van Winden, 1999).  
Hinterland access is a fifth CAP. Hinterland access is crucial for the attractiveness of 
seaports (Kreukels and Wever, 1998). Individual firms cannot fully appropriate the benefits 
of a good hinterland access: a variety of firms in the cluster receive benefits. Thus, collective 
action could generate resources to improve the hinterland access. 
An important issue in this respect is the role of inland nodes in a port network. Van Klink 
(1995) convincingly argues that ports benefit from creating networks with inland nodes. 
Investments of the port authority, together with private port operators and other 
stakeholders, can improve the hinterland access. In some ports port authorities and firms in 
the port cluster do invest in hinterland nodes, examples include investments of Marseilles in 
Lyon, Amsterdam in Duisburg and Hamburg in a variety of eastern European countries. 
Such investments can be analyzed as the results of the ‘hinterland access regime’. 
The role of port authorities 
The role of the (public) port authority in port clusters differs substantially from public 
involvement in other clusters. The role of the port authority is discussed frequently (see 
Goss, 1990A and 1990B, and Stevens, 1999), but not from the perspective that a port is a 
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cluster, where collective action problems have to be solved. We claim that the ‘institutional 
position’ of the port authority can be described with the term ‘cluster manager’. For this 
reason, one could assume that collective action regimes in port clusters are relatively 
effective compared to other clusters. This issue is not addressed in this study, but deserves 
further attention. 
A ‘perfect’ cluster manager would be an organization with the following four characteristics: 
1. A cluster manager has incentives to invest in the cluster, because its revenues are 
related to the performance of the cluster. The ‘perfect’ revenue structure of a cluster 
manager would be a share of the value added generated in the cluster, for instance 
through a ‘cluster tax’.  
2. A cluster manager operates self-sustaining: over time investments equal revenues. 
Cluster managers are not-for-profit organizations, but do not receive subsidies either. 
3. A cluster manager aims to recover investment costs as much as possible from firms 
that benefit from the investments, through co-finance arrangements with these firms. 
However, investments cannot be directly recovered because benefits ‘spill-over’ to other 
firms in the cluster. Therefore, cluster managers need revenues (the cluster tax) that 
are not directly related to expenditures so that they have resources to invest in the 
cluster.  
4. The ‘investment rule’ of a cluster manager is to invest when ‘cluster benefits’ exceed 
costs and when (coalitions of) private firms in the cluster do not invest, because a 
substantial part of the benefits are ‘external’ to the (coalition of) firm(s)75. 
The institutional position of landlord port authorities, especially those with a regional 
jurisdiction, resembles a perfect cluster manager76. The port authority owns the land in the 
                                          
75  These four characteristics are institutional ones; one could add managerial characteristics to a 
perfect cluster manager, such as ‘legitimacy in the cluster’. 
76  The ‘Hanzeatic port model’ (Kreukels and Wever, 1998) where the local or regional 
administration controls the port authority, is relatively widespread, especially in continental 
Europe. In this model the port authority has an additional motive, apart from the 
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port. Its revenue comes from port dues77 and lease rents78. Landlord ports are (in general) 
self-sustaining and non-profit organizations. The revenues of port authorities are related to 
the performance of the cluster as a whole: revenues from port dues and lease contracts go 
up when the cluster performs well. As a consequence, port authorities have incentives to 
invest in the performance of the cluster. Furthermore, landlord port authorities only invest 
when private firms are not willing to invest. Port authorities invest in activities such as port 
safety and port marketing. Since a variety of firms receive benefits of these investments, no 
individual firm is willing to make such investments. Thus, port authorities have the position to 
act as a cluster manager79. Following the cluster manager perspective they ‘should’ invest 
when benefits for the cluster exceed costs for the cluster. Furthermore, they ‘should’ recover 
costs as specifically as possible, but given the fact that a part of the benefits cannot be 
priced directly, both land prices and port dues are mechanisms to recover costs in an 
indirect manner.  
In Table 33 a distinction between two types of justifications for investments of port 
authorities is made: justification with reference to the role of port authorities as landlords, 
and reference to the role of port authorities as cluster managers.  
                                                                                                                                                    
abovementioned economic incentives, to invest in the port cluster: it generates employment and 
value added in the port region. For regional policy makers, such effects are important. 
77  Charges for shipowners/ship operators are termed ‘port dues’ and in most cases related to the 
size of vessels.  
78  Port authorities lease land to firms such as terminal operators, warehousing and manufacturing 
firms. In some cases cargo owners also pay a charge to the port authority. These charges are 
termed wharfage and in general related to the volume and/or the value of goods. The latter 
does not make sense from an economic point of view and is little used. Volume based wharfage 
is also not widespread, since cargo owners indirectly pay all transport costs anyway and 
transaction costs are high.   
79  Seaports clusters are special because of the prominent role of port authorities. In many other 
clusters, such as the Dutch maritime cluster (De Langen, 2002) the shipbuilding cluster in the 
Northern Netherlands (Van Klink and De Langen, 2001) and Silicon Valley (Hall and Markusen, 
1985) a central actor with a similar set of incentives, resources and a similar institutional 
position is lacking. Therefore, cluster management is likely to be more advanced in seaports 
than in other clusters. 
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Investments justified with reference to the landlord role are those investments that a) 
improve the quality and safety of the transport node and b) are recovered directly from the 
shippers and terminal operators. Investments on top of the landlord investments are justified 
from the perspective that a port authority is also a cluster manager.  
Table 33 shows examples of investments whose costs can be recovered with direct charges 
and investments that need to be financed in an indirect manner. A distinction is made 
between ‘basic’ and ‘advanced’ investments. The basic investments are standard practice 
among port authorities across the globe. Only a part of the port authorities make ‘advanced 
investments’. Consequently, the latter are potential sources of superior governance. Table 
33 shows examples of investments in each of the four ‘quadrants’.  
Table 33: The role of port authorities as cluster managers 
Role of port 
authority 
Direct cost recovery Indirect cost recovery 
Investments in 
port cluster 
(location) 
Hinterland terminals (dry ports) 
Industrial pipeline infrastructure 
Logistics zones 
Dedicated freight transport systems 
Venture capital provision 
Office space provision for SME’s 
Web-based port community system 
ICT system for commodity trade 
Innovation platforms and research 
projects 
Training and education infrastructure 
Promotion port as working environment 
Investments in 
transport node  
Quay construction 
Land reclamation and development 
Cargo handling equipment 
Traffic control 
Dredging 
Waste collection 
Port security 
Port marketing and promotion 
 
 
A high level of investments with indirect financing requires high port charges. Figure 15 
visualizes the ‘optimal investment quantity’ of (port) cluster managers. 
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Figure 15: Optimal investment quantity of a cluster manager 
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Port authorities have a certain minimum investment level, for instance for dredging and 
maintenance. Up to a certain point, an increase in port charges combined with more 
investments in the port cluster increases the performance of the port. After a certain 
optimum level of investments, further tariff increases combined with more investments 
reduce the performance of the port cluster. In the optimum investment level marginal costs 
equal marginal benefits: the effect of an additional investment in the port cluster has the 
same effect as a marginal reduction of port charges. Furthermore, the marginal benefits of a 
‘reservation’ for future investments also equal marginal costs80.  This background provides a 
basis for analyzing the roles of port authorities in the three cases. 
                                          
80  Finally, the marginal effects of the two different tariffs are the same as well: a reduction of land 
prices has the same effect on the cluster performance as the reduction of port dues.  
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9.4 Governance and performance in port clusters; research set-up 
Table 34 shows the research set-up used for the cases. The survey propositions are derived 
from the literature review in the preceding section. Issues for desk research are relevant in 
seaports, but have not been addressed in the literature. 
Table 34: Research findings, survey questions and issues for expert interviews related to governance. 
Issue Relevant research 
findings 
Survey propositions (P1 to P6) and 
additional survey questions 
Issues for expert 
interviews and desk 
research 
General The importance of 
governance in 
ports is not widely 
acknowledged 
P1: Differences in the governance of a 
cluster have an effect of the performance 
of port clusters. 
P1a: The development of port clusters is a 
result of the interplay of market forces and 
(inter)national policies. The quality of local 
governance does not have a substantial 
effect on performance. 
What actors play a role in 
the governance of the 
port? 
What is the ‘institutional 
structure’ of the port 
cluster? 
Trust The issue of trust 
in port clusters 
has not been 
studied 
P2: The level of trust can vary between 
port clusters. Trust lowers transaction 
costs and thus contributes to the 
performance of a port cluster. 
Is there a culture of trust in 
the port cluster? 
Are reputation effects im-
portant in the port cluster? 
Presence of 
inter-
mediaries 
The presence of 
intermediaries 
adds to the 
performance of 
port clusters 
(Haezendonck, 
2001) 
P3: The presence of intermediaries adds 
to the performance of port clusters, 
because these intermediaries lower the 
costs of coordination in a cluster. 
How relevant are the 
traditional intermediaries? 
Are there new kinds of 
intermediaries? 
Presence of 
leader firms 
Leader firm 
behavior in ports 
has not been 
studied 
P4: The presence of embedded leader 
firms adds to the performance of port 
clusters 
What are leader firms in 
the three cases? Is it their 
strategy to have a positive 
impact on the cluster as a 
whole? 
Quality of 
solutions for 
CAP’s 
Marketing and 
promotion is a 
relevant regime in 
seaports (Van 
Klink and van 
Winden, 1999). 
Hinterland access 
requires 
cooperation. 
Forms of 
cooperation have 
not been studied. 
P5: The quality of solutions to collective 
action problems influences the 
performance of the port cluster. 
P6: The collective action problem in 
seaports is relevant for the issues 
innovation, education and training, 
marketing and acquisition, 
internationalization and hinterland access. 
Experts are asked to indicate whether the 
five CAP’s are present, the importance of 
these CAP’s and the quality of the 
solutions to these CAP’s  
What forms of cooperation 
have developed in 
seaports? 
How do actors try to create 
coalitions to solve CAP’s? 
To what extent do port 
authorities act as cluster 
managers? 
 

 10 STRUCTURE AND PERFORMANCE IN SEAPORT 
CLUSTERS; RESULTS OF THE CASE STUDIES 
In this chapter the effects of agglomeration economies, internal competition, cluster barriers 
and heterogeneity are discussed, each in one paragraph. The survey results are given in a 
series of tables, each presented in the same way. Two calculations to analyze the statistical 
significance of these results are used: 
• A calculation of the significance of expert opinions. For instance, only when a relatively 
large majority of experts agrees or disagrees with a proposition, can their judgment be 
safely claimed to be the common ‘expert opinion’. The ‘one sample T-test’ can be used 
to calculate the significance of these survey results. In general, results will be taken to 
be significant when the majority that agrees or disagrees is so large that the chance that 
these results are a ‘coincidence’ (when more experts would have been surveyed the 
results would not hold) is lower than 5%81. This test is done for the overall ‘expert 
opinion’ and for the three particular cases. 
• An analysis of the significance of the differences of results between the cases. The 
significance of these differences can be analyzed by an ‘independent samples test’. 
This test determines whether differences between the cases are significant in the sense 
that the chance that they are a ‘coincidence’ is lower than 5%. This test only yields 
relevant results when it can be assumed that the experts in the three cases have the 
same reference point. In general this is the case, but the judgment of the quality of trust 
for instance, experts are likely to have different (nation specific) reference points. For 
the agree/disagree questions and the rating questions experts do have the same 
reference point, since these questions deal specifically with port clusters.  
The propositions in the table are given in their general form (‘the port cluster’). The 
respondents answered the questions specifically for ‘their’ port cluster (for instance 
                                          
81  With regard to the propositions, the ‘average response’ of the experts is compared with an 
outcome where half of the experts agree and the other half disagrees.    
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‘Durban’s port cluster’). Three answers are possible to the propositions: agree (A), disagree 
(D) and no opinion (NO).   
10.1 Agglomeration economies 
Table 35 shows the opinion of the experts in the three cases with regard to six propositions 
on agglomeration economies. 
Table 35: Agglomeration advantages of a port cluster 
 Total LMPC Rotterdam Durban 
Agglomeration advantages A D NO A D A D A D 
The presence of a cluster specific labor force in port 
cluster is a reason for firms to locate in the port 
cluster. 
60 37 7 19* 8 29* 11 12** 18** 
The presence of cluster related customers and 
suppliers in the port cluster is a reason for firms to 
locate in the port cluster. 
86* 16 1 17 10 42* 1 27* 5 
The presence of cluster related knowledge and 
information in the port cluster is a reason for firms to 
locate in the port cluster 
77* 20 4 18 6 35* 7 24* 7 
Relatively high land prices and scarcity of land in the 
port cluster induce firms to leave the cluster. 43 54 5 5 21* 24 14 14 19 
A relatively high level of congestion in the port cluster 
induces firms to leave the cluster. 32 70* 2 5 22* 9 32* 18** 16** 
The high wage level and power of labor organizations 
in the port cluster induce firms to leave the cluster. 29 72* 3 3 23* 21** 20** 5 29* 
A = agree, D = disagree, NO = no opinion 
*  Significant majority of experts (from across the cases or one particular case)  
**  Significantly different from other cases 
 
The following conclusions can be drawn on the basis of these results: 
• The presence of customers and suppliers is a clear agglomeration force. Firms are 
attracted to port clusters because customers and suppliers are located in a cluster.  
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• The presence of information and knowledge is a second clear agglomeration force. A 
significant majority of the experts claim that knowledge and information attract firms to 
the port cluster. 
• The presence of qualified labor is regarded as an agglomeration force in Rotterdam and 
the LMPC, but not in Durban. This is because labor is present everywhere in Kwazulu 
Natal and the labor pool in Durban is not regarded as well trained or skillful. 
• Congestion82 is not regarded as a reason for firms to locate outside the cluster. In 
Rotterdam and the LMPC, the vast majority of experts do not regard congestion as a 
‘disagglomeration force’, primarily because congestion is currently ‘under control’.  
• In Rotterdam, relatively many experts indicate that the wage level is higher and union 
power is stronger in the cluster than outside the cluster. However, the experts still 
indicate that a cluster specific labor force attracts firms to the cluster. Thus, the quality 
and availability of labor in the cluster must be relatively good.  
The answers to the proposition ‘The presence of a cluster specific labor force in port cluster 
is a reason for firms to locate in the port cluster’ depend on the size of the respondent’s 
firm83. Experts from small firms agree more than experts from large firms. This is explained 
by the fact that small firms benefit from the labor pool because they employ only a limited 
number of people that can be ‘sourced’ from the shared labor pool, whereas large firms with 
a continuous demand for labor depend on the ‘supply’ of new employees and are confronted 
with the limited attractiveness of the port cluster as a working environment. Table 36 shows 
the distribution of responses. 
                                          
82  Both maritime congestion (waiting ships) and congestion of hinterland modes are relevant. 
Maritime congestion hardly occurs in the LMPC and Rotterdam. 
83  The significance of the difference is smaller than 10%, but that is explained by the small number 
of respondents 
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Table 36: Distribution of responses with regard to the first proposition of table 34 (on labor) (N=9084) 
  Experts from small firms Experts from large firms Total 
Agree 34 (68%) 20 (50%) 54 
Disagree 16 (32 %) 20 (50%) 36 
Total  50 40 90 
 
The importance of the five agglomeration and disagglomeration forces was surveyed, by 
asking the experts to rank all ten ‘cluster structure variables’ from 1 (most important 
variable) tot 10 (least important variable). The average rankings of the five 
(dis)agglomeration forces are given in Table 37.  
Table 37: Importance of five (dis)agglomeration forces 
Variable LMPC Rotterdam Durban Total 
Customers & suppliers 2.7* 2.0* 2.2* 2.2* 
Labor force 4.7 4.1 3.7 4.0** 
Knowledge spillovers 4.1 5.1 7.5*** 5.9 
Congestion 6.7 6.8 5.1**** 6.1 
Land prices & office rents 7.9 5.8 6.6 6.4 
Average scores on a scale from 1 (most important) to 10 (least important) 
*  Significantly more important than other four factors 
**  Significantly more important than 3 least important factors 
***  Significantly less important than in other two ports 
****  Significantly more important than in other two ports 
On the basis of these results four important conclusions can be drawn. First, the presence of 
customers and suppliers is by far the most important agglomeration force in seaports. In all 
three cases this variable is ranked as more important than the other variables. This is an 
important finding, especially given the fact that ports are widely analyzed as transport nodes. 
Cargo moves through seaports when costs are minimized, firms locate in ports primarily 
                                          
84  This number is lower than in table 34, because some experts did not fill in the number of 
employees.  
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because ports are clusters of economic activity. This explains why there is not ‘causal 
relation’ between the cargo throughput and value added in ports.  
Second, the agglomeration economies are regarded as more important than the 
diseconomies (congestion and land prices). This indicates that further clustering of activities 
in seaports is more likely than spatial deconcentration of port related activities. 
Third, the presence of knowledge and information is not a strong force towards clustering in 
seaports. In Durban, this factor is regarded as unimportant, in both other clusters the 
importance is moderate. Even though transport and logistics chains are closely related to an 
‘information chain’ and even though ports try to develop as ‘brainports’ (places where 
knowledge, information and expertise is concentrated), the cluster experts regard the 
presence of knowledge and information as a moderately important force for agglomeration.   
Fourth, contrary to a common opinion, congestion is not regarded as very important for the 
performance of a cluster. In the open interviews the reason for this was identified: port 
clusters have to scale to invest in solutions for the congestion problem, such as dedicated 
freight lanes, dynamic highway management and intermodal transport. Congestion in 
seaports is not necessary worse than elsewhere.  
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10.2 Internal competition 
Table 38 shows survey results with regard to propositions on the effects of internal 
competition, presented in the same way as in the preceding section. 
 
Table 38: Survey results on internal competition in port clusters 
 Total LMPC Rotterdam Durban 
Proposition A D NO A D A D A D 
Since the competitive environment is practically the 
same for competitors in the same port cluster, internal 
competition is a stronger force inducing firms to 
specialize than external competition. 
82* 17 2 20* 5 32* 10 30* 2 
Internal competition leads to low “switching costs” for 
port users; switching costs are higher when port 
services only face external competition. 
84* 9 8 19* 2 36* 4 29* 3 
Internal competition leads dynamism and a “vibrant 
competitive environment”. Such an environment is 
conducive for innovation.  
91* 9 2 21* 3 40* 3 30* 3 
 The presence of internal competition adds to the 
performance of the port cluster. 97* 2 3 25* 1 41* 1 31* 0 
A = agree, D = disagree, NO = no opinion 
*  Significant majority of experts  
 
Internal competition promotes specialization, it lowers switching costs and fosters 
innovation. Expert opinions clearly confirm the validity of the three arguments for the positive 
effects of internal competition on performance.  
These results are relevant given the lack of internal competition in cargo handling and port 
services in many port clusters. The expert assessment of the fierceness of internal 
competition is given in Table 39.   
 
Chapter 10 – Structure and Performance in Seaport Clusters; Results of the Cases  127
 
Table 39: Fierceness of internal competition (IC) in seven market segments in the cases 
 LMPC Rotterdam Durban 
Activity No IC Limited IC Fierce IC No IC Limited IC Fierce IC No IC Limited IC Fierce IC 
Container 1 13 10 3 33 * 4 24* 7 0 
Dry bulk 0 6 18* 1 37 * 2 2 18 6 
Liquid bulk 1 15 8 5 32 * 2 3 16 6 
Breakbulk 0 6 19* 1 28 * 11 0 13 15 
Pilotage 26* 0 0 38 * 4 0 31* 1 0 
Towage 0 16 9 2 28 * 11 31* 1 0 
Mooring 1 16 7 30 * 12 0 31* 1 0 
Overall frequency 17% 42% 41% 28% 61% 11% 59% 28% 13% 
*  Significant majority 
 
Pilotage is a regulated monopoly in all three ports. Especially in the LMPC, this monopoly 
has a clear negative effect on the performance of the cluster; this issue is discussed in more 
detail later. Apart from pilotage, internal competition in the LMPC is moderate to fierce. Two 
reasons explain the presence of internal competition in the LMPC.  
First the LMPC is not administered by one port authority, but by five competing port 
authorities. Entry is relatively easy because port authorities are eager to accommodate an 
entrant, even if this entrant duplicates existing port facilities. In contrast, in Rotterdam or 
Durban, entry is more difficult because the port authority is not necessarily interested in 
creating internal competition, especially when the minimum efficient scale is relatively large 
compared to the size of the market.  
Most experts indicate that the port authority in Rotterdam traditionally followed a strategy to 
enable local cargo handling firms to make a reasonable profit, based on the assumption that 
in this market environment these firms would be willing and able to make investments that 
improve the competitiveness of the port cluster. According to the experts, the port authority 
in Rotterdam started to encourage internal competition only recently, partially in response to 
the internationalization of the cargo handling industry. 
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A second reason for the fierceness of internal competition in the LMPC is the geography of 
the cluster: the cluster is not one compact port area, but a collection of port facilities 
stretched out along the river banks. Space for expansion is widely available, which makes 
entry easier. 
In the expert interviews in the LMPC the ‘specialization’ argument and ‘vibrant environment 
argument’ were validated. Experts indicate that internal competition in the LMPC is very 
fierce. Firms are willing to make specific investments to attract customers and continuously 
try to improve their performance. On the other hand, due to fierce competition in the LMPC 
average profitability is so low that most firms have limited resources for investments. 
In Durban, internal competition is limited in most cargo segments. Only in breakbulk is the 
competition moderate to fierce, in the other segments, including container handling, internal 
competition is limited or absent. This is widely regarded as a weakness of Durban’s port 
cluster. A tender procedure to lease the container handling facility to one private operator is 
planned. The dominant opinion of the experts from Durban is that this would seriously 
damage the competitiveness of Durban’s port cluster. 
In Rotterdam, internal competition is limited. In none of the seven market segments is 
internal competition fierce, even though Rotterdam is, in tons throughput, the largest seaport 
in the world. With regard to pilotage and mooring, efforts to introduce internal competition to 
date have failed.    
The argument that internal competition fosters specialization is supported by results from a 
small additional survey, carried out only in Rotterdam among the executives of four 
container terminal operators. All four executives agree with the proposition ‘internal 
competition fosters specialization’. These executives scored the importance of a number of 
variables for the competitive position, both vis-à-vis internal and external competitors. Table 
40 shows the results.   
 
Chapter 10 – Structure and Performance in Seaport Clusters; Results of the Cases  129
Table 40: Factors for the competitive position (N = 4, executives of all four container terminal operators) 
Internal competition Score External competition Score 
Price of services 4.8 Hinterland connections 5.0 
Reliability 4.0 Price of services 4.8 
Speed of handling 4.0 Geographical location 4.0 
Flexibility 3.8 Political factors 4.0 
Image of company 3.3 Reliability 3.8 
  Speed of handling 3.5 
  Flexibility 3.5 
Scale from 1 (not important) to 5 (very important) 
 
These results show that three of the four most important factors for external competition 
(hinterland connections, geographical location and political factors) differ between ports, but 
are the same for operators in the same port. These results suggest that internal competition 
‘sends stronger signals’ for increasing the performance than external competition, because a 
good performance translates directly into a better market position. 
Results from an additional survey in Durban show that when the number of internal 
competitors is two or more, internal competition is fiercer than external competition. When 
the number of internal competitors is less than two, external competition is fiercer. All these 
survey results provide evidence for the proposition that internal competition adds to the 
performance of port clusters. This has implications for policy and management in seaport 
clusters, since the results also show that (fierce) internal competition is not prevalent in most 
market segments in the three case studies. These implications are discussed later. 
The evidence presented above suggests that internal competition contributes to the 
performance of port clusters, but that, given the relative large minimum efficient scale, the 
number of internal competitors is likely to be limited. In this market, each service provider 
can specialize in a particular niche, in order to avoid destructive competition. Thus, perhaps 
the ‘ideal competition’ in clusters is between firms with a distinctive specialization that 
nevertheless compete. 
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10.3 Cluster barriers 
Seven propositions deal with the effects of cluster barriers on the performance of a cluster. 
Table 41: Survey results on the effects of cluster barriers 
 Total LMPC Rotterdam Durban 
Proposition A D NO A D A D A D 
High barriers to start a new business in a cluster 
reduce the performance of that cluster 87* 10 5 22* 1 34* 6 31* 3 
High barriers to ‘leave’ a cluster increase the 
performance of that cluster 
36 56 10 11 12 13 26 12 18 
High barriers to leave a cluster have a negative effect 
on the performance of that cluster in the long run, 
because they reduce the pressure to maintain the 
vitality of that cluster. 
73* 20 8 17 5 31 10 25* 5 
The inaccessibility of knowledge networks is a relevant 
barrier for entry and start-up. 
71* 32 0 22* 4 26 17 23 11 
The unavailability of ‘local capital’ is a relevant barrier 
for start-up. 
63 34 6 21* 4 17** 22** 25* 8 
The presence of labor that is ‘sticky’ to the port cluster 
is a relevant exit barrier. 58 43 2 11 14 30* 13 17 16 
The presence of specific investments is a relevant exit 
barrier 86* 9 4 20* 3 38* 4 28* 2 
A = agree, D = disagree, NO = no opinion 
*  Significant majority of experts (from across the cases or one particular case)  
**   Significantly different from other cases 
 
The following conclusions with regard to the effects of entry barriers can be derived from the 
survey results: 
• A significant majority of port cluster experts agree that entry barriers have a negative 
effect on the performance of a cluster. Most experts indicate that new entrants and 
start-ups are necessary for the cluster to remain vital.  
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• The most relevant entry barrier is the inaccessibility of knowledge and networks. In all 
three port clusters, networks are relatively closed and knowledge is relatively 
inaccessible. In the conversations this was explained with reference to a specific local 
‘port community’. This port community is internationally oriented but inaccessible for 
entrants with no prior expertise in the port cluster. Especially in the LMPC, the vast 
majority of respondents regard the cluster community as closed for outsiders. 
• A significant majority agrees that exit barriers have a negative effect on the cluster (in 
the long run). According to the experts, exit barriers reduce dynamism. This argument is 
regarded as more important than the ‘static’ argument that ‘firms committed to the 
cluster (because of high exit barriers) are more likely to invest in the quality of the 
cluster’.   
• Specific investments are regarded as a relevant exit barrier. Experts indicate this can 
also be regarded as an entry barrier. This underlines the theory that exit barriers are by 
definition entry barriers as well and provides an argument for port authorities to make 
specific investments - provided that firms are willing to lease these investments - in 
order to reduce entry barriers. This is an important result, because it implies that 
arrangements that lower the need for firms to invest in specific assets contribute to the 
performance of a port cluster. Possibilities for such arrangements are discussed later. 
• With regard to local capital, the difference between Rotterdam on the one hand and 
Durban and the LMPC on the other is striking. Contrary to Rotterdam, in the latter two 
clusters, the absence of ‘local capital’ is regarded as a relevant start-up barrier. This 
might be explained by the fact that banks in Rotterdam (branches of multinational 
banks) as well as a venture capitalist partially owned by the port authority (together with 
partners from the banking industry) actively seek customers in the port cluster. Such 
organizations are lacking in the other two ports. 
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10.4 Cluster heterogeneity 
Five propositions deal with the effects of heterogeneity on performance (see Table 42). 
Table 42: Survey results on heterogeneity 
 Total LMPC Rotterdam Durban 
Proposition A D NO A D A D A D 
Opportunities for co-operation in a cluster are 
higher the larger the diversity of the cluster 
population. 
84* 14 4 22* 1 35* 6 27* 7 
Opportunities for innovation in a cluster are higher 
the larger the diversity of the cluster population. 
88* 6 8 24* 0 33* 5 31* 1 
Diversity of the cluster population reduces the 
vulnerability of a cluster for changes in the 
environment. 
86* 8 8 17* 4 39* 1 30* 2 
Diversity of the resource base of a cluster reduces 
the vulnerability of a cluster for changes in the 
environment. 
90* 9 3 20* 4 41* 0 29* 5 
Co-operation between firms in the port cluster is of 
a minor importance for the performance of this 
cluster compared to co-operation with firms outside 
the cluster. 
27 68* 7 7 19* 14 24 6 25* 
A = agree, D = disagree, NO = no opinion 
*  Significant majority of experts  
**   Significantly different from other cases 
 
The cluster experts agree that diversity strengthens the competitiveness of a port cluster. 
Diversity stimulates co-operation and innovation and reduces vulnerability for external 
shocks. According to the vast majority of experts, the diversity of the cluster population and 
resource base reduce the vulnerability of a cluster.  
The experts indicate that co-operation within the cluster is relatively important. This result is 
important since it provides evidence to reject the argument that local cooperation is not 
relevant, given the international nature of port related activities. Thus, a diverse local set of 
firms and resources is important for the performance of a cluster.   
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A second set of questions deals with the importance of three dimensions of diversity, and 
the diversity of the three port clusters (see Table 43). Both importance and the diversity of 
the cluster are measured on a scale from 1 (not important/diverse) to 5 (very 
important/diverse). 
Table 43: Importance of diversity  
Type of diversity LMPC Durban Rotterdam Importance overall 
International scope 4.2 4.0 4.0 4.1 
Economic activities 4.5** 3.9 3.7 3.9 
Firm size 3.3 3.3 3.1 3.2* 
Scale from 1 (not important) to 5 (very important) 
*  Significantly lower than other scores 
**  Significantly higher than in two other clusters 
 
Both diversity of international scope and diversity of economic activities are regarded as 
important dimensions of cluster diversity. Diversity of firm size is less important. Experts 
were asked to judge the diversity of their cluster. The scores are given in Table 44. 
Table 44: The diversity of the cluster according to experts 
Type of diversity Score Durban Score LMPC Score Rotterdam 
International scope 3.5 2.9** 4.2* 
Economic activities 3.9 3.2** 3.9 
Firm size 3.8 3.2** 3.8 
Scale from 1 (not diverse) to 5 (very diverse) 
*   Significantly higher than other clusters 
**   Significantly lower than other two clusters  
 
These results show that the LMPC experts rate the diversity of their cluster as moderate. 
The data analysis and interviews support this judgment: the vast majority of firms in the 
LMPC are local branches of (inter)national firms that are not committed to the LMPC. Most 
branches hardly have any ‘strategic content’: strategic decisions are made elsewhere. There 
are hardly any headquarters of large firms in the LMPC.  
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Durban’s port cluster is relatively diverse. The port is very diverse in terms of traffic base, 
virtually all commodities are handled in Durban. Durban is relatively less diverse in terms of 
international scope: most firms are niche-operators that concentrate on the South(ern) 
African market.  
Rotterdam’s port cluster is diverse. The opinions of the experts are in line with data. The 
cluster is endowed with a diverse set of firms, especially in terms of international scope. 
Various headquarters of internationally operating firms are located in Rotterdam.  
10.5 The importance of the variables of the cluster structure 
The issue of the importance of the various variables related to the structure of the cluster is 
addressed in the survey. The experts were asked to rank 10 structure variables from 1 (most 
important) to 10 (least important). Table 45 shows the results. 
Table 45: Importance of structure variables; average scores 
Variable Importance 
Durban 
Importance 
Rotterdam 
Importance 
LMPC 
Importance 
Overall 
Presence of customers and suppliers 2.2 2.0 2.7 2.2* 
Quality of labor pool 3.7 4.0 4.7 4.0** 
Diversity of the cluster population 4.6 4.7 5.6 4.8 
Presence of internal competition  4.8 4.9 5.6 5.0 
Diversity of cluster resources 5.1 5.7 4.5 5.3 
Presence of knowledge 7.5**** 5.1 4.1*** 5.9 
Level of entry barriers 6.2 6.3 5.1 6.1 
Presence of congestion 5.1*** 6.8 6.7 6.1 
Level of land prices and land scarcity 6.6 5.8 7.9**** 6.5 
Level of exit barriers 9.0 9.3 8.3 9.0***** 
Average scores on a scale from 1 (most important) to 10 (least important). 
*  Significantly more important than other nine variables 
** Significantly more important than eight other variables  
*** Significantly more important than in other two cases 
**** Significantly less important than in other two cases 
***** Significantly less important than other variables 
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These results show that two agglomeration economies, the presence of customers and 
suppliers and the presence of a labor pool, are regarded as the most important for the 
performance of the cluster. The labor pool however, is not an agglomeration force in 
Durban. This is a weakness of Durban. 
Diversity and the presence of internal competition are judged as relatively important. The 
disagglomeration effects, land prices and congestion, are regarded as relatively 
unimportant. Exit barriers are regarded as unimportant.  
Experts in Durban attribute a relatively limited importance to the presence of knowledge, 
whereas in the LMPC, knowledge is regarded as important. This might be explained by 
differences in context: Durban is the leading South African port. The LMPC faces strong 
competition from Houston and lacks ‘entrepreneurial spirit’, partly because knowledge is 
lacking.  
In the LMPC, land is widely available and as a consequence this factor is not as important 
as in the other two port clusters. Congestion is relatively important in Durban. This can be 
explained by congestion problems due to the fact that the city surrounds most of the port 
area and ships have to wait before being served in the port. 
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10.6 Conclusions: cluster structure and performance 
Table 46 summarizes the most important conclusions on the relation between the structure 
of a cluster and the performance of that cluster. 
Table 46: Research findings on structure and performance in clusters 
Issue Research finding 
Agglomeration 
economies 
The presence of customers and suppliers is the most important agglomeration force. 
The quality of the labor pool is important, but not, as suggested in theories, a force 
towards agglomeration in all port clusters, because of high wages and strong labor unions. 
In general, agglomeration economies are regarded as stronger than the diseconomies. 
Thus, seaport clusters have the potential to attract port related firms. 
Internal 
competition 
Internal competition contributes to the performance of port clusters, first of all because 
monopoly pricing is prevented. 
Even when there is no threat of monopoly pricing, because external competition is fierce, 
internal competition is desirable because it fosters specialization and innovation. 
In cargo handling and some port services, internal competition is limited or even absent. 
Cluster barriers Start-up and entry barriers have a negative effect on cluster performance. The 
inaccessibility of networks, as a result of a relatively closed port community is the most 
important barrier for entry. 
Exit barriers reduce performance. However, their effect on the performance of port clusters 
is minor. The inability to recover port specific investments is the only relevant exit barrier.  
Heterogeneity The positive effects of heterogeneity on performance are validated by the survey results 
and interviews. 
Diversity of international scope is the most important dimension of diversity. 
Rotterdam is a diverse cluster; the LMPC is not diverse. 
 
 11 GOVERNANCE AND PERFORMANCE IN 
SEAPORT CLUSTERS; RESULTS OF THE CASE 
STUDIES  
In this chapter the results of the case studies with regard to the relation between cluster 
governance and cluster performance are discussed. As in the preceding chapter, the survey 
results are given in a series of tables, and two calculations to analyze the statistical 
significance are used: the significance of majority opinions and the significance of the 
differences of results between the cases. The second test only yields relevant results when 
it can be assumed that the experts in the three cases have the same reference point. For 
some questions on the ‘score’ of a port cluster this assumption is questionable. Thus, the 
comparison of the outcomes of these questions is done with some precaution.    
In the next four paragraphs the four variables (trust, intermediaries, leader firms and 
collective action regimes) are discussed. First, the relevance of the concept of cluster 
governance is demonstrated with the results of two propositions (see Table 47).   
Table 47: Survey results on the relevance of cluster governance 
 Total LMPC Rotterdam Durban 
Proposition A D NO A D A D A D 
Differences in the governance of a cluster influence 
the performance of that cluster. 104** 0 1 28* 0 43* 0 33* 0 
The development of port clusters is the result of the 
interplay of market forces and (inter)national policies. 
The quality of local governance does not have a 
substantial affect on the performance of a cluster. 
10 95** 1 4 25* 3 40* 3 30* 
A = agree, D = disagree, NO = no opinion 
**  Significant majority of experts from across the cases 
 
All experts in the three cases recognize the role of governance in a port cluster. All but one 
of the experts indicate that differences in governance influence cluster performance. As a 
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‘test’ to check the consistency of this result, the second proposition claims cluster 
governance does not have a substantial effect, instead market forces and (inter)national 
policies are proposed as drivers of the performance of a cluster. The vast majority of experts 
disagree with this proposition. This validates the importance of cluster governance for the 
performance of a cluster.  
11.1 Trust 
The vast majority of experts acknowledge the influence of trust on performance (Table 48). 
Table 48: Survey results on trust 
 Total LMPC Rotterdam Durban 
Proposition A D NO A D A D A D 
A culture of trust increases the quality of the 
governance of a cluster because it lowers transaction 
costs and enables co-operation. 
104* 1 1 29* 0 41* 1 34* 0 
A = agree, D = disagree, NO = no opinion 
*  Significant majority of experts from across the cases 
 
The experts agree that the notion of ‘port specific trust’ is relevant. Most experts indicate 
there is such a thing as a ‘port community’ where reputation effects are important and trust 
can be created. The level of trust is regarded as the most important variable related to 
governance.   
 
Chapter 11 – Governance and Performance in Seaport Clusters; Results of the Cases 139
11.2 Intermediaries  
Table 49 shows the expert opinion on the effects of the presence of intermediaries. 
Table 49: Survey results on intermediaries 
 Total LMPC Rotterdam Durban 
Proposition A D NO A D A D A D 
The presence of intermediaries increases the 
quality of the governance of a cluster, because 
intermediaries lower transaction costs and enable 
co-operation. 
74* 26 6 24* 4 29* 9 21 13 
Many firms in the port cluster access knowledge 
and information through contacts with ‘knowledge 
intermediaries’ located in the cluster. 
80* 11 3 21* 0 33* 5 26* 6 
A = agree, D = disagree, NO = no opinion  
*  Significant majority of experts from across the cases 
 
The majority of experts agree that the presence of intermediaries increases the quality of 
governance. The role of intermediaries to lower transaction costs and enable co-operation is 
acknowledged.  
A substantial minority disagrees with the first proposition, because in their opinion 
intermediaries increase transaction costs. An analysis of the responses reveals that large 
firms disagree more with the first proposition of table 48, because they have sufficient size to 
lower transaction costs and develop cooperation in networks. Table 50 shows the 
distribution of responses over small and large firms. 
Table 50: Distribution of responses with regard to the first proposition of Table 49 
  Experts from small firms Experts from large firms Total 
 Agree 43 (83%) 21 (55%) 64 
 Disagree 9 (17%) 17* (45%) 26 
 Total 52 38 90 
*  Significantly higher percentage than small firms 
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Table 51 shows the results of a question to rank six intermediaries from 1 (most important) 
to 6 (least important). 
Table 51: Ranking of the importance of intermediaries in the three cases, N=95 
 Intermediary LMPC Rotterdam Durban 
 Forwarders 3.0 2.0* 2.6 
 Ship’s agents 3.3 3.0 2.6 
 Associations85 3.5 4.0 3.3 
 Commodity traders 2.9** 4.2 4.0 
 Shipbrokers 3.3 4.4 4.0 
 Non asset owning LSP’s 4.7* 2.9** 4.1 
Scale of 1 (most important) to 6 (least important) 
*  Significantly more/less important than other intermediaries in same cluster 
**  Significantly more important than in other cluster 
 
The following conclusions can be drawn on the basis of these figures: 
• Forwarders are regarded as the most important intermediaries, because they ‘control 
cargo’. The presence of forwarders increases performance because they improve the 
position of a port in a logistics chain.  
• Commodity traders are relatively important in the LMPC. This is explained by the fact 
that this cluster is strong in commodities that are frequently traded, such as grains, 
coffee and steel. 
• Non-asset owning logistics service providers are especially important in Rotterdam’s 
port cluster. This can be explained by the fact that Rotterdam, and the Netherlands as a 
whole, has a strong position in logistics. Given the continuous restructuring of logistics 
chains, ‘chain orchestrators’ (LSP’s) are regarded as important for the performance of 
Rotterdam’s port cluster.  
                                          
85  An association is the only non-profit intermediary. Therefore the importance of this intermediary 
is hard to compare with the others.   
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The importance attributed to various intermediaries differs strongly between experts. Various 
experts associate intermediaries with ‘traditional’ middleman whose importance is slowly 
reduced. The differences of responses of experts with a long experience in the port industry, 
versus experts with a short experience are given in Table 52. This shows that opinions 
about the importance of intermediaries change. 
 
Table 52: The intermediary ranking of two ‘experience cohorts’ 
 Intermediary Average ranking by experts with a
‘short’ experience 
Average ranking by experts with a 
‘long’ experience 
 Agent 3.2 2.7 
 Forwarder 2.1 2.5 
 Shipbroker 4.2 4.0 
 Trader 3.7 4.6 
 Associations 3.9 3.4 
 Non asset owning LSP 3.5 3.7 
Scale of 1 (most important) to 6 (least important) 
 
These differences, even though not statistically significant, reveal something also observed 
in the open interviews; relative newcomers attribute less importance to the presence of ship 
related intermediaries (ship agents and shipbrokers) and more importance to cargo related 
intermediaries (forwarders, traders and non asset owning LSP’s). This can be explained as 
shipping becomes more and more ‘commodified’: the product becomes more homogeneous, 
and is purchased more and more electronically. As a consequence, the importance of ship 
related intermediaries declines vis-à-vis cargo related intermediaries. The survey results 
provide ‘circumstantial evidence’ that in Rotterdam shipping is more ‘commodified’ than in 
the two other ports: experts rank ship related intermediaries as relatively unimportant. 
The experts acknowledge the role of intermediaries as important sources of knowledge. 
‘Dedicated’ knowledge intermediaries have not emerged in seaports; especially forwarders 
are mentioned as intermediaries that possess and distribute knowledge. 
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11.3 Leader firms 
Table 53 shows the survey results on the presence of leader firms in the cluster. 
Table 53: Survey results on leader firms 
 Total LMPC Rotterdam Durban 
Proposition A D NO A D A D A D 
The presence of ‘leader firms’ increases the quality of 
the governance of a cluster. 102* 1 3 29* 0 40* 1 33* 0 
A = agree, D = disagree, NO = no opinion 
*  Significant majority of experts from across the cases 
 
The positive influence of leader firms in the port cluster is widely acknowledged. In the 
interviews leader firms were identified. In Table 54 leader firms and their effects, according 
to various experts, are discussed. 
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Table 54: Leader firms and their effects 
Leader firms in Rotterdam 
P&O 
Nedlloyd 
P&ONedlloyd contributes with international expertise to the development of a ‘port 
information system’ in the port. The firm has initiated ‘European Rail Shuttle’, that developed 
into the largest European container rail operator. Finally, the firm’s top management 
contributes to efforts to improve Rotterdam’s transport related education infrastructure. 
Maersk/ 
SeaLand 
Leading partner in the above mentioned ERS. Furthermore, this firm has been active in 
lobbying for rail deregulation, both at the Dutch and the European level.  
ECT  This main container operator is advanced in developing new terminal technologies.  The 
firm develops inland networks and is engaged projects to reduce landside congestion at the 
terminal. Due to the bad financial performance of the firm and the take-over by Hutchison, 
ECT behaves now less as a leader firm. 
Lyondell 
Chemical 
Nederland 
Leader firm in the chemical cluster; encourages/enforces competition among local suppliers 
and leading in cooperation between chemical firms in the port area. 
Leader firms in the LMPC 
Central Gulf 
Lines 
Central Gulf Lines’ CEO plays an important role in forming a coalition to improve the 
governance of the port cluster (discussed more in detail in the next section). 
Leader firms in Durban 
Rennies 
group 
A leading private terminal operator in the port with various subsidiaries. Rennies is 
committed to the port of Durban and actively involved in governance issues. 
MSC The largest container shipping line in Durban and initiator of the ‘container lines operators 
forum’ (CLOF), to improve the daily operations of the container terminal. 
Toyota  The leading shipper/receiver in Durban, critical and involved with regard to the performance 
of the port.  
 
Table 54 shows that Rotterdam is relatively well endowed with leader firms and the LMPC 
not. These leader firms contribute to the quality of the governance of the port cluster. The 
role of leader firms in creating collective action regimes is discussed in the next section.  
11.4 Collective action regimes 
In this section, the quality of collective action regimes in the three cases is assessed. In the 
first section the general survey results are discussed. In the next five sections, five relevant 
regimes are discussed. 
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11.4.1 Identification of collective action regimes 
Table 55 shows the results of a question whether or not collective action adds to the 
performance of the port cluster. This question is asked for five different potential CAP’s, 
discussed in chapter 9. If collective action has/would have positive effects, the collective 
action regime (CAR) is analyzed.  
Table 55: Identification of CAR’s 
 Total LMPC Rotterdam Durban 
 Present (P) Absent (A) P A P A P A 
 Innovation 81* 22 24* 4 29 12 28* 6 
 Training & Education 99* 5 27* 2 38* 3 34* 0 
 Internationalization 61* 38 26* 3 13 28** 22 7 
 Marketing & Promotion 98* 6 28* 1 37* 4 33* 1 
 Hinterland access 93* 6 24* 2 37* 4 32* 0 
*  Significant majority (across the cases of for one case) 
**  Significant differences with respondents in other 2 cases 
 
All five potential CAR’s are relevant in port clusters. Four of the five CAR’s are relevant 
across the cases; only internationalization is not regarded as a collective action problem in 
Rotterdam. This means that an arrangement for ‘collective internationalization’ is not 
regarded as an initiative that would enhance the performance of the cluster. In the interviews 
it was found out that this opinion is based on the argument that the majority of firms in the 
cluster is already international on the one hand, and can internationalize ‘on their own’ on 
the other hand. The importance of the five CAR’s according to the experts is given in Table 
56. 
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Table 56: Importance of the five CAR’s 
 Issue  LMPC Rotterdam Durban Overall importance 
 Hinterland access 4.8 4.6 4.8 4.7* 
 Training & Education 4.1*** 4.4 4.8*** 4.4 
 Marketing & Promotion 4.6 4.3 4.0 4.3 
 Innovation 4.5 4.1 4.4 4.3 
 Internationalization 4.4 N.R. 4.0 4.1** 
Average scores on the scale of 1 (not important) to 5 (very important) 
* Significantly more important than other regimes 
** Significantly less important than other regimes 
***  Significantly different from other cases  
 
The following conclusions can be drawn on the basis of these results: 
• All five regimes are regarded as important for the performance of the cluster. The least 
important regime is internationalization, but even this regime ‘scores’ 4.1 on a scale 
from 1 to 5.  
• Hinterland access is regarded as the most important CAR. The quality of the ‘hinterland 
access regime’ is very important for the performance of the port cluster, with a score of 
4.7 on a scale from 1 to 5.  
• Training and education is significantly more important in Durban than in the other two 
cases. This can be explained by the fact that in South Africa, firms have to pay a special 
charge that can be recovered by investing in training and education. Firms therefore 
have an incentive to invest in port related training and education, but due to limited 
‘collective action’ no professional training organization has developed. 
 
The importance of the five variables of the quality of a collective action regime according to 
the experts is given in Table 57. 
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Table 57: The importance of the five variables of the quality of a CAR 
Variable  All cases Durban Rotterdam LMPC 
Leader firms 4.4 4.3 4.3 4.5 
Organizational infrastructure 4.4 4.5 4.1*** 4.6 
Involvement public actors 4.3 4.4 4.3 4.2 
Voice 4.0** 4.2 3.8*** 4.2 
Community argument 3.8* 4.1 3.5 3.9 
Average scores on the scale of 1 (not important) to 5 (very important) 
*  Significantly lower than other scores 
**  Significantly lower than three most important factors 
***  Significant difference with other cases 
 
These figures show that all five variables are relevant. The least important variable (the 
community argument) has an average score of 3.8 (on a scale from 1 to 5). Furthermore, the 
figures show that the three variables, leader firms, the role of public actors and the 
organizational infrastructure are the most important. 
The survey results presented above confirm the existence and importance of five CAR’s in 
port clusters and the relevance of the five variables of the quality of a CAR. In the following 
paragraphs, the five relevant CAR’s are discussed. First, survey results are presented. The 
experts were asked to assess the quality of each regime. Two statistical tests are 
performed: one to analyze the significance of differences between the cases a second to 
analyze which variables in a regime are evaluated positive and which negative. The latter 
analysis is carried out by analyzing the significance of differences between the score of one 
variable with the average score of all variables in the regime. 
Second, a detailed description of each regime is given. On the basis of the expert judgment 
and desk research, opportunities to improve the regime are discussed. These opportunities 
were discussed with the experts. Only opportunities that are acknowledged by a number of 
experts are discussed. In some cases steps to develop joint initiatives to improve the regime 
have already been taken.  
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11.4.2 The hinterland access regime 
Table 58 shows the expert evaluation of the quality of the hinterland access regime in the 
three cases. A scale from –5 (very bad) to +5 (very good) was used, so that a score of nil 
means neither bad nor good. This scale is also used for the other four regimes. 
Table 58: Expert evaluation of the quality of the hinterland access regime 
Variable Rotterdam Durban LMPC 
Leader firms 2*, ** -0.4*** 0.2 
Public actors 2*, ** 0.4 0.8 
Organizational infrastructure 0.7 0.1 0.3 
Community argument 0.9 0.8** 0.1 
Voice 1 0.8** 0.4 
Overall score86 1.1* 0.1 0.3 
Average scores on a scale from –5 (very bad) to +5 (very good) 
*  Significantly higher score than in other two port clusters  
**  Significantly higher average judgment of all factors in same port cluster 
*** Significantly lower average judgment of all factors in same port cluster 
 
On the basis of these results the following conclusions can be drawn: 
• The hinterland access regime is not very effective in any of the three cases.  
• Rotterdam’s HAR is significantly better than in the two other cases, with a score of 1.1 
on a scale from –5 to +5. 
• The involvement of leader firms and the role of the public actors (most importantly the 
port authority), are two strengths of the HAR in Rotterdam. 
• In Durban, the HAR is not effective. This is predominantly due to the lack of leader firm 
involvement. Firms in the cluster are willing to become involved, but no firm has the 
incentive and ability to take the lead. 
                                          
86  The overall score of the HAR is computed by multiplying the score for each of the variables with 
the importance they attach to that variable. The maximum score is +5 and the minimum score –
5. 
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• The HAR in the LMPC is moderate across the board.  
The hinterland access regime in the LMPC 
The most important inland mode in the LMPC is inland waterways. Mainly dry bulk is 
transported over the vast Mississippi river network. Oil is processed to a large extent ‘on 
site’ or transported by pipeline. The inland shipping system for bulk is very efficient. The 
widespread use of push-barges allows for economies of scale and better equipment 
utilization, while standardization secures efficient cargo handling. This system has already 
been ‘running’ for decades, so that improvements are incremental87. Table 59 shows the 
various initiatives/investments to improve the hinterland access regime in the LMPC. 
Table 59: Initiatives/investments to improve the hinterland access regime in the LMPC 
Mode of 
coordination 
Relevant initiatives/investments 
Hierarchies No single firm has made major investments that have improved the hinterland 
accessibility. 
Interfirm alliances The number of strategic alliances to improve the hinterland accessibility is very limited.  
Associations The barge fleeting association, the freight forwarders association and the steamship 
association promote the interests of their members. They are not actively lobbying for 
more infrastructure or a better interface with the terminals. 
Public-private 
partnerships 
Public-private partnerships do not play a role in the HAR in the LMPC . 
Public 
organizations 
The Public Belt Railroad is the most important public organization in the hinterland 
access regime. The port authorities are hardly involved. The port of New Orleans has a 
(strategic) partnership with the inland port of Memphis, but this partnership has not 
resulted in joint initiatives to improve the corridor between Memphis and the LMPC.          
 
                                          
87  One joint initiative that could improve the quality of the hinterland access in inland bulk shipping 
is by means of better web-based communication systems. Since shippers receive most benefits 
(better logistics planning), while operators have to make the investments, joint initiatives are 
problematic. The inland waterways operators associations do not play a leading role in this 
respect, nor do public organizations. It is unlikely that an initiative in this field would be 
successful unless large American shippers are willing to act as ‘leader firms’. Thus, setting up 
such a project is beyond the scope of the actors in the LMPC. 
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Three related initiatives to improve the quality of the hinterland access regime can be 
identified: market intelligence, promoting containers on barge and the rail accessibility of the 
port.  
Market intelligence 
The market intelligence in the LMPC is seriously underdeveloped, due to amongst others 
competition between the port authorities and absence of an effective private sector 
organization. Insights in origin-destination patterns of transport flows and strengths and 
weaknesses of the LMPC compared to competing ports are lacking. Neither the port 
authorities, nor any other organization in the cluster had developed market intelligence to 
identify potential customers and map their service preferences.  
Recently, a coalition with the name ‘maritime cluster initiative’ has been set up to improve 
the market intelligence in the cluster. Partners in this coalition are Metrovision, the five port 
authorities, the university of New Orleans, the Public Belt Railroad, the pilot associations, 
the Board of Trade, the Mississippi River Maritime Association, the Steamship Association, 
the state of Louisiana, and the Millennium Port Authority. This coalition has been initiated by 
two CEO’s of leader firms in the New Orleans region (Central Gulf Lines and Bollinger 
Industries). Metrovision provides ‘support infrastructure’ for the initiative. The various 
partners have agreed to invest in total 600,000 US dollars in the project. After the initial 
phase structural resources should be attracted88. The coalition is the first of its kind to 
address strategic issues for the LMPC. The project is in its infancy but is an important step 
towards a more effective hinterland access regime. 
                                          
88  In the first phase, the main activity of the project will be creating market intelligence. An analysis 
of various transport chains that currently move through the lower Mississippi or could be moved 
through the lower Mississippi is central. The outcomes could be used to investigate elements in 
the transport chain that put the area at a disadvantage and see how these disadvantages can 
be reduced or omitted 
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Rail accessibility of the LMPC  
Rail access is especially relevant in the container market. About 35% of all containers are 
put on rail. All six89 ‘class A railroads’ (railroads with a national network) offer train services 
to or from New Orleans. However, due to the limited size of market, the port is not a priority 
for these railroads. Thus, even though the railroads serve the LMPC, the quality of the rail 
accessibility from the port to the hinterland is bad.  
The New Orleans Public Belt Railroad plays a leading role in improving the quality of rail 
services to and from the LMPC. This organization carries out local inter-terminal traffic 
between the rail terminals and aims to improve the rail accessibility by offering a ‘one stop 
shop service’ for the railroads90. The railroads encourage this ambition, since their 
competence is operating long distance trains, not local operations. When the Public Belt 
Railroad would become a regional communication and dispatch center, providing 
information to the railroads, creating complete trains for the railroads and managing the train 
movements in the region, the rail accessibility of the LMPC would improve. 
The Public Belt recently took over the management of the rail terminals of two of the six 
railroads. They aim to take over the yard activities from the other railroads as well. In order 
to realize its ambition, the Public Belt needs the support of other organizations in the 
hinterland access regime. 
Containers on barges 
The transport of containers by barges has to date not been successful, at least partially 
because cooperation to create sufficient cargo and investment funds is lacking. Firms have 
tried to set up services, but the coordinated development of a ‘container on barges system’ 
is required. Firms have tried to set up one piece of such a system but lacked sufficient scale. 
Coordination to introduce containers on barges is still limited. 
                                          
89  Shortly after the case study, a merger between two railroads was announced; once this merger 
is completed there are five ‘class A railroads’. 
90  An important strategic asset of the organization is the rail bridge over the Mississippi. The public 
belt is in charge of all flows over this bridge. The bridge is one of the three bridges over the 
Mississippi South of Chicago. Therefore, large volumes of transit cargo cross the bridge. 
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The port authority of Baton Rouge, the most upstream port of the LMPC, invests in the first 
inland container terminal in the Mississippi, with a substantial annual base volume from one 
shipper. The majority of the volume will be shipped to Houston, since the port of New 
Orleans is not called by enough shipping services. The cost advantage of shipping barges to 
New Orleans, compared to Houston, is about US $ 150 per TEU. Due to this large cost 
advantage, these containers are ‘captive’ as soon as a good terminal facility is developed.  
A promising partner for a ‘containers on barges’ coalition is the Federal Maritime 
Commission (FMC). This federal public organization acknowledges the substantial positive 
(external) effects from shifting containers from road (and train) to barge transport. Such a 
modal shift would reduce pollution and relieve congestion. Therefore, the FMC intends to 
start an initiative to promote container barge shipping. For the LMPC, such a project could 
be an effective way to free up resources for innovation, education and marketing of 
container barge shipping. However, no major efforts to develop a coalition have been made 
to date.  
A second important partner for a ‘containers on barges coalition’ is ‘Sea Point’, a privately 
funded venture that intends to develop an offshore terminal in the mouth of the Mississippi. 
Containers are shipped by barge from this terminal to inland ports. Such an offshore 
terminal would make container on barge more attractive.   
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The hinterland access regime in Durban 
The two dominant hinterland modes in Durban are road and rail transport. The road 
transport system is relatively well developed in South Africa and not heavily congested. The 
quality of rail services to the hinterland is less well developed. The public organization 
Spoornet is the single provider of train services. Spoornet can charge relatively high prices 
and operate relatively ineffectively. Furthermore, investment policies are not decided on the 
basis of a clear economic logic but interrelated with political issues. The key challenge of the 
‘hinterland access regime’ is to improve the rail accessibility of Durban. Table 60 shows 
relevant initiatives and investments in this regime in Durban. 
Table 60: Relevant initiatives and investments in the hinterland access regime in Durban 
Mode of 
coordination 
Relevant initiatives/investments 
Hierarchies Firms have not made investments to improve the hinterland accessibility by rail, because 
of Spoornet’s monopoly.  
Interfirm 
alliances 
No interfirm alliances have developed to improve rail accessibility.  
Associations The port interests are represented in the Chamber of Commerce’s Port Liaison 
Committee, but a ‘rail user forum’ is lacking. 
Public-private 
partnerships 
No public private partnerships to improve the HAR have been developed.  
Public 
organizations 
The port authority has to date not made an impact on the HAR.  
Spoornet is a national pubic body with limited decision-making powers located in Durban. 
The organization has a shortage of equipment and concentrates on large bulk flows from 
the ports to the hinterland.  
 
A promising opportunity91 to improve the rail accessibility to/from Durban is the development 
of a coalition of firms that invest in rail equipment and leases the equipment to Spoornet 
(which has a serious shortage of equipment) provided the equipment is utilized on tracks 
from Durban and the coalition can contribute to the efficiency of the deployment of the 
                                          
91  Other opportunities, such as a cargo card or other systems to relieve congestion of trucks at the 
terminal, or initiatives to reduce the empty hauls of truckers could be viable as well, but both are 
of less priority and risks of failure are higher.  
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equipment. Such a coalition needs ‘institutional access’ on a high level. Given the high 
potential benefits, firms have incentives to be included in such a coalition. Such a coalition 
has not developed, especially because potential leader firms (such as MSC for containers 
and Rennies for bulk) have not been active, the port authority has not been active and 
existing associations or discussion platforms do not have sufficient decision making power 
to initiate such ambitious projects. The evaluation of the CAP, given in a preceding section, 
supports this conclusion: a below average score is given to leader firms and a modest score 
to the quality of the organizational infrastructure. 
The hinterland access regime in Rotterdam 
In Rotterdam, inland water transport is the largest inland mode, with a market share of about 
47% of all transport flows. Road (22%) and pipeline (27%) are of considerable importance 
as well, rail has only a modest share in the modal split (4%). The share of rail in container 
transport, the market where the issue of hinterland access is the most pressing, is larger, 
14% (RMPM, 2003). Table 61 shows the role of relevant organizations in the HAR in 
Rotterdam. 
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Table 61: Relevant initiatives/investments in the Hinterland Access Regime in Rotterdam 
Mode of 
coordination 
Relevant initiatives/investments 
Hierarchies ECT invests in inland terminals to improve their market position. 
DB, the main railway in Germany, has a strong market position on the Dutch market, since 
they have taken over the cargo division of the former public railway of the Netherlands.  
Vopak invests in innovative chemical tanker barges. 
Interfirm 
alliances 
Oil companies have jointly invested in pipeline infrastructure. 
The large dry bulk companies are joint owners of inland shipping firms. 
ERS, a joint venture of P&ONedlloyd and Maersk/Sealand have started container shuttle 
services from Rotterdam. ERS has developed into a leading European container railway.  
Associations Deltalinqs lobbies for better hinterland connections, but the association is not directly 
engaged in projects to improve hinterland access. Other associations (CBRB, TLN, VRS en 
Fenedex) also focus on interest representation. 
Public-private 
partnerships 
PCR/RIL engages in projects to improve the ‘interface’ between the terminals and hinterland 
modes, for instance by streamlining communication flows and by introducing a ‘cargo card’ 
for container truckers. 
A public private partnership is developing new barges to transport pallets on barge.  
Public 
organizations 
The RMPM is developing market intelligence of all hinterland markets and partnerships with 
regions in the hinterland. RMPM also has ‘Rotterdam representatives’ in the hinterland 
whose task is to attract cargo. 
 
The HAR in Rotterdam is evaluated relatively well by the experts. The role of leader firms is 
appreciated. Leader firms include ECT, P&ONedlloyd and Maersk/Sealand and Vopak. The 
role of public authorities is also appreciated. The port authority has a clear hinterland 
strategy, created a network of inland representatives and develops market intelligence to 
identify opportunities.  
The quality of the organizational infrastructure in the HAR is regarded as moderate; this is 
consistent with the limited involvement of associations. Two opportunities to improve the 
HAR in Rotterdam are identified: automated road transport systems and joint development 
of intermodal transport systems. 
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Automated road transport systems 
If forms of automated road transport systems could be implemented successfully, Rotterdam 
would be one of the first places where implementation would be viable, given the huge road 
transport volumes in Rotterdam. The technical capabilities for an innovative system exist, 
even though they have never been tested in practice on a large scale. For instance, 
dedicating one lane of major highway corridors from Rotterdam to the hinterland for trucks 
with automated vehicle control (perhaps only in off peak hours) would improve the 
accessibility of the port and reduce congestion. Various coalitions investigate the viability of 
such forms of automation, but none of the initiatives is likely to be implemented in the short 
run.  
Intermodal transport systems 
The importance of inland waterway, rail and short sea shipping make Rotterdam an 
important intermodal transport node. A key characteristic of intermodal transport is that it is 
to some extent ‘systemic’; various components make up an intermodal chain, and 
coordination between these components is required. Especially the development of new 
intermodal services requires coordination. For instance, terminal investments will only be 
made if transport providers develop services and vice versa. In many cases, the 
development of new large-scale intermodal connections requires the formation of alliances 
of multiple actors. In the absence of leader firm behavior, the port authority aims to initiate 
such coalitions. In Rotterdam, two examples can be mentioned. First, development of a 
‘barge train service’ where goods are shipped to Germany by barge and put on trains there. 
A barge-train coalition is in development, the RMPM plays a pro-active role in the formation 
of this coalition. Second, Rotterdam is an important RoRo port. All trucks that use RoRo 
services arrive in Rotterdam by road. An intermodal service to put trucks on a RoRo vessel 
in an inland port so that trucks do not have to pass the (congested) port area could be 
viable. Again, a coalition needs to be formed to develop such an intermodal service. Even 
though the idea has been ‘around’ for some time, no steps towards realization have been 
taken.  
The hinterland access regime; conclusions from the cases 
The hinterland access regime is very important for the competitiveness of seaports. A huge 
majority of cluster experts agrees that hinterland access is to some extent a ‘collective 
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action problem’ and an effective regime will not develop spontaneously. Coordination and 
the formation of various sorts of coalitions are required. The HAR in Rotterdam is judged as 
being more effective than the regimes in Durban and the LMPC. This judgment is consistent 
with the description of the regimes: in Durban, coalitions have hardly developed, in the 
LMPC, the formation of a coalition has been started recently.  
In all three port clusters, opportunities to improve the HAR have been identified, on the basis 
of interviews and desk research. These initiatives are summarized in Table 62. 
Table 62: Initiatives to improve the HAR in the three cases 
Port cluster Opportunity to improve the HAR 
LMPC Market intelligence 
 Regional coordination of rail services 
 Container on barge 
Durban Coalition to lease equipment to Spoornet, and manage deployment 
Rotterdam Automated road transport 
 Coalitions to improve intermodal accessibility  
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11.4.3  Marketing and promotion 
Table 63 shows the expert evaluation of the quality of the marketing and promotion regime 
in the three cases: 
Table 63: Expert evaluation of the quality of the marketing and promotion regime 
Variable Rotterdam Durban LMPC 
Leader firms 0.5 -0.5 -0.2 
Organizational infrastructure 1.3* -0.8 -0.2 
Public actors 1.4 -0.2** 1.3*** 
Community argument 0.2**** 0.1 -0.2 
Voice 0.7 -0.5** 0.9*** 
Overall score 0.7 -0.7 0.2 
Average scores on a scale from –5 (very bad) to +5 (very good) 
*  Significantly higher score than in other two port clusters 
** Significantly lower score than in two other port clusters 
*** Significantly higher score than average of all factors in same port cluster 
**** Significantly lower average judgment of all factors in same port cluster 
 
On the basis of these results, the following conclusions can be drawn: 
• The marketing and promotion regime in Durban is the worst of the three cases, 
especially because public actors ‘underperform’ compared to the other cases and there 
is a lack of voice. 
• The role of public actors in Rotterdam and the LMPC is appreciated.  
• The organizational infrastructure in Rotterdam is in place, in contrast to both other ports. 
• In general, the community argument is not present in the marketing and promotion 
regime. Firms are not willing to invest in marketing for the port community as a whole.   
The marketing and promotion regime in the LMPC 
The five port authorities in the LMPC promote their jurisdiction. The port of New Orleans is 
the most active in marketing. Until recently, private firms from the LMPC were not involved in 
joint marketing efforts. As a consequence, the LMPC as a whole is not well marketed. With a 
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change in the top management of the port authority of New Orleans, more emphasis is 
placed on joint marketing with the business community. However, marketing efforts still 
focus on the ‘New Orleans jurisdiction’ not the whole cluster. For instance, three port 
authorities (New Orleans, Baton Rouge and South Louisiana) issue a ‘port partners’ 
brochure, with partners from their jurisdiction. This is a clear lack of coordination.  
Two initiatives to improve the marketing regime have developed, but the marketing and 
promotion regime is still (winter 2003) weakly developed. The first one is the project to 
improve the market intelligence, discussed in the preceding paragraph.  
Second, the port authorities have agreed to cooperate in marketing. The five port authorities 
compete with other Gulf ports, such as Houston, Galveston and Mobile. The LMPC even 
competes with ports on the east and west coast: the Mid West can be served by the LMPC 
(via the Mississippi) and by ports on both coasts of the USA. The focus on internal 
competition has prevented cooperation to market common strengths vis-à-vis competing 
ports. This new initiative could improve the marketing regime in this respect. 
Currently, the position of the LMPC as the premier gateway to the USA and possibly the 
world’s largest port complex in tonnage, is not widely known or appreciated. Joint marketing 
initiatives could be an effective way to attract more cargo to the LMPC. The five port 
authorities have recently agreed on a joint marketing initiative. The practical implications of 
this agreement are still unclear, but the agreement is a step towards a more effective 
marketing and promotion regime.     
The marketing and promotion regime in Durban 
In Durban, port marketing and promotion is regarded as a relatively unimportant regime. 
Other regimes, especially the hinterland access regime and training and education regime 
are more important. In the South African context, marketing is not as important as in other 
port ranges, because Durban is by and large the dominant port, and relatively widely known. 
Port marketing is more of an issue for the relatively small competitors of Durban, such as 
Maputo and Port Elisabeth. 
Portnet Durban carries out port marketing for Durban. Private firms do not cooperate to 
improve the brand name and reputation of Durban and are hardly involved in the marketing 
and promotion regime.  
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One opportunity to improve the marketing and promotion regime would be the creation of a 
coalition to attract new investments in South Africa. The ‘geography of production’ in South 
Africa is changing. As a consequence of the integration of South Africa in the global 
economy, most new production facilities are export oriented. This provides opportunities for 
port regions. All actors in the port cluster benefit from new activities in logistics and 
manufacturing. However, such a coalition has not yet materialized.  
The marketing and promotion regime in Rotterdam 
Table 64 shows the relevant initiatives/ investments in Rotterdam’s marketing and promotion 
regime.  
Table 64: Initiatives/investments in Rotterdam’s marketing and promotion regime 
Mode of 
coordination 
Relevant initiatives/investments 
Hierarchies ECT is active in marketing Rotterdam as ‘the gateway to Europe’ for containers. 
Interfirm 
alliances 
Interfirm alliances do not play a role in this regime. 
Associations Deltalinqs, the port cluster association, and the member associations of Deltalinqs play a 
limited role in the marketing and promotion regime. Deltalinqs invest in ‘public relations’ in 
order to get a ‘license to operate’. Deltalinqs occasionally has marketing activities abroad. 
Deltalinqs was involved in mapping opportunities for co-siting in the petro-chemical industry. 
This has led to an overview of co-siting opportunities and enables specific marketing efforts.   
Public-
private 
partnerships 
The Rotterdam Port Promotion Council (RPPC) is an association specifically developed for 
the marketing and promotion of the port of Rotterdam. About 300 firms are member of the 
organization. Since RPPC also receives funding from the RMPM, it is a public private 
partnership. The organization focuses on attracting cargo to the port and organizes 
marketing tours and host representatives from shippers.  
Public 
organizations 
RMPM has developed a network of Rotterdam representatives in important markets, both 
overseas and in the hinterland. These representatives develop contacts with shippers and 
promote the interests of the port of Rotterdam. 
 
The RPPC and the RMPM contribute most to the marketing and promotion regime. Both 
organizations invest substantially in marketing and promotion. The institutional structure of 
the RPPC has the advantage that a part of the RMPM’s marketing budget is transferred to 
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the private sector, with ‘financial matching’ by the private sector and more involvement as 
most important benefits. 
Even though investments in the marketing and promotion regime in Rotterdam are 
substantially higher than in the other two cases, the evaluation of the marketing and 
promotion regime is not positive. In the open interviews experts indicate that they doubt 
whether RPPC’s ‘traditional’ activities are still effective, given the increasing role of ICT and 
rationalization of supply chain management. In this view, the RPPC has to pay more 
attention to ‘strategic decision-makers’ and less to operational transport and logistics 
managers. 
The marketing and promotion regime; conclusions from the cases 
The experts indicate that an effective marketing and promotion regime is important for the 
performance of the port cluster. The quality of the marketing and promotion regime improves 
when a specific organizational infrastructure is created. Rotterdam is the only port where 
such an infrastructure has developed. The marketing and promotion regime in the three 
ports is judged as moderate. On the basis of interviews, the following opportunities to 
improve the regime have been identified: 
Table 65: Opportunities to improve the marketing and promotion regime in the cases 
Port cluster Opportunity to improve the marketing and promotion regime 
LMPC Improve market intelligence. 
 Cooperation between port authorities to position the LMPC as ‘gateway for the 
Mid-West’ and USA’s largest port complex. 
Durban Coalition to market Durban as location for port related manufacturing and 
logistics activities. 
Rotterdam Transforming marketing efforts away from ‘operational transport managers’ 
towards strategic decision makers. 
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11.4.4  Training and education 
Table 66 shows the expert evaluation of the quality of the training and education regime in 
all three cases: 
Table 66: Expert evaluation of the quality of the training and education regime 
Variable Rotterdam Durban LMPC 
Leader firms 1.6* -0.3 -1.9**, **** 
Organizational infrastructure 2.0*, *** -0.4 -1.3 
Public actors 0.8 0.2 -0.8 
Community argument 1.1 0.7 -1.0** 
Voice 1.0* -0.6 -0.4*** 
Overall score 1.1* -0.1 -1.1** 
Average scores on a scale from –5 (very bad) to +5 (very good) 
*  Significantly higher score than in other two port clusters 
** Significantly lower score than in two other port clusters 
*** Significantly higher score than average of all factors in same port cluster 
**** Significantly lower average judgment of all factors in same port cluster 
 
The following conclusions can be drawn on the basis of these figures: 
• The training and education regime is the best developed in Rotterdam and the worst in 
the LMPC. 
• The main strength of Rotterdam’s regime is the quality of the organizational 
infrastructure. 
• The main shortcoming of the LMPC’s regime is the lack of leader firms. Firms put the 
issue on the agenda, but firms are not willing to invest in the training and education 
regime. 
• The training and education regime in Durban is ‘moderate’ across the board. 
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The training and education regime in the LMPC 
Apart from operational ‘training-on the job’ there are no specific education programs in 
transport and logistics92. In the past, an initiative to develop an education program for the 
firms in the cluster failed to materialize, because of the lack of commitment from firms in the 
industry and a lack of demand for such education services. The experts indicate that training 
and education is a collective action problem and important for the performance of the LMPC, 
but at the same time ‘lessons learned’ make all actors reluctant to invest in improving the 
training and education regime. 
                                          
92  The Port of New Orleans organized a training program for foreign port managers, especially 
from developing countries, but this program is more relevant in the internationalization regime, 
since it does not improve the quality of the LMPC labor market. 
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The training and education regime in Durban 
The training and education regime in Durban is regarded as very important by the experts. 
The involvement of various organizations is given in Table 67. 
Table 67: Relevant initiatives/ investments in Durban’s training and education regime 
Mode of 
coordination 
Relevant initiatives/investments 
Hierarchies Firms have an incentive to invest in the training of their employees. The firms mostly 
contract education suppliers individually. 
Interfirm 
alliances 
Interfirm alliances do not play an important role in the training and education regime. 
Associations In Durban the associations play a limited role. They do not engage in ‘collective bargaining’ 
for their members, nor do they strive to improve the education infrastructure.   
Public-private 
partnerships 
No public private partnerships have developed yet, the Portnet Academy (see below) could 
become such a venture. 
Public 
organizations 
The Portnet Academy has the ambition to become the central provider of cluster related 
training and education. Currently, the Academy only trains the Portnet labor force. Training 
programs from basic vocational training to specific short courses in port management are 
offered. 
The university of Natal offers port related education programs, amongst others an MBA. 
The university has good links with firms in the port cluster.       
  
The key issue in the training and education regime in Durban is the quality of the ‘education 
infrastructure’. For higher education, this infrastructure is good: the University of Natal offers 
a port related master program. On the vocational level the training infrastructure is poor, as 
no institution offers good port related training programs. Given the incentives for firms to 
invest in training, collective action to make sure that these investments lead to a better 
education infrastructure, is an opportunity to improve the training and education regime. To 
set up this initiative, strong leader firm involvement is central, but (still) lacking.    
The training and education regime in Rotterdam 
The main characteristics of the training and education regime are given in Table 68. 
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Table 68: Initiatives/ investments in Rotterdam’s training and education regime 
Mode of 
coordination 
Relevant initiatives/investments 
Hierarchies Huntsman and Shell are leader firms for training in the chemical industry. They put efforts 
in a joint training facility.  
Interfirm 
alliances 
Interfirm alliances are of limited importance in this regime 
Associations Associations, especially Deltalinqs, invest in the quality of the training and education 
infrastructure, for instance through sponsorship of the chair port economics at Erasmus 
University Rotterdam. 
Deltalinqs also plays a role in finding resources for the ‘education and information center’ 
and the ‘process college’ (see below for a description of both initiatives). 
Third, Deltalinqs is involved in setting up a ‘young roundtable’ for young ‘high potentials’ in 
the port, in order to improve learning and networking and create an environment fertile for 
the ‘creative class’ to work in.  
Public-private 
partnerships 
Education and information center (EIC, http://www.eic-mainport.nl/) hosts visits from 
students of all ages and arranges company visits of schools to firms in the port. The 
center also provides educational material for primary schools. 
Process college (http://www.procescollege.nl/) a public private partnership to provide 
training for process operators in the chemical industry. The partners are four schools and 
the chemical industry in the port. 
Knowledge infrastructure mainport Rotterdam (KMR, http://www.kmr.nl/), is a ‘network 
organization’ aiming to free up resources to invest in training and education infrastructure. 
All relevant stakeholders are represented in the organization. KMR aims to 
develop/support coalitions, not to provide training. The process college’ and EIC are ‘spin-
offs’ of KMR. 
Public 
organizations 
The training and education infrastructure is relatively good and consists of at least five 
education providers, four of which cooperate under the name ‘Rotterdam Transport 
Schools’.  
The RMPM finances university chairs in port economics (together with Deltalinqs) and in 
cargo handling technology. RMPM also made money available for a ‘training and 
education fund’ for the cargo handling industry, provided the private sector also invests. 
No initiatives to use the fund have developed. 
 
Table 68 shows that the training and education regime consists of a large number of 
initiatives. Various coalitions are formed to improve the quality of the training and education 
infrastructure, and to increase the attractiveness of working in the port cluster. The large 
number of initiatives can be explained by the scarcity of well-trained labor in some segments 
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of the labor market, especially for vocational technical training. The coalitions are 
successful: the region has become the center of training for many port related functions.  
The training and education regime in Rotterdam has not been successful with regard to a 
second, and more difficult objective: the re-training of ‘redundant’ port workers. Due to 
containerization, the labor requirements in the cargo handling industry have diminished 
rapidly. Labor mobility is required to reduce this redundancy. In the Dutch context, forced 
mobility (firing employees) is very expensive. A program to re-train employees for enrolment 
outside the cargo handling industry could be an instrument to solve the labor redundancy. In 
Rotterdam, this has not been successful, with as a consequence persisting labor problems. 
Given the fact that labor costs are important in the cargo handling industry, this hampers 
Rotterdam’s performance (De Langen et al, 2003). 
The training and education regime; conclusions from the cases 
Huge differences in the training and education regime can be observed. In the LMPC, 
coalitions are hardly created and even though the potential benefits of collective action are 
recognized, actors are reluctant to invest (time) in improving the regime. In Rotterdam, the 
formation of coalitions is almost a routine. Various initiatives have been set up and add to 
the quality of the regime. Local and national governments play an ‘enabling role’ in this 
regime by providing funds. The organizational structure of this regime in Rotterdam is 
interesting: it is the only example where one organization (KMR) is specifically set up to 
improve the quality of the regime. The - stylized - role of KMR is visualized in Figure 16. 
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Figure 16: The regime manager in Rotterdam’s training and education regime 
Private firms Education providers Governments
Other projects/ 
organisations:
-Industrial ecology
-EIC
-Syntens
-Port-city project
New education 
infrastructure
New learning 
tools
Promotion education 
in Rotterdam
KMR, 
‘regime manager’
 
 
In other cases, such a ‘regime manager’ could be instrumental for improving the quality of 
the training and education regime. Opportunities to improve the regimes in the three cases 
are given in Table 69. 
Table 69: Opportunities to improve the training and education regime 
Port cluster Opportunities to improve the training and education regime 
LMPC Initiative to attract external resources to improve the regime. 
Durban Collective action to improve the training and education infrastructure. 
Rotterdam Re-training to solve labor redundancy problems. 
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11.4.5  The Innovation regime 
Table 70 shows the expert evaluation of the quality of the innovation regime in all three 
cases. 
Table 70: Expert evaluation of the quality of the innovation regime 
Variable Rotterdam Durban LMPC 
Leader firms 1.5*** 1.0*** -0.8** 
Public actors 0.1 -0.3 -0.5 
Organizational infrastructure 0.8 0.1 0.4 
Community argument -0.8**** 0.7* -0.8 
Voice 0.0 -0.5**** 0.7*** 
Overall score 0.2 0.2 -0.2 
Average scores on a scale from –5 (very bad) to +5 (very good) 
*  Significantly higher score than in other two port clusters 
** Significantly lower score than in two other port clusters 
*** Significantly higher score than average of all factors in same port cluster 
**** Significantly lower average judgment of all factors in same port cluster 
 
These figures lead to the following conclusions: 
• The innovation regime is perceived as moderate in all three cases. Strengths and 
weaknesses differ between the cases. 
• In Rotterdam, the involvement of leader firms is relatively good, the main shortcoming is 
the lack of a ‘community argument’. 
• In Durban, the leader firm involvement is also a positive factor, the weakness is the lack 
of voice: firms are not expressing innovation needs. 
• In the LMPC, the voice is relatively good, but as is the case with some other regimes, 
leader firms are lacking and public organizations do not play a leading role. 
The innovation regime in the LMPC 
The innovation regime in the LMPC is not effective. The scope of coordination is very 
limited. The firms in the cluster are mostly operational branches without budgets for 
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innovation. Furthermore, knowledge centers are absent. This is partly because the business 
environment is not conducive for innovation. The University of New Orleans has technology 
transfer programs and is a recognized knowledge center. However, it is hardly involved in 
the port cluster. Port related firms are also hardly involved in the Louisiana Technology 
Council. 
Finally, public funding for investments in R&D is missing. Such funding is necessary given 
the ‘empty pockets’ and cost-focus of firms in the LMPC. Two opportunities to create an 
innovative coalition are innovation in barge shipping and Sea Point. 
Innovation in barge shipping 
In the section on the hinterland access regime the challenge of creating a system of 
container-on-barge was discussed. Container on barge is problematic because of its 
‘systemic nature’: it is only viable when sufficient volumes are attracted. Given the 
advantages of container on barge vis-à-vis road transport - less congestion, environmentally 
friendly, low costs per kilometer - container on barge is an opportunity. Grasping this 
opportunity requires cooperation, coordination and innovation. A - federally funded - 
innovation project to simultaneously assess the market potential for container barge 
shipping and develop innovative solutions to overcome the disadvantages of inland 
shipping, such as the low speed, the high costs of handling the cargo in ports and 
imbalanced cargo flows, would greatly improve the quality of the innovation regime in the 
LMPC.   
Sea Point 
The most innovative idea in the LMPC is the Sea Point project. Sea point is a small artificial 
island for transhipping containers from sea-going vessels to barges. The fact that in this 
concept no landside infrastructure is required is a huge advantage, compared to a traditional 
terminal, because constructing infrastructure to the mouth of the Mississippi is very 
expensive. The offshore terminal would complement the existing terminal in New Orleans, 
since a large part of the cargo would have to be moved to a terminal with rail and road 
connections.  
Two retired industry experts developed the Sea Point idea. The project, even though clearly 
a contribution to the competitiveness of the LMPC, did not receive any institutional support. 
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On the contrary, various firms in the LMPC oppose the project and some port authorities are 
also skeptical. This illustrates the shortcomings of the innovation regime in the LMPC: no 
institutional support for innovative ideas and an environment not conducive for innovation. In 
this context, one expert remarked: ‘if someone is fired in Houston, he/she starts a new firm, 
if someone is fired in the LMPC, he/she moves to Houston’.  
The innovation regime in Durban 
The innovation regime in Durban is at best moderate. The scope of coordination is limited. 
The experts in Durban have realistic ambitions: Durban is not positioned to develop 
innovations. The firms in the cluster are mostly part of internationally operating firms, with 
limited involvement in innovation. The ambition is to become an ‘early adopter’ in the African 
context. 
Given this ambition, an opportunity is to encourage the knowledge transfer between large, 
internationally operating leader firms and local firms that are related to these leader firms. 
Such a project enables these local firms to become early adopters. Such a project also 
could also support the empowerment of the ‘previously disadvantaged’ (mainly black South 
Africans), an important policy objective in the South African context. 
The innovation regime in Rotterdam 
The innovation regime in Rotterdam is moderate, according to the experts. The port is not 
an ‘innovation prone environment’, even though some of the conditions for such an 
environment are fulfilled: knowledge centers are present (especially the Technical University 
and the national research center TNO in Delft, and Erasmus University in Rotterdam), 
government subsidies for innovation projects are available, and organizations that 
encourage innovation and knowledge transfer are present. Furthermore, the port authority 
encourages and initiates innovative projects.  
The experts frequently mentioned four explanations for the relatively bad regime given the 
favorable conditions. First, profit margins of the majority of firms in the cluster are small. The 
industry is to a large extent cost driven and not willing or able to free up resources for 
innovation. Second, cooperation proves to be very difficult. Firms in the port cluster are not 
willing to share information and knowledge. The threat of opportunistic behavior prevents 
cooperation. Third, even though governments (national and regional) encourage innovation, 
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they focus on ‘systemic’ technological innovations whereas the majority of firms do not 
posses the organizational capabilities and market position to engage in such projects. 
Fourth, some experts argue that past experiences have an influence: in the past innovative 
projects, especially in the field of ICT-applications, were not successful. This makes it 
difficult to create coalitions for new innovative projects.  
In this respect, it is important to make a distinction between the port related manufacturing 
activities on the one hand and cargo handling, transport and logistics firms on the other. The 
manufacturing firms cooperate better. Perhaps the most important coalition in petro-
chemical manufacturing is the coalition of chemical firms and various public organizations to 
encourage the development of ‘industrial ecology’ (INES, see http://www.inesmainport.nl). 
This coalition did invest substantially in projects and investigates the viability of others.   
The innovation regime; conclusions from the cases 
The innovation regime is the most problematic regime. The quality of this regime is regarded 
as moderate in all three cases. Experts indicate creating coalitions is difficult. Two reasons 
for these difficulties were identified in all cases. First, financial resources to develop 
innovative capabilities are lacking, due to the limited returns on investment in the port and 
the cost-focus of most firms. 
Second, firms in the port cluster have difficulties with cooperation in networks on the basis of 
trust. The port industry is not a high trust industry. Conflicts related to the distribution of 
potential benefits obstruct cooperation to realize those benefits.   
An effective innovation regime is difficult to develop in such a cluster. It has become clear 
from the cases that without port authority involvement and public funding a good innovation 
regime does not arise. It has also become clear that in any innovation regime adoption is 
central. Firms in the port cluster adopt technologies developed outside the port cluster 
(examples are ICT, the use of new materials, new communication systems, and the like). 
This is hard to reconcile with the need for public funding, since such funds are generally for 
knowledge development, not for adoption. 
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11.4.6  The internationalization regime 
The internationalization regime is regarded as the least important of the five regimes 
analyzed in this study. Table 71 shows the expert evaluation of the quality of the 
internationalization regime in the three cases: 
Table 71: Expert evaluation of the quality of the internationalization regime 
Variable Rotterdam Durban LMPC 
Leader firms 1.3*,*** -1.0**** -0.5**** 
Public actors 0.2 0.5 0.4 
Organizational infrastructure 1.1 -0.9** 0.8 
Community argument -0.4**** 0.9* 0.1 
Voice -0.1 0.5 0.5 
Overall score 0.4 -0.1 0.2 
Average scores on a scale from –5 (very bad) to +5 (very good) 
*  Significantly higher score than in other two port clusters 
** Significantly lower score than in two other port clusters 
***  Significantly higher score than average of all factors in same port cluster 
**** Significantly lower average judgment of all factors in same port cluster 
 
The following conclusions can be drawn on the basis of these figures: 
• The internationalization regime is moderate in all three cases. 
• In Rotterdam, the majority of experts do not regard internationalization as a CAP. Some 
leader firms do encourage internationalization of other firms. The organizational 
infrastructure is relatively good.  
• In Durban, the regime is moderate, due to the lack of leader firm behavior and 
organizational infrastructure. 
• In the LMPC, the organizational infrastructure is relatively good, the lack of leader firms 
is (again) a shortcoming of the regime. 
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The internationalization regime in the LMPC 
In the LMPC the World Trade Center (http://wtcno.org/) is the most important institution in 
the internationalization regime. The WTC promotes international trade and more generally, 
the internationalization of the members of the WTC. For this purpose seminars, courses 
(including language courses) and business trips are organized. The WTC has a broad 
membership base.  
Metrovision, a public private partnership of greater New Orleans, used to organize trade 
missions. However, the effects were hard to quantify, and the willingness to participate by 
the business community remained limited; hence, these activities were discontinued. 
Metrovision now works on a project basis. Even though they still promote the 
internationalization of firms, the scope has been reduced. 
The internationalization regime in Durban 
Most firms in Durban engage in internationalization on their own. Even though the experts 
indicate that some sort of collective action would be in the interest of all actors in the port 
cluster, no arrangements to coordinate internationalization have been created. Hence, the 
organizational infrastructure is underdeveloped. Internationalization is important in the South 
African context. The dominant ‘mode of internationalization’ is the inclusion of South African 
firms in international networks. The leader firms are generally well-positioned in international 
networks, but not willing to include other South African firms. The associations do not play 
an important role: firms from the cluster do not cooperate to visit foreign trade fairs.   
The internationalization regime in Rotterdam 
The majority of experts indicate that internationalization is not a CAP. Firms have individual 
internationalization strategies, coalitions for joint internationalization efforts are not regarded 
as important. Only for one specific segment of the cluster, firms that are active in port 
consultancy and training, is a coalition for joint internationalization formed. This coalition, 
Rotterdam Maritime Group (http://www.port.rmg.nl/) is a ‘networking device’ and an umbrella 
to jointly tender for contracts. 
The RMPM encourages internationalization by organizing and hosting trade missions. 
Furthermore, Rotterdam representatives can support the internationalization of firms from 
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the port cluster. Thus, even though internationalization is not regarded as a CAP, in specific 
cases collective arrangements are created.      
The internationalization regime; conclusions from the cases 
The majority of experts indicate that internalization is a collective action problem. 
Consequently, collective arrangements add to the quality of the internationalization regime. 
However, the three case studies show that only one port specific arrangement, the 
Rotterdam Maritime Group exists. In all the other regimes, firms hardly cooperate in the field 
of internationalization. Even though the experts indicate that some sort of ‘community spirit’ 
in a cluster would enable the internationalization in the cluster, there is no clear set of 
possibilities for collective action. Suggestions include: 
• Large firms enabling the internationalization of small firms. 
• Collective representation in foreign trade fairs. 
• Collective learning of international developments, for instance through seminars. 
Even though these suggestions have been made and in some cases firms have grouped 
together, the benefits of collective action are small compared to some of the other regimes.  
11.5 The importance of the variables related to cluster governance 
One survey question addresses the issue of the importance of the four variables related to 
the governance of the cluster. The experts were asked to rank these variables from 1 (most 
important) to 4 (least important). Table 72 shows the results. 
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Table 72: The importance of the four governance variables  
Variable Importance 
Durban 
Importance 
Rotterdam 
Importance 
LMPC 
Importance 
Overall 
Presence of trust 1.8 1.7 1.7 1.7* 
Presence of leader firms 2.2 2.0 2.4 2.1* 
Collective action regimes 2.3 2.8 2.7 2.5* 
Presence of intermediaries 3.7 3.5 3.3 3.5* 
Average scores on a scale from 1 (most important variable) to 4 (least important variable) 
* significantly different from other average scores 
 
The experts from across the cases agree on the relative importance of the four governance 
variables: the ranking is very similar in all three cases. Trust is the most important variable 
for the quality of the cluster performance. The presence of intermediaries is by far the least 
important variable. Leader firms and collective action regimes are second and third. 
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11.6 Conclusions: cluster governance and performance 
Table 73 summarizes the most important conclusions on the relation between the structure 
of a cluster and the performance of that cluster. 
Table 73: Research findings on cluster governance and performance 
Issue Research finding 
Trust Trust is the most important variable for the quality of the governance of the cluster. Ports 
are not regarded as high trust environments. 
Intermediaries The presence of intermediaries is the least important variable for the quality of the 
governance of the cluster.  
A relatively large part of large firms do not agree intermediaries improve the quality of 
cluster governance. 
Cargo related intermediaries are more important than ship related intermediaries. 
Leader firms Leader firms contribute to the quality of cluster governance. 
In all three cases, leader firm behavior takes place. 
Leader firms make their international knowledge/networks available for local firms in the 
cluster. 
Leader firms improve the quality of collective action regimes. 
Collective action 
regimes 
The five collective action regimes (innovation, training and education, marketing and 
promotion, hinterland access and internationalization) are relevant in seaports. 
Hinterland access is the most important regime and very important in all three cases. 
Internationalization is the least important regime. 
The role of public actors, the infrastructure for collective action and the role of leader 
firms are especially important for the quality of collective action regimes. 
None of the studied regimes (15 in total) is evaluated very positively, for all regimes 
opportunities for improvement are present. 
Innovation is the most difficult regime, because of need for cooperation and funding.  
 

 12 ANALYZING STRENGTHS AND WEAKNESSES OF 
SEAPORT CLUSTERS 
In the preceding two chapters, the results of the case studies were discussed. The results 
confirm the relevance of the variables of the performance of a cluster. Furthermore, the 
relative importance of the variables has been discussed.  
In this chapter, a comparative analysis of the strengths and weaknesses of the three cases 
is made. The strength and weaknesses are related to available performance indicators. As 
discussed in the theoretical part, the best indicator would be the value added generated in 
the cluster, but this figure is only available for Rotterdam and Antwerp. Thus, a volume 
performance indicator is used for the other ports. As discussed in the theoretical part, the 
aim is not to establish causal relationships between variables and performance, the analysis 
is meant as a test to see whether the ‘big picture’ derived from the case studies is in line 
with the performance indicators.  
Rotterdam is compared with Antwerp and Hamburg, Durban is compared with Richard’s Bay 
and the LMPC is compared with Houston. The case study port is also compared with the 
average of the six other ports as a ‘benchmark’. However, since the respondents of the 
three cases have different ‘frames of reference’ the results of this comparison are 
questionable. Therefore, this comparison is only made to find out whether a strength or 
weakness of a port compared to its competitor(s) is also a strength or weakness compared 
to the average of the six other ports.    
The experts in a port were asked to evaluate the quality of each variable (13 in total) on a 
scale from –5 (very bad) to +5 (very good), for the case study port and the competing 
port(s). This provides the basis for an assessment of strengths and weaknesses of the port 
clusters in the three cases. Not all experts were knowledgeable about all the variables in 
competing ports. When experts did not have an informed opinion, the question was left 
open. The number of experts that evaluated the ports is given in Table 74. The figures show 
that between 70% and 85% of the experts felt knowledgeable enough to make an 
assessment of the competing port(s). 
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Table 74: Number of experts that assessed strengths and weaknesses 
Port Number of experts 
Rotterdam 42 
Antwerp 35 
Hamburg 29 
Durban 32 
Richard’s Bay 26 
The LMPC 30 
Houston 22 
 
First, differences between the port regions North-West Europe, US Gulf and Southern Africa 
in general are discussed. These differences should be treated with some precaution: 
different points of reference might explain the differences in outcomes. 
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Table 75: Differences in assessments between ports in three regions 
Variable Average 
North-West 
Europe 
Average US 
Gulf 
Average 
Southern 
Africa 
Overall 
The presence of customers and suppliers 2.6 1.7** 2.5 2.4 
The presence of knowledge spillovers 2.3 1.9 1.8 2.1 
The diversity of the cluster population 2.3 1.8 2.0 2.1 
The presence of embedded leader firms  2.0 2.1 1.9 2.0 
The presence of a labor force  1.6 2.1 1.9 1.8 
The presence of a culture of trust 1.4** 2.3 2.1 1.8 
The quality of collective action regimes 1.6 1.4 2.5* 1.8 
The presence of internal competition   0.9 2.5* 0.8 1.3 
The presence of intermediaries 2.1* 0.4 0.5 1.2 
The level of land prices and office rents 0.1 1.1 0.6 0.5 
The presence of cluster exit barriers (immobile 
staff and fixed investments) 0.1 1.4* 0.1 0.5 
The level of congestion 0.2 1.1* -0.4 0.3 
The presence of cluster entry barriers (access 
to local knowledge, networks and capital) -0.2 1.1* -0.5 0.0 
Average scores on a scale from –5 (very bad) to +5 (very good) 
*  Significantly higher score than in other two regions 
** Significantly lower score than in two other regions 
 
These figures show that the USA Gulf ports (LMPC and Houston) differ from the other ports 
in this study in several aspects. First, the level of internal competition is higher. Second, and 
closely related, entry barriers are lower (the evaluation is more positive). These two 
variables are in line with expectations: in both Gulf ports the public port authority is less 
deeply involved (private land ownership, no operational involvement, less involvement in 
planning) and markets work more freely.  
The North-west European ports are well endowed with intermediaries. This can be explained 
by the relative importance of international transport compared to domestic transport. In the 
United States, domestic transport is dominant. As a consequence ports, that generally 
accommodate international transport, are less important in logistics chains.  
The North-west European ports are relatively ‘low trust environments’. The validity of this 
research outcome is questionable, since especially trust is evaluated by the experts given 
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the national background. It can be argued that in North-west Europe ports are low trust 
environments given the national context, but not necessarily more low trust than African or 
US Gulf ports. A similar reservation is relevant for the research outcome that collective 
action regimes are especially well developed in South African ports.    
12.1 Strengths and weaknesses of Rotterdam’s port cluster 
Table 76 shows the score of Rotterdam compared to the scores of Hamburg (H) and 
Antwerp (A). The average score of the 6 port clusters is used to analyze whether strengths 
and weaknesses apply when related to ports outside the competitive environment. The 
variables are ranked from weaknesses to strengths. 
Table 76: Strengths and weaknesses of Rotterdam’s port cluster 
Variable R H A Conclusion 
The level of land prices and office rents 
-1.5 -0.2 1.9 
Significantly worse than Antwerp, 
Hamburg and the average of 6 
ports 
The quality of collective action regimes 1.0 1.6 2.2 Significantly worse than Antwerp and average of 6 ports 
The presence of a labor force  1.4 1.0 2.3 Significantly worse than Antwerp 
The presence of a culture of trust 0.8 1.7 1.8  
The presence of internal competition   0.9 0.5 1.4  
The presence of cluster exit barriers 
(immobile staff and fixed investments) 0.2 -0.3 0.4 
 
The presence of cluster entry barriers 
(access to local knowledge, networks 
and capital) 
0.1 0.9 0.2  
The level of congestion 0.2 0.8 -0.4  
The presence of embedded leader 
firms 2.0 1.5 2.3 
 
The presence of intermediaries 2.1 1.7 2.5  
The diversity of the cluster population 3.0 1.3 2.4 Significantly better than Hamburg and average of 6 ports 
The presence of customers and 
suppliers 3.0 2.0 2.6 
Significantly better than Hamburg 
and average of 6 ports 
The presence of knowledge spillovers 2.7 2.2 2.0 Significantly better than Antwerp and average of 6 ports 
Average scores on a scale from –5 (very bad) to +5 (very good) 
*  Significantly higher score than in other two regions 
** Significantly lower score than in two other regions 
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The results show that the level of land prices and office rents is a serious weakness for the 
port of Rotterdam. Furthermore, the collective action regimes are a weakness, compared to 
Antwerp and the average score of ports. Third, the labor pool is a weakness of Rotterdam. 
The strengths of Rotterdam’s port cluster are the diversity of the cluster population, the 
presence of customers and suppliers and the presence of knowledge spillovers. These are 
relatively ‘advanced’ strengths: they are not easy to copy by competing ports.  
Two indicators of the performance of the port of Rotterdam are available: first the market 
share of Rotterdam in the throughput in the Hamburg Le Havre range. This market share is 
given in Table 77. 
Table 77: Changes in market share of Rotterdam 1989-2001 
Year 1989 2001 
Total throughput 43,1 36,6 
Agribulk 47,2 31,7 
Ores and scrap 45,1 44,5 
Coal 35,1 34,0 
Oil 62,0 53,7 
Chemical products 40,0 28,8 
Roll on/roll off 23,2 22,9 
Containers 39,9 28,9 
Other breakbulk 21,2 17,9 
Source: RMPM (2003) 
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The evolution in market shares for containers is given in Table 78. 
Table 78: Market shares major North European ports in container throughput 
Year R'dam Hamburg Antwerp Bremen Le Havre Zeebrugge 
1991 38% 20% 17% 12% 8% 4% 
1992 39% 20% 17% 11% 6% 6% 
1993 38% 21% 16% 11% 7% 5% 
1994 40% 22% 18% 12% 6% 5% 
1995 37% 21% 18% 11% 6% 5% 
1996 36% 21% 20% 11% 6% 4% 
1997 36% 21% 20% 11% 7% 5% 
1998 35% 21% 20% 10% 7% 5% 
1999 34% 21% 20% 11% 7% 5% 
2000 31% 22% 21% 13% 7% 6% 
2001 29% 23% 22% 14% 7% 5% 
Source: RMPM, 2003 
 
Figures on the value added generated in Rotterdam’s port cluster are given in Table 79. 
Table 79: Value added generated in the Rotterdam’s port cluster  
Year Value added in 
€ million 
Cargo throughput in 
million ton 
Value added (€ 
per ton) 
1987 4,460 255 17,5 
1990 5,492 288 19,0 
1993 5,431 282 19,2 
1996 5,334 288 18,5 
1999 5,904 300 19,7 
2000 7,451 318 23,4 
2001 7,611 314 24,2 
Source: Nationale Havenraad, 2003 
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A comparison can be made between the performance of the port clusters in Rotterdam and 
Antwerp. For both ports figures on the value added and throughput volume are available. 
Figure 17shows the evolution of the value added per ton cargo. 
Figure 17: Relation between value added and volume in Rotterdam and Antwerp 
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0
10
20
30
40
50
60
1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001
year
€ per ton
Antwerp
Rotterdam
 
These figures show that Rotterdam’s port cluster did not perform very well in terms of 
throughput performance: market share was lost in most commodities to other ports. 
Especially Antwerp gained substantial market share between 1995 and 2001. However, in 
terms of value added generated in the cluster, the performance of Rotterdam was relatively 
good: while the value added per ton declined in Antwerp from 1996 to 2001, it rose in 
Rotterdam in the same period. This conclusion can be related to the strengths and 
weaknesses of the port of Rotterdam, and allows a provisional conclusion: Rotterdam’s 
weaknesses (high land prices and lower quality of the labor pool) have especially had an 
impact of throughput volumes, while its strengths (input-output relations, knowledge spill-
overs and diversity) have secured a relatively good performance in value added. 
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12.2 Strengths and weaknesses of Durban’s port cluster 
Table 80 shows the score of Durban’s port cluster compared to the score Richard’s Bay 
(RB) and the average score of the 6 port clusters. 
Table 80: Strengths and weaknesses of Durban’s port cluster 
Variable D RB Research findings 
The level of congestion -2.1 1.8 Significantly worse than in Richard’s Bay and other 6 ports 
The level of land prices and office rents -1.3 3.1 Significantly worse than in Richard’s Bay and other 6 ports 
The presence of intermediaries -0.6 1.7 Significantly worse than in Richard’s Bay and other 6 ports 
The presence of a labor force  2.2 1.5  
The presence of cluster entry barriers 
(access to local knowledge, networks and 
capital) 
-0.6 -0.3 
 
The presence of cluster exit barriers 
(immobile staff and fixed investments) 0.2 0.0 
 
The quality of collective action regimes 93 2.3  
The presence of knowledge spillovers 2.5 0.9 Significantly better than in Richard’s Bay  
The diversity of the cluster population 3.3 0.4 Significantly better than in Richard’s Bay and other 6 ports 
The presence of a culture of trust 3.2 0.8 Significantly better than in Richard’s Bay and other 6 ports 
The presence of customers and suppliers 3.4 1.5 Significantly better than in Richard’s Bay and other 6 ports 
The presence of embedded leader firms 2.8 0.6 Significantly better than in Richard’s Bay and other 6 ports 
The presence of internal competition   1.9 -0.5 Significantly better than in Richard’s Bay  
2.6  
Average scores on a scale from –5 (very bad) to +5 (very good) 
*  Significantly higher score than in other two regions 
** Significantly lower score than in two other regions 
 
The weaknesses of Durban’s port cluster are first the level of congestion, second the level of 
land prices and office rents and third the presence of intermediaries. 
                                          
93  This score is very high compared to the evaluation of the five regimes: compared to Richard’s 
Bay the quality is good, but a comparison with the other cases would be misleading. 
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The port cluster of Durban possesses various strengths. First, the level of internal 
competition is high, compared to Richard’s Bay. Second and third, Durban is more diverse 
and has more knowledge spill-overs than Richard’s Bay. Fourth, the level of trust is high; 
fifth, Durban is well endowed with leader firms; and sixth, relatively many customers and 
suppliers are present in Durban.  
These strengths and weaknesses show that Durban is a strong cluster. The cluster 
economies are stronger in Durban than in Richard’s Bay. However, the concentration of 
cluster activities has led to diseconomies of high land prices and congestion. Addressing 
those two weaknesses is a central challenge for improving Durban’s performance. Only data 
on container throughput and overall throughput are available. Both are given in Table 81. 
Table 81: Market share of Durban, total throughput and containers in South Africa 
 Total cargo (tons) Containers (TEU) 
Year Durban 
Richards 
Bay Saldanha Cape town 
Port 
Elizabeth Durban Cape town 
Port 
Elizabeth 
1990 24.4% 49.9% 15.6% 4.9% 4.0% 68.0% 19.6% 10.0% 
1991 23.4% 52.7% 145.0% 5.1% 3.5% 68.5% 20.1% 9.0% 
1992 22.9% 52.7% 14.1% 5.3% 3.7% 65.4% 21.7% 10.4% 
1993 20.4% 55.6% 15.4% 4.8% 2.9% 66.7% 21.2% 9.8% 
1994 19.8% 53.3% 16.1% 5.7% 3.1% 65.5% 21.0% 10.8% 
1995 19.3% 54.6% 16.2% 5.5% 3.7% 63.7% 22.4% 10.9% 
1996 21.9% 54.7% 14.2% 4.7% 3.7% 65.5% 20.7% 11.1% 
1997 20.6% 55.1% 14.9% 5.0% 3.7% 64.8% 20.9% 11.9% 
1998 20.4% 56.3% 14.8% 4.4% 3.8% 65.2% 19.7% 12.4% 
1999 18.2% 57.3% 14.9% 4.9% 4.3% 61.1% 20.7% 15.8% 
2000 20.1% 56.2% 14.5% 4.7% 4.1% 64.4% 19.7% 14.3% 
Source: National Port Authority of South Africa (2003) 
 
This table shows that Durban has lost market share overall, but almost exclusively because 
coal exports increased substantially. These volumes are handled in Richard’s Bay. In 
containers, Durban still has a dominant market share, only Port Elisabeth managed to gain 
some market share. However, this is mainly because of increasing volumes in their captive 
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hinterland. Thus, the strengths of the cluster are in line with the strong position of Durban as 
South Africa’s leading port.  
12.3 Strengths and weaknesses of the LMPC 
Table 82 shows the score of the LMPC compared to the score of Houston and the average 
score of the 6 port clusters. 
Table 82: Strengths and weaknesses of the LMPC 
Variable LMPC Houston Research findings 
The quality of collective action regimes 0.3 3.0 Significantly worse than in Houston and other 6 ports 
The presence of customers and suppliers 0.5 3.3 Significantly worse than in Houston and other 6 ports 
The diversity of the cluster population 0.9 3.0 Significantly worse than in Houston and other 6 ports 
The presence of intermediaries -0.4 1.5 Significantly worse than in Houston and other 6 ports 
The presence of a culture of trust 1.5 3.3 Significantly worse than in Houston 
The presence of embedded leader firms 1.8 2.5  
The presence of a labor force  1.7 2.6  
The presence of cluster entry barriers 
(access to local knowledge, networks and 
capital) 
0.5 1.8 
 
The presence of knowledge spillovers 1.5 2.4  
The presence of cluster exit barriers 
(immobile staff and fixed investments) 1.6 1.1 
 
The level of land prices and office rents 1.4 0.6  
The presence of internal competition   2.4 2.7  
The level of congestion 1.6 0.4 Significantly better than in Houston and other 6 ports 
Average scores on a scale from –5 (very bad) to +5 (very good) 
*  Significantly higher score than in other two regions 
** Significantly lower score than in two other regions 
 
Five weaknesses of the LMPC result from the comparison. First, the quality of collective 
action regimes is relatively bad. Second, the presence of customers and suppliers is poor, 
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compared to Houston. Third, the diversity of the cluster is limited, and fourth, the presence 
of intermediaries is limited. Fifth, the LMPC is a ‘low trust cluster’ compared to Houston. The 
only strength of the LMPC compared to Houston is the low level of congestion. 
These strengths and weaknesses indicate that the LMPC is a weak cluster. Agglomeration 
economies are absent; the main strength of the cluster is absence of congestion. These are 
not ‘advanced strengths’. The following performance indicators are available to compare the 
LMPC with other Gulf ports  (see Table 83, Table 84, and Table 85). 
Table 83: Market shares of the LMPC and three other gulf ports in the total US port throughput. 
Market shares 1990 1997 2000 2001 
LMPC 18.0% 18.1% 17.6% 17.2% 
Houston 5.8% 7.1% 7.8% 7.6% 
Mobile 1.9% 2.1% 2.2% 2.0% 
Tampa 2.4% 2.4% 2.2% 1.9% 
 
Table 84: Performance of the LMPC as container port 
Year 1980 1985 1990 1995 1998 2001 
New Orleans 279,500 380,000 157,000 198,000 245,000 247,000 
Houston 300,000 363,000 502,000 705,000 968,000 1072,000 
US Gulf 580,000 812,000 822,000 1188,000 1479,000 1652,000 
Total USA 7,658,000 11,480,000 15,266,000 22,339,000 26,175,000 30,471,000 
Market share 
LMPC in Gulf 48.2% 46.8% 19.1% 16.7% 16.6% 15.0% 
Market share 
LMPC in USA 3.6% 3.3% 1.0% 0.9% 0.9% 0.8% 
Source: US Army Corps of Engineers (2003) 
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Table 85: Concentration patterns in five US ports (2002) 
Economic activity Mobile LMPC Houston Tampa 
LA/Long 
Beach 
Support Activities for Water Transportation 10.4 15.3 3.4 2.2 1.0 
Freight Transportation arrangement 1.6 2.3 2.0 0.8 2.3 
Petroleum and Petroleum Products Wholesalers 1.6 1.7 3.2 0.7 0.5 
Process, Physical Distribution, and Logistics 
Consulting Services  0.5 0.7 0.3 1.4 0.7 
Source: US Bureau of Census (2003) 
 
These figures show that the LMPC has lost market share, especially in container throughput. 
This is explained to some extent by natural factors, and also because of the LMPC’s 
weaknesses, most importantly its lacking capability to solve collective action problems and 
develop an adequate system for handling containers and moving them into the hinterland. 
Apart from containers (the only growth market), the LMPC has not lost market share, 
predominantly because it can operate at low costs (land prices are low and internal 
competition secures low handling rates) and does not face congestion problems. 
Another indicator of the performance of the LMPC is the relative concentration of various 
cluster activities. ‘Support activities for water transportation’, the ‘core’ of a port cluster, are 
strongly concentrated in the LMPC. These firms have to be located at deepwater facilities. 
Activities that can locate in seaports, such as logistics consultants and transportation 
arrangement firms are less concentrated in the LMPC. This indicates that the cluster does 
not attract a large share of footloose port related activities. This can be explained by its 
weaknesses: the cluster is not diverse and customers and suppliers are absent in the 
LMPC.   
 
 PART THREE: CONCLUSIONS 
 

 13 CONCLUSIONS FOR ANALYZING CLUSTERS 
This chapter is the first of three concluding chapters. This chapter discusses research 
findings of this study that can be generalized to clusters in general. As discussed in the 
empirical part, this should be regarded as ‘analytical generalization’ (not as empirical 
generalization).  
In the next chapter, conclusions specifically related to seaport clusters are discussed. The 
final chapter discusses implications for policy and management in seaport clusters. Some 
overlap between these chapters is unavoidable, since the same research findings can be 
relevant for clusters in general, for seaport clusters and for policy and management. All 
three chapters are finalized with a few suggestions for further research. 
13.1 Constructing a cluster 
In this study a method to identify the ‘cluster population’ was developed. The cases show 
that this method is applicable when ‘economic census data’ are available at a sufficiently 
disaggregated level, both economically and geographically. Cluster activities have to be 
identified with the use of input-output data, an analysis of the structure of value chains, an 
analysis of the association structure and expert interviews. The relevant cluster region can 
be identified on the basis of a concentration analysis of these cluster activities. The cluster 
population, consisting of all organizations engaging in cluster activities and located in the 
relevant cluster region, can be identified with the use of a dataset in which all firms are 
classified in industries. This method does allow for a precise delimitation of the cluster and 
consequently a more precise analysis of the development of the cluster over time.  
13.2 The theoretical framework 
The validity of the theoretical framework developed in the theoretical part (see Figure 18) is 
broadly confirmed in this research. A few additions to the framework that have resulted from 
the cases are discussed in the following paragraphs. The relevance of the four variables 
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related to the structure of a cluster and the four variables related to the governance of the 
cluster is confirmed in this research. 
Figure 18: The theoretical framework 
Cluster 
performance
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Experts were asked to identify variables that were not addressed in the survey. They 
identified a number of variables, most importantly ‘distortions of the level playing field’, 
‘trends in the shipping industry’ and ‘the transport policy of a country’ (state). These 
variables are relevant for the performance of port clusters. However, the framework deals 
exclusively with ‘cluster specific variables’ and these three variables are not cluster specific. 
Industry experts focus on the overall picture, but from a theoretical perspective a focus on 
cluster specific variables makes sense: without such a delimitation, an infinite number of 
variables can be identified and ‘everything is related to everything’.  
As far as cluster specific variables are concerned, the framework developed in this study 
proved to be a useful and complete ‘tool’ to analyze the performance of (port) clusters. The 
framework is an alternative for Porters well-known diamond framework and the adapted 
version of this diamond (Rugman et al, 1995). The most important differences between our 
framework and both alternatives are: 
• The distinction between structure and governance variables. In both alternatives, such a 
distinction is lacking. This distinction adds to the quality of the framework, in the sense 
that it is a shift away from the ‘mechanic’ explanation of the performance of a cluster 
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towards an explanation that incorporates behavioral aspects. Our study demonstrates 
the importance of governance in (port) clusters. 
• The incorporation of analytical tools to analyze governance, most importantly, the 
theory of ‘collective action’, the concept ‘leader firms’ and the concept ‘regimes’. These 
three analytical tools enrich the analytical framework. 
• Recognition of the effects of the diversity of a cluster. The positive effects of diversity on 
economic growth and innovation performance of regions have been acknowledged, but 
this insight has not been incorporated in cluster research. Industry experts do agree 
with the positive effect of the diversity of a cluster on its performance, indicate that 
diversity of international scope is especially important, and rank diversity as a relatively 
important determinant of cluster performance. 
13.3 The role of entry and exit barriers  
One important adaptation of the framework resulted from the case studies: the effects of exit 
barriers are not in line with the theoretical arguments presented in the theoretical part. The 
argument that exit barriers increase the embeddedness of firms in the cluster is dismissed. 
Embeddedness arises when the cluster environment offers advantages, not when barriers 
prevent exit. The empirical results show that exit barriers do not contribute to the 
performance of the cluster, as suggested in the theoretical part, but reduce the performance 
of the cluster.  
Two reasons explain this effect: first, exit barriers are also entry barriers. Since entry barriers 
reduce performance, exit barriers reduce performance as well. In this sense, the answers of 
the experts are coherent. Furthermore, exit barriers reduce dynamism in the cluster. When 
firms exit, entrants take their place. This dynamism has - according to the survey results - in 
general positive effects on the cluster. The experts rank exit barriers as by far the least 
important variable of the performance of clusters. Entry barriers are regarded as more 
important. In this respect, it is important to note that exit barriers are entry barriers, but the 
reverse is not true. For instance, the inaccessibility of networks is found to be a relevant 
entry barrier, but is not an exit barrier. 
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13.4 Internal competition in clusters 
The results of the case studies confirm the importance of internal competition for cluster 
performance, as emphasized by Porter (1990) and Baptista (1999). In this study, the 
mechanisms that explain the positive effects of internal competition were studied. Three 
mechanisms were identified. All three mechanisms (monopoly rents, specialization and the 
vibrant environment) were found to be relevant in practice. This is an important conclusion, 
since the issue of internal competition is generally linked to the threat of monopoly power. 
The case study results show that internal competition has positive effects apart from 
preventing the abuse of market power. Since internal competitors have similar cost 
functions, they have strong incentives to specialize (to reduce competition). This also 
triggers innovation. Both effects are beneficial for the performance of a cluster. In this sense, 
it could be claimed that internal competition is most beneficial when it can lead to an 
‘oligopoly’ with specialized service providers and less beneficial when it leads to cut-throat 
competition, on top of the competition with firms outside the cluster.  
13.5 The role of leader firms in clusters 
The concept ‘leader firm’ was incorporated in the framework for analyzing the performance 
of clusters. The leader firm concept is relatively new and not well studied. Leader firms are 
defined as ‘firms with both the ability and the incentives to make investments with positive 
external effects for other firms in the cluster’. 
The case studies demonstrate that the leader firm concept contributes to the understanding 
of governance in clusters. The experts acknowledge the positive influence of leader firms on 
the performance of a cluster and they judge leader firms as important for the performance of 
the cluster. Evidence from the three cases shows the role leader firms can play. 
Furthermore, the analysis of collective action regimes shows the difficulties that arise when 
leader firms are absent. These results justify the conclusion that a special set of firms in 
clusters can have a substantial impact on its performance. These firms can be termed 
leader firms.    
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13.6 The role of intermediaries in clusters 
The presence of intermediaries was found to contribute to the performance of a cluster. This 
is an addition to existing theories on governance in clusters, since this function of 
intermediaries is not widely acknowledged. However, in the three cases the presence of 
intermediaries is relatively unimportant and especially large firms can do without 
intermediaries. In seaports large numbers of ‘traditional’ intermediaries, such as ship’s 
agents and freight forwarders play a role. The traditional value added of these intermediaries 
declines, because transparency of supply chains and transport services increases. This 
might explain why the intermediaries are regarded as unimportant.  
The study shows intermediaries can play a role in the transfer of knowledge. However, in 
seaports, intermediaries that position themselves as ‘knowledge intermediaries’ have not 
emerged (yet). Comparison with other clusters could yield new insights here. 
13.7 Collective action regimes in clusters 
The case studies show that the concept of collective action regimes is an important 
analytical tool for analyzing governance in clusters. At least five collective action problems 
are relevant: innovation, training and education, internationalization, hinterland access, and 
marketing and promotion. Four of these are not port specific and likely to be present in other 
clusters as well. These regimes are important for the performance of a cluster. 
The empirical results show that five variables determine the quality of collective action 
regimes, the most important ones being the infrastructure for collective action 
(organizational infrastructure), the presence of leader firms, and the role of public actors. 
The two others are the ‘voice’ of the business community and the presence of a community 
argument in the cluster.  
The results discussed above contribute to the understanding of governance in clusters. The 
theory of collective action can be applied to clusters and the concept of a collective action 
regime contributes to the literature on collective action (in clusters).  
 
The Performance of Seaport Clusters 196
13.8 A regime manager 
The concept ‘regime manager’ was developed on the basis of the case studies. The regime 
manager of the training and education regime in Rotterdam (KMR) is a ‘network 
organization’ that brings together all actors that have incentives and resources to contribute 
to the quality of the training and education regime. The regime manager is a not-for-profit 
public private organization. 
A regime manager is one particular (institutional) arrangement to overcome collective action 
problems. Only in one of the fifteen regimes (the knowledge and training regime in 
Rotterdam), does a regime manager exist. The evidence from the cases shows that this 
regime is effective: its score (on a scale from –5 to +5) was the highest (shared with a 
second regime) of all fifteen regimes. Furthermore, the evaluation of the organizational 
infrastructure of the training and education regime in Rotterdam is by far the best of the 
fifteen regimes that are analyzed, with a score of 1.8 on a scale from –5 to +5. Thus, the 
regime manager is an arrangement that can improve the quality of collective action regimes 
in clusters. This addition to theories on governance in clusters resulted from the empirical 
research.  
13.9 Cluster associations 
The concept of a ‘cluster association’ is a second concept to analyze the quality of 
governance in clusters that has been developed on the basis of the case studies. Firms in 
clusters set up collective organizations. In all three clusters, various associations, each with 
a specific membership base, such as an association for forwarders, shipping lines or 
terminal operators, have developed. In only one cluster (Rotterdam) have these various 
organizations grouped together to set up a port cluster association. In this cluster the quality 
of the collective action regimes is better than in the other two clusters. This is an indicator 
that a cluster association can contribute to the quality of the ‘organizational infrastructure’. In 
the two other port clusters, there are initiatives to develop such a cluster association. A 
schematic overview of a cluster association is given in Figure 19. 
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Figure 19: A cluster association 
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Cluster associations exist in other clusters as well94, but are relatively new phenomena and 
have not been addressed in the literature. Thus, the concept of a cluster association is an 
addition to the theory on clusters and governance in clusters. 
13.10 Cluster managers 
A final contribution to theories on (governance in) clusters is the concept of a cluster 
manager. The case studies revealed that the port authority plays a very central role in the 
governance of the cluster. Especially in Rotterdam, the traditional landlord model of the port 
authority does not capture the deep involvement of the port authority in the cluster. The 
alternative developed in this study, is the concept of a ‘cluster manager’.  
The ‘perfect’ institutional setting of a cluster manager was analyzed. In this setting the 
cluster manager is a not-for-profit organization that generates income through a ‘cluster tax’ 
and re-invests this income to improve the performance of the cluster in the long run. In the 
perfect setting, the cluster manager can create co-finance arrangements with firms that 
benefit from the investments.  
                                          
94  Examples include the ‘Dutch Maritime Cluster’ (www.nml.nl). 
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The institutional setting of port authorities closely resembles this ‘perfect setting’: port 
authorities are mostly not-for-profit, generate revenues from fairly general port charges and 
make investments to improve the performance of the cluster. Special to the port authority is 
its revenue structure, which creates substantial resources to act as a cluster manager. This 
particular institutional setting contributes to the quality of the governance in seaport cluster. 
The port authority is special in this respect; in other clusters organizations with a similar 
institutional position are missing. We argue that the cluster manager model of port 
authorities is a relatively advanced arrangement to govern clusters.   
13.11 Relations between the different variables 
The different variables of cluster performance are related. For instance, a better training and 
education regime (governance) strengthens the agglomeration economy of a shared labor 
pool (structure). These interrelations are assumed to be positive or neutral:  when the quality 
of one of the variables increases, this has either no effect or a positive effect on the other 
variables. In general, these positive effects run from the governance variables to the 
structure variables, since some governance efforts aim to improve the structure of the 
cluster. Improvements of the structure of the cluster do not ‘automatically’ lead to better 
cluster governance. The following positive interrelations were found in the case studies: 
• The presence of intermediaries leads to more knowledge spillovers. Intermediaries also 
lower the entry barriers of a cluster, since intermediaries make knowledge and networks 
more open.  
• More trust leads to more knowledge spillovers, since firms are more inclined to share 
knowledge. 
• More leader firm behavior leads to more agglomeration forces, since leader firms 
improve the quality of the labor pool and improve knowledge spillovers in the cluster. 
More leader firm behavior can also lead to more internal competition. In various cases, 
including Huntsman in Rotterdam and Rennies in Durban, leader firms induce 
competition.  
• Better collective action regimes lead to stronger agglomeration effects, lower cluster 
barriers (for example the hinterland access regime in Rotterdam), and more 
heterogeneity (especially though marketing and promotion efforts). 
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The effects of governance variables on the structure of the cluster are given in Figure 20. 
Figure 20 Governance efforts to improve the cluster structure 
Leader firmsCluster barriers
Structure Governance
Governance efforts to improve the structure
(Dis)Agglomeration forces
Internal competition 
Heterogeneity
Intermediaries
Trust 
Collective action regimes
 
 
The absence of trade-offs between the various variables is an assumption of the theoretical 
framework. In the cases, no evidence for the existence of such trade-offs was found. In the 
interviews the issue of the relation between effective governance and internal competition 
was raised and discussed. The preliminary conclusion on the basis of the interviews is that 
fierce internal competition can have a negative impact on the quality of the governance of 
the cluster, but not necessarily so.  
13.12 Suggestions for further research 
In this study three cases of port clusters were analyzed. Conclusions of the three cases can 
be used for further research on clusters. Research on the institutional structure of clusters 
can build on institutional arrangements described in this study, such as a ‘regime manager’, 
a ‘cluster association’, and a ‘cluster manager’. Such research will contribute to the 
understanding of governance in clusters. 
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A second suggestion for further research that builds on this research is the role of 
knowledge intermediaries. Port clusters do not seem to be well endowed with knowledge 
intermediaries. Firms indicate that they do access knowledge and information through 
intermediaries, but indicate that this is a ‘by product’. Further research could analyze the 
presence of knowledge intermediaries in various different clusters. 
A third suggestion for further research addresses the issue of the effects of internal 
competition on the quality of governance. It has become clear that firms in clusters compete 
and cooperate. However, experts indicate that in some cases, destructive competition can 
take place. This kind of competition does not go hand-in-hand with cooperation, but prevents 
it. The question under what conditions competition and cooperation are simultaneously 
possible, and if there is a threat of ‘destructive internal competition’ in (seaport) clusters is 
intriguing and still unanswered. This study suggests that opportunities for specialization 
might be relevant in this respect, but further research is required. 
 
 14 CONCLUSIONS ON SEAPORT CLUSTERS 
In this chapter, relevant conclusions with regard to seaport clusters are drawn. These 
conclusions are especially relevant for scholars with an interest in seaports. Six conclusions 
are discussed, and the chapter is finalized with suggestions for port research that builds on 
this research. 
14.1 Seaport clusters 
The application of the cluster concept has resulted in more clarity on clustering in seaports: 
• First, it has become clear that seaports are clusters. In all the three cases, the cluster 
consists of substantial numbers of firms, all related to the arrival of ships and goods in 
seaports. The majority of value added and employment in the three clusters in not 
generated in primary port activities (cargo handling), but in related activities, such as 
logistics, manufacturing and trade. All these activities are concentrated in seaports. 
• Second, it is possible to identify a port cluster region. In all three cases, port activities 
are distributed over a number of municipalities and not limited to the port city. In fact, in 
the LMPC and Rotterdam, the port-cities have a lower concentration of port activities 
than smaller municipalities in the vicinity of the port.  
• Third, a ‘general’ list of cluster activities can be compiled. Such a list consists of all firms 
active in cargo handling, transport and logistics, and manufacturing and trading firms in 
a small number of ‘chains’ such as chemicals and grain. In the empirical part the list of 
cluster activities, each with the corresponding NAICS, are presented. This list of cluster 
activities is general and can be used to compare port clusters worldwide. 
14.2 Internal competition in seaports 
The lack of internal competition is a weakness for seaports, even if external competition is 
fierce enough to prevent firms from monopoly pricing, because internal competition fosters 
specialization and creates an innovation-prone environment. Internal competition in cargo 
handling segments such as dry bulk, containers and fruits, and in most nautical port 
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services, such as pilotage and towage is limited in the three cases. Since all three cases are 
large ports, internal competition is likely to be absent to an even larger extent in small and 
medium sized ports. The lack of internal competition can be explained to some extent by 
regulation (especially pilotage), but mainly because scale economies are so substantial that 
the minimum efficient size is so large that internal competition is unstable. 
Regulation, to tender and benchmark monopolies might be necessary in some cases to 
prevent monopoly pricing. However, regulation does not provide incentives for specialization 
and innovation. Thus, regulation is the least desirable policy direction.  
Policies to create internal competition are difficult and only desirable when firms can 
specialize. In these cases an arrangement that reconciles scale economies with the 
presence of internal competition is desirable. Such an arrangement is only possible when 
the port authority makes fixed investments and leases these assets to firms. In this case the 
port authority creates scale economies. An example could be pilotage equipment (ships as 
well as ICT infrastructure) that can be leased by independent pilotage firms as well as ship-
owners. Such opportunities are discussed in the final chapter. 
14.3 The organizational infrastructure in seaports 
The three port clusters are characterized by ‘institutional thickness’95. The number of 
collective organizations (and to some extent public private partnerships) is large. Most of the 
collective organizations have a long history. Because of this institutional thickness, the 
infrastructure for coordination is relatively good. However, a consolidation of associations is 
widely regarded as a step forward, because current associations have limited resources to 
add value to their members. The results from the survey show that associations are not 
regarded as important intermediaries. Furthermore, the port experts indicate that the 
associations are not important as knowledge intermediaries.  
Finally, notwithstanding the presence of a substantial number of associations in the three 
cases, the organizational infrastructure is judged as moderate: in Rotterdam the average 
                                          
95  In the sense of a variety of collective organizations and arrangements between governments 
and firms. This is a particular use of the term ‘institutional thickness’, others use the term 
institutions strictly for ‘rules’ and not for ‘organizations’.    
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overall evaluation is 1.2 on a scale from –5 to +5, in Durban and the LMPC the average is –
0.2 and –0.1 respectively. This assessment shows that the organizational infrastructure in 
the three ports is not effective. A merger of various associations into one cluster association, 
as was done in Rotterdam, is probably a step forward. 
14.4 Leader firm behavior in seaports 
The three case studies show that leader firms can contribute substantially to the 
performance of port clusters. The experts regard leader firms as relatively important. 
Examples of leader firm behavior in port clusters include: 
• Efforts and investments to improve rail accessibility, by setting up a freight rail 
company. 
• Efforts and investments to improve the quality of the labor force in the cluster. 
• Efforts and investments to improve the ‘data interchange infrastructure’ in a port. 
• Efforts to improve the organizational infrastructure in a port and the cooperation 
between firms and the port authority. 
• Efforts to increase the working standards of suppliers in the port. 
• Efforts to encourage the introduction of internal competition in a cluster. 
In every port cluster the involvement of leader firms will be different. These examples show 
the huge potential benefits of leader firm involvement.  
14.5 Collective action regimes in seaports 
Collective action regimes are very relevant in port clusters. The hinterland access regime is 
especially important for the performance of a port cluster. Innovation, training and education, 
internationalization and marketing and promotion are also regarded as important regimes in 
all three ports. Central in improving regimes is the ability to commit resources, such as 
capital, management involvement, and commitment, to a regime.  
The quality of collective action regimes varies between the cases but is generally speaking 
moderate. Given the importance of the regimes, this is an important opportunity to improve 
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the governance of seaports. One could even argue that the quality of regimes becomes 
more relevant in port competition: when firms become active in various port clusters, 
technological differences between ports become smaller and regulations to create a ‘level 
playing field’ more strict, these potential sources of competitive advantage become smaller. 
In such a competitive environment, the quality of collective action regimes becomes more 
important. 
14.6 Port authorities as cluster managers 
The role of port authorities has traditionally been described with the ‘port models’ landlord, 
toolport and service port. It has become clear that these port models are of limited use for 
understanding strategies of port authorities (see Heaver et al, 2001). The case studies show 
that this distinction does not capture the involvement of port authorities in the governance, 
regardless their port model. On the basis of the case study evidence and theoretical insights 
stemming from the analysis of governance in clusters, the concept ‘cluster manager’ was 
developed. Figure 21 shows the newly proposed scheme to analyze investments of port 
authorities. 
Figure 21: The port authority as cluster manager 
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This scheme was used to analyze investments of the port authorities in the three cases. 
Table 86, Table 87 and Table 88 show cluster manager investments in Rotterdam, Durban 
and the LMPC. 
Table 86: Cluster manager investments in Rotterdam 
Role of port authority Direct cost recovery Indirect cost recovery 
Investments in port 
cluster (location) 
Port consultancy 
Venture capital provision 
Office space provision 
Industrial pipeline infrastructure 
Hinterland terminals in Middle Europe 
Co-funding of university research 
Co-funding of innovation projects 
(among other through long term 
programs Connekt and Klict 
Co-funding of port labor pool 
Co-funding of training facility 
Co-funding of education center EIC 
Investments in transport 
node  
‘Standard investments’ such as 
dredging, quay construction, traffic 
control’. 
Market intelligence 
Port marketing: Rotterdam 
representatives 
Port marketing: contribution to RPPC 
 
Table 87: Cluster manager investments in Durban 
Role of port authority Direct cost recovery Indirect cost recovery 
Investments in port 
cluster (location) 
Port consultancy 
City development (under study) 
Training facility (currently 
predominantly for own staff) 
Investments in transport 
node  
‘Standard investments’ such as 
dredging, quay construction, traffic 
control’. 
Market intelligence 
Port marketing 
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Table 88: Cluster manager investments in the LMPC 
Role of port authority Direct cost recovery Indirect cost recovery 
Investments in port 
cluster (location) 
City development  
Training for foreign port managers 
Partnerships with hinterland ports 
Investments in transport 
node  
‘Standard investments’ such as 
dredging, quay construction, traffic 
control’. 
Market intelligence 
 
These tables show that the port authority of Rotterdam acts to a large extent as cluster 
manager. The port authorities in both other clusters act cluster managers to a lesser extent. 
In Durban, the port authority transforms from a service port to a landlord port. The 
organization has not (yet) developed cluster management routines. In the LMPC, port 
authorities play a more modest role. The experts expect an increase in cluster management 
involvement of the port authorities in Durban and the LMPC. 
14.7 Suggestions for further research 
The conclusions of this study are a basis for further research. Four suggestions for further 
research are discussed. 
• This study claims the role of cluster manager is an important potential competence for 
port authorities. However, the role of port authorities as cluster managers is little 
understood. Differences between a cluster manager and a landlord could be explored 
further. The theoretical basis provided in this study also allows for an analysis of 
organizational and institutional transformations of port authorities. 
• Second, leader firms can improve the quality of the governance of clusters (and the 
collective action regimes) substantially. Examples of leader firm behavior were found in 
all three cases. It can be argued that the potential benefits of leader firm involvement 
are especially large in ports in developing countries, because of the skills and 
knowledge leader firms can transfer. Thus, the role of (internationally operating) leader 
firms in port clusters in developing countries is an interesting and relevant research 
theme. 
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• Third, the collective action framework could be useful to analyze the increasingly 
important issue of port security. Port security is likely to be a collective action problem, 
because the threat of free riding seems present. This issue could be analyzed with the 
analytical framework developed in this study. For instance, questions such as ‘could a 
network organization act as regime manager’, ‘would a security charge be a good 
mechanism to generate resources to improve port security’, and ‘what is the role of 
leader firms in the port security regime’ are relevant research questions. 
• Finally, this thesis has addressed the issue of the performance of port clusters, but has 
not discussed the issue of the regional economic development of port regions. The 
performance of the port cluster is relevant for the development of port regions. 
However, one could claim that port regions run the risk of ending up in a ‘lock-in’: 
because of the importance of the port cluster and the specialization of the region in 
ports, the region becomes less attractive for other economic activities with more growth 
potential. Thus, the issue of how to align efforts to improve the performance of the port 
with regional economic development, as well as the issue to what extent the ‘quality of 
life’ of the city is important for the port cluster, deserves attention. 
 

 15 OPPORTUNITIES FOR POLICY AND 
MANAGEMENT IN SEAPORT CLUSTERS 
In this final chapter, the case study results are used to identify opportunities for policy and 
management in seaport clusters. These opportunities should be read as suggestions that 
need further exploration. The opportunities for policy and management were discussed with 
the experts. The opportunities can be relevant for other (port) clusters. The opportunities to 
improve the collective action regimes were discussed in chapter 11 and are only briefly 
summarized in this chapter.  
15.1 Opportunities to strengthen agglomeration economies and 
reduce diseconomies 
Several opportunities to improve the agglomeration economies or reduce the agglomeration 
diseconomies have been identified. The most important ones are discussed below.  
In Durban land prices are high and congestion problematic. High land prices can be solved 
by port expansion and by intensifying the land-use of existing facilities. Given geographical 
conditions, expansion is relatively expensive in Durban, and not an option in the short run. 
Intensifying the land use is a more viable opportunity in the short run. This can be done by 
increasing land prices. This does not imply an overall increase in tariffs. Other tariffs, such 
as the cargo dues and port dues should be reduced. A pricing structure with high land prices 
‘sends the right signals’: firms will have an incentive to increase land-use. 
Congestion is a second important agglomeration diseconomy in Durban. Infrastructure 
expansion is problematic, given the fact that residential areas surround the port. Better traffic 
management systems, pre-arrival information systems and the development of a ‘dry port’ 
outside the congested port area are more cost-effective opportunities to reduce congestion.   
In Rotterdam, land prices are high and land availability is limited. The expansion project 
‘second Maasvlakte’ will reduce the scarcity of land in Rotterdam’s port cluster. A second 
opportunity to reduce land scarcity is through encouraging ‘co-siting’ (especially in the 
chemical industry). Lease holders, especially chemical plants, lease more land than 
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effectively needed, because of reservations for expansions. Process intensification reduces 
the land requirement for chemical facilities. This provides an opportunity to co-locate related 
firms on one site. Various co-siting projects have been initiated and increased land use. Two 
challenging opportunities to increase the intensity of land use are first the development of a 
new space-efficient system to store chemical products, especially oil and second the 
development of a more systematic approach to co-siting and industrial clustering. 
In the LMPC, the transport infrastructure is relatively good and a substantial number of sites 
are  available. These diseconomies do not have to be addressed.  
Strengthening agglomeration economies is a more difficult path to improve the structure of a 
cluster. Through a good ‘training and education regime’ the quality and quantity of the labor 
pool can be improved, a good ‘innovation regime’ can improve knowledge spillovers. 
Opportunities to improve these regimes have been discussed in chapter 11.  
The presence of customers and suppliers (the third agglomeration force) depends on the 
economic structure and location factors of the port region. In the LMPC and Durban, policies 
or strategies to improve the location factors are absent. In Rotterdam, actors from the port 
industry stress the importance of the location factors of the region.  
In all three cases, the port cluster would benefit from more establishments in logistics, 
manufacturing and trade. These activities cannot be attracted with only traditional location 
factors, such as accessibility and land availability. The two most important ‘new’ location 
factors for port clusters are ‘the quality of life’ in a port region, and the presence of a good 
knowledge infrastructure. Reducing the negative effects of transport flows, for instance by 
creating dedicated solutions for freight road transport, can enhance the quality of life. 
Furthermore, the redevelopment of old port areas is an opportunity to improve the quality of 
life.  
The knowledge infrastructure increases the attractiveness of the port city for higher skilled 
port related jobs. In many cases, these jobs are not located in ports at all, but in a location 
where the knowledge infrastructure and quality of life are better. The knowledge requirement 
differs per port: in Rotterdam, petro-chemical knowledge infrastructure would fit, whereas in 
the LMPC and Durban, a logistics knowledge base would fit better.  
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15.2 Opportunities to create internal competition 
The lack of internal competition has a negative effect on the performance of the cluster. This 
negative effect might become more important given the rise of global terminal operators and 
other (trans)port service providers that are not committed to or embedded in particular 
clusters.  
Internal competition between pilots is lacking in all three ports. The port authority undertakes 
pilotage in Durban. In the LMPC and Rotterdam, an independent organization provides 
pilotage services, but prices are not competitive. In the LMPC, port users have joined a ‘pilot 
user group’ (PUG) that started elsewhere in Louisiana. This shows organizing capacity in 
the LMPC is limited. The issue of appropriate regulation for the pilots is complicated and not 
exclusively based on economic arguments. One arrangement that follows from the previous 
discussion on entry barriers would be to develop a government owned leasing agency that 
leases equipment to pilots. In this arrangement, licensed pilots can lease equipment and 
provide services, without the need to make high specific investments. 
With regard to the lack of competition in cargo handling, the opportunity - in general terms - 
is to reconcile scale economies with competition. An arrangement could be to lease a 
terminal to two operators. In principle, two independent operators can use the same gate, 
berth, stacking space, cranes and a part of the labor force. If the firms are head-on 
competitors this arrangement is likely to be unstable, but when one terminal operator offers 
‘multi-user services’ while the other in principle only handles his own ships the arrangement 
could be stable and at the same time increase competitive pressure. The possibility that the 
dedicated terminal operator could start to offer services for third parties disciplines the multi-
user terminal. Such an arrangement was discussed with the port experts in Durban and was 
regarded as a good arrangement to prevent monopolistic behavior. 
15.3 Opportunities to reduce cluster entry and exit barriers 
Entry and exit barriers reduce performance. The result that exit barriers reduce performance 
is relevant, since it implies that strategies to ‘tie’ firms to the cluster are not likely to promote 
the performance of the cluster.  
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Since exit barriers are entry barriers, we discuss opportunities to reduce cluster entry 
barriers96 and include exit barriers in this discussion. Lowering entry barriers is an 
opportunity to improve cluster performance. Relevant entry barriers that can be influenced 
by actors in the cluster are: lack of (venture) capital, inaccessibility of knowledge and 
networks, and the amount of specific investments that have to be made. 
In Rotterdam, the port authority has taken the initiative to develop a venture capitalist that 
provides capital to start-ups. This venture capitalist is self-sustaining operates in partnership 
with commercial banks. This initiative has proved to be valuable for start-ups. This 
arrangement might explain why the availability of venture capital is not regarded as an entry 
barrier in Rotterdam contrary to Durban and the LMPC.  
The second entry barrier, the inaccessibility of knowledge and networks, is not addressed by 
initiatives in any of the three cases. The inaccessibility can derive from language and 
cultural differences. These can hardly be addressed. The presence of all kinds of 
associations as well as ‘port clubs’ in these ports shows that platforms to meet others in the 
port industry do exist.  
The third entry barrier, the level of specific investments that have to be made, can be 
addressed by developing arrangements where actors willing to make specific investments 
invest in assets that are leased to start-ups and entrants. Such arrangements include: 
• Developing land and infrastructure and leasing this to the private sector (the primary 
role of landlord ports). This reduces investments needs of private firms. This policy is 
common practice in the port industry and is done in Rotterdam, the LMPC and Durban. 
                                          
96  For firms present in the cluster, entry barriers are not relevant (anymore), while exit barriers are 
relevant. Policies to reduce exit barriers are not widespread, one could think of labor laws 
related to the closure of an establishment, or the take-over of an establishment. However, such 
laws are not cluster-specific. Furthermore, the experts rated exit barriers as unimportant. For 
these reasons, we do not deal with exit barriers specifically.    
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• Investing in specific assets, such as cranes, warehouses and special cargo facilities. 
These investments imply port authorities invest in the ‘tools’ and lease these to the 
private sector. This strategy leads to a reduction of entry barriers and can improve the 
performance of the port cluster. The port authority in the LMPC and Rotterdam makes 
such investments. In some cases a ‘toolport arrangement’ is superior to the (common 
practice) landlord model.  
• The provision of office space in the port area for small and medium sized port related 
firms. ‘Micro-clustering of these firms in the same area has advantages, such as the 
presence of knowledge and networks. For these reason, port authorities can invest in a 
self-sustaining organization that provides accommodation at market-prices in targeted 
areas - when the provision of adequate office space by the market is not effective, for 
instance because real estate investors are not willing to make the initial investments. 
Rotterdam is the only one of the three ports where the port authority is involved in 
providing office space. 
• Developing and leasing modular warehouse space for clients. This would reduce entry 
barriers for firms in the logistics industry. With fragmented private ownership of 
warehouses, the owners have no incentive to invest in the quality of the distribution park 
as a whole. As a consequence the quality of the zone can decrease. If the port authority 
invests in warehouse space, it has a clear incentive to maintain a certain quality level. 
This arrangement was not found in any of the three cases. 
15.4 Opportunities to increase the heterogeneity of the cluster 
population 
Policies and strategies to improve the diversity of the port cluster are lacking in Durban and 
the LMPC. In Rotterdam, the need to attract ‘new growth activities’ in the cluster, in order to 
counterbalance the loss in value added and employment in cargo handling and transport, is 
widely accepted. Attracting new growth activities is an opportunity to improve the diversity of 
the cluster. In Rotterdam, the following growth activities have been identified (Welters and 
De Langen, 2003): 
• Logistics, especially ‘supply chain management’ (Haynes et al, 1997). 
• Industrial tourism. 
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• Waste processing and recycling. 
• Maritime services. 
• Offshore construction and decomposition (RMPM, 2002). 
• ‘Postponed manufacturing’. 
• The manufacturing of high value chemicals, such as medicine and bio-tech products. 
• Port leisure. 
• Education in port and transport related activities. 
Coalitions that aim to attract firms from these industries have to develop. In Rotterdam, such 
coalitions have developed to attract new manufacturing activities and offshore 
decomposition. However, results are not up to expectations. One of the reasons for the 
difficulty in developing successful coalitions is the need to continue making efforts for a long 
period of time, up to 10 years.   
15.5 Opportunities to increase trust 
In the short and medium run, the level of trust is ‘given’ for the actors in the port cluster. 
Since trust is based on a ‘social relation’, improving the social embedding of individuals in 
the port cluster is a method to improve trust. However, most experts are skeptical about 
initiatives to enhance the level of trust. Once a climate of trust has developed, it can be 
sustained. One approach that could make sense, is to try to develop ‘community spirit’ 
among young professionals in the port.  
In Rotterdam, a ‘young roundtable’ was developed, where young professionals meet about 
four times a year and discuss common themes. One of the objectives of this initiative is to 
make these professionals aware of the importance of common themes and to prepare them 
for later involvement in organizations (especially associations) that promote common 
interests. In the LMPC and Durban, initiatives to build trust are absent. 
15.6 Opportunities to increase the role of intermediaries 
The presence of intermediaries, especially ‘cargo-controlling’ intermediaries such as 
forwarders and ship’s agents, adds to the performance of seaport clusters. These 
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intermediaries are ‘customers’ of seaports; they control substantial volumes of cargo. 
Intermediaries generally speaking have limited assets, and can shift easily between ports. 
However, most forwarders select one port as consolidation hub.  
Attracting consolidation cargo from the intermediaries is predominantly an issue of 
developing a sound price/quality package, because the price-elasticity of the demand of 
intermediaries is very high. However, port authorities have no commercial relation with 
intermediaries:  they do not lease land, nor pay port dues. Thus, in Rotterdam, as well as in 
the LMPC, intermediaries have become ‘the forgotten customers’ of the port. A form of 
‘account management’ for intermediaries can improve relations with intermediaries and 
provide the port authority with relevant management information. The port authority in 
Rotterdam has recently developed a structure with account managers.  
Forwarders obtain volume discounts, for instance from shipping lines and inland transport 
firms. In the port, such discounts are not a common practice since forwarders have no 
commercial relations with either the port authority or the terminal operators. Nevertheless 
discounts can be justified with theoretical arguments (e.g. more volume, more purchasing 
power). Therefore in ports where the absence of (activities of) forwarders is a weakness, 
port authorities can consider developing a tariff scheme that allows for giving discounts to 
actors that generate substantial volumes for the port97.   
15.7 Opportunities to encourage leader firm behavior 
Leader firm involvement arises when leader firms have both the ability and the incentives to 
act as a leader firm. Leader firms generally have incentives to make investments with 
benefits for other firms in the cluster, simply because they have a substantial market share. 
                                          
97  This is an issue that deserves more attention in future studies. Central in the discussion is the 
(marginal) effect of volume discounts on cargo volumes. In the current situation (in Rotterdam 
and probably other ports as well), ship-owners get volume discounts, while intermediaries 
(forwarders) do not. The question is: who of those two would bring more volumes to a port when 
offered a volume discount. The current practice is only effective when ship-owners indeed react 
much more to volume discounts than intermediaries. We have the impression that, especially in 
‘destination ports’ (rather than transshipment ports) this is probably not the case.  
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The ability of firms to behave as leaders, can be improved by providing a ‘support 
infrastructure’.  
Leader firm involvement is in most cases a top management issue. Typical activities where 
a contribution of leader firms would make sense include: 
• Attract financial resources for joint projects.  
• Ensure political support for projects with substantial political involvement. 
• Provide management expertise and best practices information. 
The above-mentioned activities can contribute substantially to the viability and success of 
projects but only when the leader firm involvement is matched with a professional support 
infrastructure that deals with the project management and realization. A part of this support 
infrastructure can be provided by associations, in other cases specific organizations have to 
be developed, such as KMR in the training and education regime in Rotterdam. In 
Rotterdam, the support infrastructure is relatively good. This is one of the reasons for the 
relatively positive evaluation of the involvement of leader firms in the collective action 
regimes in Rotterdam. In the LMPC, the maritime cluster initiative, initiated by Metrovision, 
provides the support infrastructure that enables two leader firms to become involved. In 
Durban, the support infrastructure is not well developed.  
15.8 Opportunities to improve collective action regimes 
In chapter 12 opportunities to improve five collective action regimes were discussed. Table 
 shows some of the opportunities and initiatives to improve the regimes that could be 
relevant in other port clusters. These opportunities are not discussed in more detail in this 
section. 
89
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Table 89: Opportunities to improve collective action regimes  
Regime Opportunity  
Hinterland access Improve market intelligence 
Improve intermodal accessibility 
Develop a network with hinterland nodes 
Marketing and promotion Developing a collective organization for marketing and promotion, with indirect 
financing from the port authority 
Training and education Strategic cooperation to improve the quality of the training and education 
infrastructure 
Re-training to increase job mobility of employees in declining industries 
Innovation Knowledge transfer between small and large firms 
A high volumes, low nuisance, freight road transport system 
Internationalization Port representatives in important markets 
  
15.9 Further research on policy and management in port clusters 
The conclusions of this research have implications for policy and management in port 
clusters. In some cases, best practices were found. These best practices cannot be 
translated into general policy recommendations, further study building on these results is 
required. Four issues seem especially relevant: 
• First, research into the possibilities and likely effects of policies to lower entry barriers 
would be relevant. Increasingly, assets are owned by leasing firms and operated by 
others, such as terminal operators, but also operators of chemical plants or 
warehouses. The investment policies of ‘assets owners’ are based on risk reduction and 
diversification strategies, while operators increasingly strive to be as flexible as 
possible. In a port where it is easy to lease all kinds of assets, entry barriers are lower 
with positive effects on performance. More research is needed to determine whether the 
number of lease constructions is indeed increasing, how such constructions are created 
and how port authorities can contribute to lowering entry barriers. 
• Second, the tariff structure in the container shipping market is a relevant research issue. 
Currently, terminal operators receive a ‘terminal handling charge’ from the shipping 
lines and port authorities charge port dues to shipping lines. Neither port authorities nor 
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terminal operators have commercial relations with shippers or intermediaries. This 
implies they cannot use the ‘pricing instrument’ to give shippers and intermediaries 
incentives to behave in the interest of the terminal operator or the port authority. This is 
a serious shortcoming. For instance, terminals might want to use the price instrument to 
avoid huge peaks at their trucking gates, but simply cannot do so. Port authorities might 
want to give volume discounts to large intermediaries or shippers who shift to 
environmentally friendly hinterland transport or use an ‘intelligent road system’. In the 
current situation, this is not possible, and one could question whether a tariff structure in 
which terminal operators and port authorities are paid by shippers and intermediaries, 
could be better from a welfare economic point of view, since it allows for more 
differentiation in pricing.  
• A third research topic that builds on this research would analyze the possibilities and 
economic effects of arrangements to reconcile scale economies with internal 
competition. In this research, the importance of internal competition was demonstrated. 
The question how to enable internal competition is explored but not analyzed in detail. 
• A final research avenue could analyze coalitions to attract growth activities. Port 
clusters (like all clusters) need to transform to remain vital. In ports, this transformation 
is at least partially a shift from a transport node to a location for various kinds of 
activities, from postponed manufacturing and maritime services to recycling industries. 
Such a transformation depends to a large extent on the capabilities of actors in the port 
cluster to initiate and sustain coalitions to attract growth activities. This issue is so 
central to the performance of port clusters that it deserves attention. 
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APPENDIX 1: THE SURVEY  
Survey on the performance of seaport clusters 
The aim of this survey is to identify which factors influence the performance of the Lower Mississippi 
Port Cluster (LMPC) and how. A wide number of issues are addressed. If you do not know how to 
answer a question, please leave the question open. About 25/30 port experts in the LMPC answer this 
survey. A list of those experts is provided at the end of the survey. All answers will be treated 
confidentially. We provide definitions of terms that may be unclear. Below, we show the framework on 
which this survey is based. 
Cluster
structure
Cluster
governance
Cluster
performance
External environment
We analyze the influence of both the structure and the governance on the performance of the LMPC. 
We have identified a number of variables related to the structure and the governance of the cluster and 
ask your opinion about the validity and importance of these variables.  
The LMPC consists of firms located in the proximity of the port jurisdictions of the port of New Orleans, 
South Louisiana, Plaquemines, St Bernard and Baton Rouge and strongly related to the movement of 
cargo and ships. The cluster consists of five ‘components’. An example of the size of these components 
in terms of employment in Durban is given the following figure:  
 
total port employment in Durban's port cluster, divided in 
different components
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Industry experts 
1. Name and organization:     ________________________ 
2. Function                      ________________________ 
3. Years of experience in the LMPC     ________ 
4. Number of employees of organization       ________ 
5. Involvement in cluster governance     YES/NO 
 
Cluster linkages 
6. Indicate which component(s) of the port cluster of the activities of your organization can be 
categorized.  
1. Cargo handling    _____% 
2. Transport     _____% 
3. Logistics    _____%  
4. Manufacturing    _____% 
5. Trade    _____% 
          100% (total) 
7. Indicate the strength of linkages of your organization with organizations active in the different 
components of the LMPC. 
Component Strength of linkages 
Very weak Weak Moderate Strong Very strong 
Transport Very weak Weak Moderate Strong Very strong 
Logistics   Very weak Weak Moderate Strong Very strong 
Trade Very weak Weak Moderate Strong Very strong 
Manufacturing Very weak Weak Moderate Strong Very strong 
Cargo handling  
Cluster linkages: relations between different actors in the cluster. Relations can be based on transactions, 
the exchange of knowledge and information and on joint projects. 
Components of the port cluster: the five cluster components: cargo handling, transport, logistics, 
manufacturing and trade.  
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Internal competition 
8. Indicate whether you disagree or agree with the following four propositions: 
 
9. Assess the presence of internal competition in cargo handling and port services in the LMPC.  
Proposition Opinion 
Since the competitive environment is practically the same for competitors 
port cluster, internal competition is a stronger force inducing firms to 
an external competition.    
Agree / disagree/ no opinion 
Internal competition leads to low ‘switching costs’ for port users; switching 
her when port service providers only face external competition. 
 
Agree / disagree/ no opinion 
Internal competition leads dynamism and a ‘vibrant competitive 
. Such an environment is conducive for innovation. 
Agree / disagree/ no opinion 
The presence of internal competition adds to the performance of the port 
 
Agree / disagree/ no opinion 
Activity Presence of internal competition 
Container handling No internal competition Limited internal competition Fierce internal competition 
Dry bulk handling No internal competition Limited internal competition Fierce internal competition 
Liquid bulk handling No internal competition Limited internal competition Fierce internal competition 
Breakbulk handling No internal competition Limited internal competition Fierce internal competition 
Pilotage No internal competition Limited internal competition Fierce internal competition 
Towage No internal competition Limited internal competition Fierce internal competition 
Mooring No internal competition Limited internal competition Fierce internal competition 
Internal competition:  competition between firms that are both located in the same port (cluster). 
External competition: competition between firms in different ports  
Switching costs: the costs associated with switching to an alternative supplier 
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Agglomeration economies 
10. Indicate whether you disagree or agree with the following propositions: 
Proposition Opinion 
The presence of a cluster related labor force in the LMPC is a reason for 
firms to locate in the LMPC.    
Agree / disagree/ no opinion 
The presence of cluster related customers and suppliers in the LMPC is a 
reason for firms to locate in the LMPC.   
Agree / disagree/ no opinion 
The presence of the cluster related knowledge and information in the LMPC 
is a reason for firms to locate in the LMPC. 
Agree / disagree/ no opinion 
Relatively high land prices in the LMPC induce firms to leave the cluster. Agree / disagree/ no opinion 
A relatively high level of congestion in the LMPC induces firms to leave the 
cluster. 
Agree / disagree/ no opinion 
The high wage level and power of labor organizations in the LMPC induce 
firms to leave the cluster. 
Agree / disagree/ no opinion 
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Diversity of the cluster population 
 
11. Indicate whether you disagree or agree with the following five propositions: 
 
12. Indicate for three dimensions of diversity of the cluster population how important this type of 
diversity is for the opportunities for co-operation and innovation in the cluster. 
 
13. Indicate the diversity of the LMPC for three dimensions of diversity. 
Proposition Opinion 
Opportunities for co-operation in a cluster are higher the larger the diversity of the 
cluster population. 
Agree / disagree/ no opinion 
Opportunities for innovation in a cluster are higher the larger the diversity of the cluster 
population. 
Agree / disagree/ no opinion 
Diversity of the cluster population reduces the vulnerability of a cluster for changes in 
the environment. 
Agree / disagree/ no opinion 
Co-operation between firms in the LMPC is of minor importance for the performance of 
this cluster compared to co-operation with firms outside the cluster. 
Agree / disagree/ no opinion 
Diversity of the resource base of a cluster reduces the vulnerability of a cluster for 
changes in the environment. 
Agree / disagree/ no opinion 
Type of diversity Importance of diversity for opportunities for co-operation and innovation 
Diversity of economic activities  Not important Of minor importance Of moderate importance Important Very important 
Diversity of firm size  Not important Of minor importance Of moderate importance Important Very important 
Diversity of international scope  Not important Of minor importance Of moderate importance Important Very important 
Type of diversity Diversity of the LMPC 
Diversity of economic activities  Not diverse Small diversity Moderately divers Diverse Very diverse 
Diversity of firm size  Not diverse Small diversity Moderately divers Diverse Very diverse 
Diversity of international scope  Not diverse Small diversity Moderately divers Diverse Very diverse 
Diversity of economic activities:  The presence of firms active in different markets. 
Diversity of firm size:  The presence of small, medium sized and large firms.  
Diversity of international scope: The presence of foreign firms, local firms, and headquarters of internationally 
operating firms.  
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Cluster barriers 
 
Indicate whether you disagree or agree with the following seven propositions: 
Proposition Opinion 
High barriers to start a new business in a cluster reduce the performance of 
that cluster. 
Agree / disagree/ no 
opinion 
High barriers to ‘leave’ a cluster increase the performance of that cluster. Agree / disagree/ no 
opinion 
High barriers to leave a cluster have a negative effect on the performance of 
that cluster in the long run, because they reduce the pressure to maintain the 
vitality of that cluster. 
Agree / disagree/ no 
opinion 
The inaccessibility of knowledge and networks is a relevant barrier for entry 
and start-up. 
Agree / disagree/ no 
opinion 
The unavailability of ‘local capital’ is a relevant barrier for start-up. Agree / disagree/ no 
opinion 
The presence of labor that is ‘sticky’ to the port cluster is a relevant exit 
barrier. 
Agree / disagree/ no 
opinion 
The presence of specific investments is a relevant exit barrier. Agree / disagree/ no 
opinion 
Entry barriers: Barriers that prevent firms from entering the cluster, 
Start-up barriers: Barriers that prevent individuals from starting a new firm  
Exit barriers:  Barriers that prevent firms from an exit of the cluster 
Sticky labour: A labour force not willing to enrol in a job outside the port region or port industry
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Cluster governance 
 
14. Indicate whether you agree or disagree with the following propositions: 
15. Please indicate the importance of six intermediaries for lowering transaction costs and enabling 
co-operation in the port cluster, by ranking them from 1 (most important one) to 6 (least 
important one). 
 
16. Indicate whether you agree or disagree with the following propositions: 
Proposition Opinion 
A culture of trust increases the quality of the governance of a cluster because it 
lowers transaction costs and enables co-operation. 
Agree / disagree/ no opinion 
The presence of ‘leader firms’ increases the quality of the governance of a cluster. Agree / disagree/ no opinion 
The presence of intermediaries increases the quality of the governance of a cluster, 
because intermediaries lower transaction costs and enable co-operation. 
Agree / disagree/ no opinion 
Differences in the governance of a cluster influence the performance of that cluster. Agree / disagree/ no opinion 
The development of port clusters is the result of the interplay of market forces and 
(inter)national policies. The quality of local governance does not have a substantial 
effect on the performance of the cluster. 
Agree / disagree/ no opinion 
Intermediary Rank 
 
Forwarders  
Shipbrokers  
Associations  
Commodity traders  
Non asset-owning logistics service providers  
Ship’s agents 
Proposition Opinion 
The accessibility of knowledge and information sources influences the performance of 
the port cluster.  
Agree / disagree/ no opinion 
Many firms in the port cluster access knowledge and information through contacts with 
‘knowledge intermediaries’ located in the cluster. 
Agree / disagree/ no opinion 
Cluster governance:  The co-ordination of activities in the port cluster. Different mechanisms, such as markets, 
inter firms alliances, associations and public-private organisations, are used to co-ordinate
activities.  
Leader firms:  Firms that have a superior ability to coordinate activities. 
Knowledge intermediaries: Firms or associations that possess, gather and ‘distribute’ knowledge and information. 
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Solving collective action problems 
 
17. Indicate of the five issues given below, whether or not the collective action problem is present in 
the LMPC. 
 
18. Indicate the importance of these five issues for the performance of the LMPC. 
Issue Presence of collective action problem 
Innovation  Present Absent 
Training and education Present Absent 
Internationalization Present Absent 
Marketing and promotion Present Absent 
Hinterland access  Present Absent 
Issue Importance in the LMPC 
Innovation  Not important Of minor 
importance 
Of moderate 
importance 
Important Very important 
Training and education Not important Of minor 
importance 
Of moderate 
importance 
Important Very important 
Internationalization Not important Of minor 
importance 
Of moderate 
importance 
Important Very important 
Marketing and promotion Not important Of minor 
importance 
Of moderate 
importance 
Important Very important 
Hinterland access  Not important Of minor 
importance 
Of moderate 
importance 
Important Very important 
The collective action problem: The problem that even though cooperation among a large group of firms 
would be beneficial for all members of that group, cooperation does not 
develop spontaneously, because individual firms are even better off when 
they ‘free ride’. 
Cluster governance issues: Issues for which ‘collective action’ would be advantageous.  
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Governance regimes 
 
19. How important are the below mentioned variables for the quality of governance in the LMPC? 
 
20. Indicate the quality of the above-mentioned variables for the five regimes in the LMPC, with 
scores ranging from –5 (very bad) to +5 (very good). 
Variable Importance for the quality of governance 
The presence of leader firms Not important Of minor 
importance 
Of moderate 
importance 
Important Very 
important 
The presence of an ‘infrastructure for 
collective action’  
Not important Of minor 
importance 
Of moderate 
importance 
Important Very 
important 
An appropriate role of the public 
organizations in the cluster 
Not important Of minor 
importance 
Of moderate 
importance 
Important Very 
important 
The legitimacy of a ‘community 
argument’  
Not important Of minor 
importance 
Of moderate 
importance 
Important Very 
important 
The appreciation of voice  Not important Of minor 
importance 
Of moderate 
importance 
Important Very 
important 
 The marketing 
and promotion 
regime 
The 
innovation 
regime 
The hinterland 
access regime 
The training and 
education 
regime 
The inter-
nationalization 
regime 
The presence of leader firms      
The presence of an 
‘infrastructure for collective 
action’  
     
The appropriateness of the 
role of the public organizations 
in the cluster 
     
The legitimacy of a 
‘community argument’  
     
The appreciation of voice       
Regimes:  The way in which firms deal with a CAP-issue.   
Infrastructure for collective action: Organizational infrastructure that facilitates coordination and 
cooperation. 
Community argument: An argument to persuade firms in the cluster to contribute to joint 
projects, because they are part of a community. 
Voice:  Firms that, when not satisfied with a solution to a collective action 
problem strive to improve it, by raising their voice.  
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The weight of the variables of cluster performance 
21. Indicate the importance of four classes of variables for the performance of the LMPC, by 
ranking them from 1 (most important class of variables) to 4 (least important class of variables).  
Classes of variables Rank 
The structure of the port cluster  
The governance of the port cluster   
General economic development   
National and international policies   
 
22. Indicate the importance of 10 ‘cluster structure variables’ for the performance of the LMPC, by 
ranking from 1 to 10, where 1 is the most important variable and 10 the least important variable. 
Cluster structure variables Rank 
The presence of a labor force   
The presence of customers and suppliers  
The presence of knowledge spillovers  
The level of land prices and office rents  
The level of congestion  
The presence of internal competition in the port cluster  
The presence of cluster entry barriers  
The presence of cluster exit barriers   
The diversity of the cluster population  
The diversity of the resource base of the cluster  
 
23. Indicate the importance of each of the ‘cluster governance variables’, for the performance of the 
LMPC, by ranking them from 1 (most important variable) to 4 (least important variable).  
Cluster governance variables Rank 
 
The presence of intermediaries  
The presence of embedded leader firms  
The quality of solutions to the collective action problems  
The presence of trust 
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An assessment of the competitive position of the LMPC vis a vis Houston 
 
24. Assess the quality of the 15 factors discussed above for the LMPC and Houston’s port 
cluster by placing a ‘□’ in the table for the score of the LMPC and a ‘○’ for the score of 
Houston. The minimum score is –5, the maximum score is +5. 
 
Variable Score 
The presence of a labor force  -5 -4 -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 4 5 
The presence of customers and suppliers -5 -4 -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 4 5 
The presence of knowledge spillovers -5 -4 -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 4 5 
The level of land prices and office rents -5 -4 -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 4 5 
The level of congestion -5 -4 -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 4 5 
The presence of internal competition  -5 -4 -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 4 5 
The presence of cluster entry barriers (access to local knowledge, 
networks and capital) 
-5 -4 -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 4 5 
The presence of cluster exit barriers (immobile stall, fixed 
investments and strong economic ties) 
-5 -4 -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 4 5 
The diversity of the cluster population -5 -4 -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 4 5 
The diversity of cluster resources -5 -4 -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 4 5 
The presence of a culture of trust -5 -4 -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 4 5 
The presence of intermediaries -5 -4 -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 4 5 
The presence of embedded leader firms -5 -4 -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 4 5 
The quality of solutions to the collective action problems -5 -4 -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 4 5 
 
Opportunities for improving the cluster management 
 
25. Indicate whether you disagree or agree with the following proposition: 
Proposition Opinion 
De ‘overall’ goal of cluster governance should be to improve the performance of 
the port cluster. 
Agree / disagree/ no opinion 
In some cases, policies aimed at improving the performance of the cluster as a 
whole can be disadvantageous for a few companies in the cluster. In such cases, 
the cluster performance would benefit when such partial interests are ‘overruled’.  
Agree / disagree/ no opinion 
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APPENDIX 2: CLUSTER EXPERTS IN THE THREE 
CASES 
Table A1: Cluster experts in the LMPC 
Organization Name Job position 
Port authority of New Orleans J. Cocchiara,  
H. Wilbert 
Senior planner/ market analyst 
Port authority of New Orleans D. Schulenkamp Chairman, Board of Directors 
Port of South Louisiana J. Accardo Executive Director 
Port of Plaquemines U. L. Truell, Jr. Port Safety Engineer 
Port of St Bernard R. Scaffidel Executive Director 
Port of Baton Rouge R. Richard Executive Director 
Millenium port Authority T. Sands Executive Director 
International Freight Forwarders & Custom 
Brokers Association of NO 
D. Schexnayder President 
Steamship Association of Louisiana Ch. F. Hayden President & Executive Officer 
UNO D. Renner Associate professor  
Metrovision T. Kurtz Vice President economic 
development  
Louisiana Economic Development D. Kane Economic advisor 
Mississippi river maritime association M. Titone President 
Mississippi river trade and transport council  G. Taft President 
World Trade Center of New Orleans E.J. Schreiber Managing Director 
New Orleans Public Belt Railroad J. Bridger General Manager 
New Orleans Board of Trade, Ltd. B. Bourgeouis Executive Director 
Central Gulf Lines E.L. Johnsen Managing Director 
Sea Point J. Amos, M. Amos Managing Director 
Associated Terminals D. Fennelly  President 
E.N. Bisso & Son. -  W. Kristiansen President 
Navios ship agencies G. Duffy President 
General maritime M. Maloz President 
Jackson Kearney Group P. L. Diez, Director, Sales and Marketing  
New Orleans Cold Storage M. Blanchard Senior Vice President 
Con-Tech International, Inc. R.G. Evans, Jr President 
Cargill B. Butz  General Manager 
Poseidon T Mantis President 
Schenker F. Hoffner President  
Bean Dredging Corporation J.W. Bean President 
Stevedoring Services of America J. Price Vice President & General 
Manager 
J.W. Allen & company W. App President 
P&O ports M. W. Kearney Vice President Special Projects  
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Table A2: Port experts in Rotterdam 
Organization Name Job position 
Gemeentelijk Havenbedrijf Rotterdam P. Van Essen Managing director 
Deltalinqs N. Westdijk Managing director 
Vereniging van Rotterdamse Cargadoors (VRC) B. Rozenkrans Managing director 
Alliantie Zeecontainervervoerders P. Dijkshoorn Managing director 
Unen Managing director 
KMR (Kennisinfrastructuur Mainport Rotterdam) R. Van der Moolen Managing director 
Erasmus University H.W.H. Welters Professor port economics 
S. Lak adviseur 
EMO BV Europees Massagoed Overslagbedrijf Van Doorn Managing director 
Odfjell Terminals (Rotterdam) B.V. Van Asch van Wijk Managing director 
Rail Service Center Rotterdam BV C. Hoenders Managing director 
Peterson's Havenbedrijf J. P. Peterson Managing director 
European Bulk Services EBS B.V. J. Kuiper Managing director 
Gevelco Terminals B.V. F. van den Gevel Managing director 
Dirkzwager BV Kon.Scheepsagentuur F. van Hoorn Managing director 
P&O Nedlloyd B.V. Lodder Port operations 
Geest North Sea Line BV W. Pronk Managing director 
Haniel Transport Maatschappij W. Sijthoff Managing director 
Jo Tankers B.V. R. van Westebrugge Managing director 
Shortlines B.V. R. Spierings Managing director 
Transforwarding P. W. Vogelaar Managing director 
Matrans Marine Services B.V. H. Vervat Managing director 
Over de Tjonger J. de Ruiter Managing director 
Rabobank H. A. van Klink Port analist 
Vopak Terminal Botlek R.J. Wester Managing director 
Broekman Beheer b.v. R. Riemen Managing director 
Interforest Terminal Rotterdam B.V. B. de Lange Managing director 
Ebrex B.V. Int. Expeditiebedrijf J Ebus Managing director 
Hudig & Veder L. Bracco Gartner Advisor 
Damen Managing director 
Geodis Vitesse Holding B.V. S. Weima Managing director 
Shell Pernis F. Snuif Managing director 
Lyondell Chemical Nederland B.V. R. P. Verhagen Managing director 
Caldic Nederland B.V. Van Caldenborgh  Managing director 
Huntsman Holland B.V. Barents E. Managing director 
Köpcke International W.F. van Noordwijk Managing director 
Cornelder Holding Van Dam Managing director 
Kamer van Koophandel R. de Boer Chairman 
Scheepvaart- en transportcollege E. Hietbrink Chairman 
Vopak  P. Govaart Managing director 
Port support A. Seltenreich Managing director 
Smit Internationale B. Vree Managing director 
PCR/RIL Van 
ECT B.V.  
Schenker Int. Nederland B.V. 
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Table A3: Port experts in Durban 
Organization Expert name Job position 
Portnet South African Port Operations (SAPO) R. Holthausen Commercial Manager 
South african association of freight forwarders  S. Frederic Director 
Durban Metro Economic Development  G. Robbins Economic and Investment advisor 
Mediterranean Shipping Company  A. Rolfe Operations Manager  
Portnet Training Academy, NPA D. Cele Port Academy Manager 
DTB Cartage Company Ltd  P. Rayner Managing Director (Chairman HCA) 
University of Natal T. Jones Professor 
P&I Associates Capt. A. Reid Managing Director 
Rennies terminals A. Dawe (Senior manager) Ops. Director 
Mediterranean Shipping Company (MSC) Capt. S. Sarno Chairman 
Portnet, NPA R. Chetty Planning & Development 
South African Stevedores J. Roux General Manager 
(Maersk) Safmarine Container Lines C. Lambourne Area Executive 
Unicorn Lines  D. Rennie Chief Executive Unicorn Lines 
Spoornet D. Naidu Ops. Manager (Durban Harbour) 
Ladit Associates D. Lawrance Managing director 
Self-employed T. Hutson port/shipping editor  
South African Sugar Association Terminal G. Ebdon operations manager 
Rennies Ships Agency (Pty) Ltd T. Kee Marketing Director 
Union Transport (UTI) H. Fisher International Forwarding 
Fresh Fruit export terminal  T. Bestenbreur General Manager: Durban 
South African Bulk Terminals Ltd (SABT) K. Smith  Managing Director Bulk Division 
Bidfreigth Terminals (Pty) Ltd A. Dawe Operations Director 
Union Transport (UTI) K. Marsh General Manager - KwaZulu Natal 
Chandling International M. Yunnie Managing director 
CSAV A. Sibbald Line Executive 
John T Rennie & Sons N. Reddy Operations Manager 
King & Sons (Pty) Ltd. Ship's Agents N. Sargent General Manager 
Outlook Maritime Project Managers N. Cronje Managing director 
Mondi Paper A. Ryan Distribution Manager 
ISS - Voigt Shipping P. Voigt Managing Director 
Seaboard Overseas Management Company Ltd. C. Sutton Manager Operations 
Rennies Ships Agency (Pty) Ltd C. D. Glen General Manager 
Vopak Terminal Durban (Pty) Ltd. R. Okker Managing Director 
Elgin R. Deane Ship Repair Managing Director 
Southern African Shipyards (Pty) Ltd J. Cobarg General Manager 
Paperlink / Mondi Paper D. McAslan Logistics Manager 
Engen Refinery J. F. Stolz Production Superintendent  
Brink & Associates, Marine Consultants Capt. A. R Brink Managing Director 
Toyota SA Manufacturing K. M. Beck General Manager Logistics Division 
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APPENDIX 3: BIK CODES OF PORT CLUSTER 
ACTIVITIES 
 
Component Description based on BIK code 
Cargo handling Loading, unloading and transhipment activities (6311) Pilotage (6322.02)  
Terminal suppliers, Port engineering (No code) 
Transport  Shipping services (6110) 
Pipeline transportation (6030)  
Rail transport (6010)  
Inland water transport (6120) Trucking services (6024.21)  
Other freight transport by road (6024.23)  
Shipbuilding and repair (351) 
Transport intermediaries (6340) 
Storage (6312)  
Logistics consulting services (no code) 
Manu-facturing4 Oil refineries (2320) 
Cokes manufacturing (2310)  
basic chemical manufacturing (241)  
Flour milling (1561)  
Production of iron and steel (271) Automobile manufacturing (34) Other chemical 
manufacturing (246)  
Specialized suppliers of port manufacturing firms (No code) 
Trade5 Fuel wholesalers (51512)  
Metal and ores wholesalers (5152) Gain wholesalers (51211)  
Mineral oils wholesalers (51513)  
Traders oil and fuels (511201)  
Traders in metals and ores (511202)   
Traders in chemical products (511203)   
Traders in raw products for food industry (511105)   
Logistics 
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The Performance of Seaport Clusters  
A Framework to Analyze Cluster Performance and an Application to the Seaport 
Clusters of Durban, Rotterdam and the Lower Mississippi 
Summary 
Economists frequently use the cluster concept to analyze the economic development of 
regions. Because of increasing interaction and competition between regions, the 
specialization of regions increases. This leads to the development of clusters: spatial 
concentrations of interrelated firms. Competitive clusters can contribute substantially to the 
economic development of regions. Therefore, the question ‘what determines the 
performance of clusters’ is relevant. 
In this thesis, a framework to analyze the performance of clusters is developed. This 
framework is applied to three case studies: the port clusters of Rotterdam, Durban and the 
Lower Mississippi. The cluster concept is frequently applied, but hardly to seaports, in spite 
of the fact that seaports are clear examples of clustering. Virtually all ports attract firms 
related to the arrival of goods and ships. The results of the case studies are relevant both for 
economists dealing with clusters in general and scholars specializing in port studies.  
The thesis consists of three parts. In the first part the theoretical framework is developed 
(chapters 1 to 6), the second part (chapters 7 to 12) deals with the application to seaports 
and the third part (chapters 13 to 15) presents conclusions. 
The theoretical part 
The question ‘how can cluster activities be identified’ has received limited serious attention. 
In virtually all cluster studies, clusters are defined loosely. A precise delimitation is a step 
forward, since it provides a basis for a precise analysis of the evolution of a cluster in time, it 
enables a detailed comparison between clusters, and it allows for a precise analysis of the 
influence of certain characteristics of a cluster, such as degree of foreign ownership, 
diversity in the cluster and entry and exit in the cluster, on its performance.  
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In this thesis a method to delimit clusters is developed, based on two ‘boundaries’ of the 
cluster: the economic and spatial boundary. The method of delimitation consists of four 
iterative steps: 
1. Selection of a loosely defined specialization of the cluster and spatial scope of the cluster 
analysis, for instance ‘shipbuilding in the North of the Netherlands’.  
2. Identification of the set of ‘cluster activities’ based on an analysis of relations between 
activities with the use of input/output data, an analysis of the spatial concentration of 
activities, an analysis of the structure and membership of business associations and an 
analysis of the composition of value chains. 
3. Identification of the relevant cluster region, based on a concentration analysis. 
Municipalities with a percentage of cluster firms above a certain minimum are included in 
the relevant region. 
4. Identification of the ‘cluster population’, consisting of firms involved in cluster activities 
and located in the relevant cluster region. 
Variables of cluster performance 
In this thesis it is argued that the value added created in the cluster is the best performance 
indicator. A growth of the added value over time shows a cluster is performing well. The 
value added in a cluster changes as a result of two effects: an ‘incumbent performance’ 
effect (changes of the value added generated by established firms) and a ‘population effect’ 
(changes in the value added caused by a changing cluster population because of start-up, 
entry, exit, and bankruptcy).  
A widely accepted theory on relevant variables of cluster performance is lacking. In this 
thesis, four relevant schools are identified and insights from these schools are used to 
develop a sound analytical framework for analyzing cluster performance. The first school is 
termed ‘the Diamond School’ because the diamond framework (Porter, 1990) is center stage 
in this school. This framework encompasses a variety of insights relevant for the 
performance of clusters, but is not precise on variables that influence the performance of a 
cluster. The second school is ‘New Economic Geography’, with Krugman (1991) and Fujita 
et al (1999) as leading scholars. This school focuses on explaining the spatial concentration 
of economic activities.  
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The third school is the ‘industrial district’ school, developed to explain the success of 
clusters of small and medium sized firms in Italy. Nowadays, this school not only analyzes 
these ‘Italianate industrial districts’ but all kinds of clusters. The fourth school is ‘Population 
Ecology’. This school analyzes the evolution of populations of firms in an industry. This 
school is relevant, since a cluster is also a population of firms that changes over time. 
The variables for the performance of clusters are derived from these four schools. A 
distinction is made between ‘governance variables’ and ‘structure variables’. The first group 
includes all variables that are directly related to the behavior of organizations in the cluster, 
the second group includes all variables for which this is not the case. Four ‘structure 
variables’ - agglomeration and dispersion forces, internal competition, cluster barriers and 
cluster heterogeneity - and four governance variables - trust, leader firms, intermediaries 
and collective action regimes - are identified. The effects of all these variables on the 
performance of clusters are summarized in the tables S1 and S2. 
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Table S1: The effects of cluster structure on cluster performance 
Element of cluster 
structure 
Effect on cluster performance 
The presence of customers and suppliers attracts firms to the cluster. 
The presence of knowledge (spillovers) attracts firms to the cluster. 
Land scarcity and high land prices ‘disperse’ firms from the cluster. 
Agglomeration 
economies 
Congestion disperses firms from the cluster. 
Internal competition prevents monopoly pricing. 
Internal competition leads to specialization. Internal competition 
Internal competition promotes innovation. 
Entry barriers (such as inaccessible networks) and start-up barriers (such as non-
availability of local venture capital) reduce competitive pressure and prevent the inflow 
of (human) capital. Cluster barriers 
Exit barriers (such as  ‘sticky labor’ and cluster specific investments) reduce uncertainty 
for firms in the cluster.  
Cluster heterogeneity enhances opportunities for cooperation. Cluster heterogeneity 
Cluster heterogeneity reduces vulnerability for external shocks. 
A shared labor pool attracts firms to the cluster. 
Cluster heterogeneity enhances opportunities for innovation. 
 
Table S2: Variables for the quality of cluster governance 
Elements of cluster 
governance 
Effects on cluster performance 
Trust lowers coordination costs because costs to specify contracts decrease. 
The presence of trust  Trust increases the scope of coordination beyond price, because the risk of free riding 
decreases. 
The presence of 
intermediaries 
Intermediaries lower coordination costs and increase the scope of coordination beyond 
price because they specialize in managing coordination. 
Leader firms generate positive external effects for firms in their network, mainly by 
encouraging innovation and promoting internationalization. 
The presence of 
leader firms Leader firms generate positive external effects for firms in the cluster, mainly by 
organizing investments in the training and education infrastructure, the innovation 
infrastructure and the infrastructure for collective action. 
Quality of collective 
action regimes 
The more resources are invested in the collective action regimes, the better the 
performance of a cluster. Five variables influence the amount of resources invested: the 
role of leader firms, the role of public organizations, the presence of an infrastructure for 
collective action, the presence of a community argument and the use of voice. 
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The empirical part 
The empirical part consists of three case studies of the port clusters in Rotterdam, Durban 
and the Lower Mississippi. These cases have been selected because they are the largest 
port on their continent, they have a large gateway function and they are important clusters in 
the region. 
The empirical results are based on desk research, interviews and a survey. In each port 
cluster, a list of port experts was made, and these experts were asked to participate, by 
making time for an interview and answering a set of survey questions. These survey 
questions were answered during the interview, so that questions and answers could be 
explained. 43 experts participated in Rotterdam, 34 in Durban and 31 in the LMPC. This is 
over 80% of all selected port experts, so the results from the survey and interviews are 
reliable. The survey questions address the validity of the variables, the importance of the 
variables, and the ‘score’ of each port cluster compared to a competing port cluster, for each 
variable. Rotterdam is compared with Antwerp and Hamburg; Durban with Richard’s Bay 
and the LMPC with Houston. For all survey results, tests of the statistical significance have 
been made.  
The cluster concept has hardly been applied to seaports. Relevant studies are those of 
Haezendock (2001) on the strengths and weaknesses of Antwerp’s port cluster, Van Klink 
(1995) on the development of port networks, and Slack (1989), among others on the location 
behavior of the port service industries. The empirical research in this thesis contributes to 
port studies in a number of ways: explicit attention is given to the issue of delimiting port 
clusters, the application of new insights from cluster theories to ports, attention to the issue 
of governance in seaports, a comparison between different port clusters, and an analysis of 
implications of using the cluster perspective for policy and management in seaports. 
The arrival of ships and cargo is central to port clusters. The arrival of goods and ships 
attracts different economic activities that can be classified in five components. The first 
component is cargo handling, comprising of all activities necessary to load and unload ships, 
such as terminal operators, pilots, towage and mooring. The second component is transport 
and includes all firms that facilitate the movement of goods, such as shipping lines, 
shipbrokers and trucking firms. The third component is logistics and includes all activities 
that add value to the transported products, such as storage, re-packing and blending. The 
fourth component consists of a specific set of manufacturing activities. The most important 
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manufacturing activities are oil refining, chemicals production and steel plants. The fifth 
component consists of specific trading companies. Trade activities related to commodities 
that are frequently stored in ports (such as oil and grain) are included in the port cluster. 
The size of the three port clusters is analyzed. The available firm data in Rotterdam lead to a 
small overestimation of the number of firms, since legal or fiscal ventures are included. 
Rotterdam’s port clusters consists of about 3,560 firms, 36% of which is active in transport 
and 45% in logistics. The number of manufacturing firms is limited (about 90) but they 
generate a substantial part of all value added in the cluster. The relevant cluster region 
consists of 16 municipalities, of which Rotterdam and Dordrecht are the most important 
ones. In Durban, firm data are lacking, so the cluster population is identified on the basis of 
expert opinions and the Yellow Pages directory. This leads to a small underestimation of the 
size of the cluster. Durban’s port cluster consists of about 680 firms, to a large extent 
transport firms (48%). The relevant region consists of 6 municipalities, of which Durban is by 
far the most important. The Lower Mississippi Port Cluster (LMPC) can be defined very 
precise. The cluster consists of 1,168 firms. Transport is dominant and trade relatively well 
represented (16%). The cluster region consists of 12 municipalities.  
In the three cases, the validity of the variables is confirmed. The specific conclusions for the 
various variables are given below. 
Agglomeration economies 
• The presence of customers and suppliers is a clear force towards concentration in all 
three ports. Furthermore, it is regarded as the most important agglomeration force. 
• The presence of knowledge is also regarded as a force towards clustering in seaports. 
• The presence of labor was regarded as an agglomeration force in Rotterdam and the 
LMPC, but not in Durban, because of high unemployment and limited training efforts in 
this port. About half of the respondents in Rotterdam indicate that the high wage level is 
a dispersion force.  
• Congestion in seaports is not regarded as a dispersion force. The same is true for high 
land prices. 
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Internal competition 
The presence of internal competition (competition between firms located in the port cluster) 
contributes to the performance of the port cluster, because it lowers switching costs (which 
prevents monopoly pricing), it leads to specialization of firms in the cluster, and it leads to 
innovation. 
The fierceness of internal competition is moderate in cargo handling and port services such 
as pilotage and towage. Only in the LMPC internal competition is fierce, for handling 
breakbulk and dry bulk. This is partly explained by the competition between port authorities 
in the LMPC.  
Cluster barriers 
The presence of barriers to entry or barriers to exit limit the performance of port clusters. 
The most relevant entry barrier is the inaccessibility of knowledge and networks. The 
unavailability of ‘local capital’ is an entry barrier in Durban and the LMPC, but not in 
Rotterdam. The only exit barrier is unrecoverable ‘port specific investments’. This finding 
suggests a strategy to ‘tie’ firms to the cluster does not contribute to performance; rather, 
exit barriers should be reduced, for instance by leasing assets to firms in the port cluster. 
Heterogeneity of the cluster 
Heterogeneity contributes to performance, because it creates opportunities for innovation 
and cooperation. Furthermore, it reduces vulnerability for external shocks. A diverse mix of 
local firms, foreign owned firms and cluster based multinationals (diversity of international 
scope) and a diverse mix of economic activities are important in this respect. The LMPC is 
less diverse than Rotterdam and Durban. 
Trust 
Trust in the cluster contributes to performance. It is the most important ‘governance 
variable’. Both the LMPC and Rotterdam are not high trust clusters, compared to their 
competitors. The level of trust in the port cluster in Durban is higher than in Richard’s Bay. 
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Intermediaries 
The presence of intermediaries contributes to the performance of the port cluster, but is 
relatively unimportant compared to the other governance variables. The forwarder is 
regarded as the most important intermediary. Rotterdam is endowed with a large number of 
intermediaries. In the LMPC and Durban, intermediaries are not well represented. 
Leader firms 
Leader firms are firms with both the ability and the incentive to make investments with 
benefits for other firms in the cluster. Leader firms generally have a good market position, an 
international scope and innovative capabilities. The presence of such firms in a cluster 
contributes to its performance. Rotterdam is endowed with relatively many leader firms, but 
the same is true for Antwerp and Hamburg. Durban has more leader firms than Richard’s 
Bay, the LMPC lags behind Houston in this respect. 
Collective action regimes 
Collective action regimes are required when the problem of collective action leads to 
underinvestment in projects with collective benefits, because individual firms ‘free ride’. This 
problem is relevant for investments in training and education, marketing, innovation, and 
hinterland access. All these regimes are important for the performance of port clusters. The 
following conclusions with regard to the quality of these regimes can be drawn: 
• The hinterland access regime in Rotterdam is better than this regime in the LMPC and 
Durban. This is explained by the involvement of public organizations (especially the port 
authority) and leader firms in this regime. 
• The marketing and promotion regime in Durban is not effective, both governments and 
private firms are not willing to contribute to the quality of the regime. In the LMPC, this 
regime depends largely on public actors, whereas in Rotterdam a good public-private 
arrangement has been created. 
• The training and education regime is especially bad in the LMPC, leader firm 
involvement is lacking in this cluster. The regime is good in Rotterdam, because of the 
role of leader firms and the effective organizational infrastructure. 
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• The innovation regime is modest in all three ports, in Rotterdam because there is no 
‘community spirit’. The internationalization regime is also modest in all three cases. 
• Leader firm involvement is an advantage for Rotterdam ‘across the board’. 
• All fifteen regimes that have been analyzed have shortcomings. Experts have indicated 
opportunities for improving all regimes. In most cases, this requires joint efforts to 
collect relevant ‘market intelligence’.  
The comparison of competing port clusters 
Rotterdam has three weaknesses compared to Antwerp: the level of land prices, the supply 
of labor and the quality of collective action regimes. Compared to Hamburg, only the level of 
land prices is a weakness. A strength of Rotterdam compared to both competitors is the 
presence of knowledge. Compared to Hamburg, Rotterdam is also more diverse and 
endowed with more customers and suppliers in the cluster. The added value in Rotterdam 
increased more in Rotterdam’s port cluster than in Antwerp, while cargo volumes were lost 
to Antwerp. This can be explained with the strengths and weaknesses: especially cargo 
handling is sensitive to land prices and labor costs and quality. 
Durban’s port cluster is competitive compared to Richard’s Bay: the cluster is more diverse, 
the knowledge base is better, there is more leader firm involvement and the number of 
suppliers and customers in the cluster is higher. Furthermore, Durban is a ‘high trust cluster’. 
Disadvantages are the high land prices and congestion. The cargo throughput statistics are 
in line with these strengths and weaknesses: Durban remains South Africa’s leading port 
and does not lose cargo to other ports. 
The LMPC is a cluster in decline: Houston has advantages in terms of collective action 
regimes, trust, presence of customers, suppliers and intermediaries and diversity of the 
cluster. The LMPC’s only advantage is less congestion. The throughput figures support this 
conclusion; the LMPC has lost considerable market share. Furthermore, the cluster does not 
attract highly skilled economic activities. 
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De performance van havenclusters 
Een raamwerk om cluster performance te analyseren en een toepassing op de 
havenclusters in Durban, Rotterdam en de beneden-Mississippi 
Nederlandse samenvatting 
Steeds meer economen gebruiken het clusterconcept om de economische ontwikkeling van 
regio’s te onderzoeken. Door de toenemende economische interactie en concurrentie 
tussen regio’s neemt de specialisatie van regio’s toe. Deze specialisatie blijkt uit de vorming 
van clusters: ruimtelijke concentraties van aan elkaar gerelateerde bedrijvigheid. Sterke 
clusters kunnen een grote bijdrage leveren aan de economische ontwikkeling van regio’s. 
Daarom is de vraag ‘wat bepaalt de performance van clusters’ relevant.  
Het clusterconcept wordt veelvuldig toegepast, maar is vrijwel niet gebruikt om havens te 
analyseren, ondanks het feit dat havens duidelijke voorbeelden zijn van clusters. In en rond 
havens vestigen zich immers vrijwel altijd bedrijven die direct of indirect gerelateerd zijn aan 
de aankomst van schepen of lading. In dit proefschrift wordt een theoretisch raamwerk 
ontwikkeld om de performance van clusters te analyseren. Dit raamwerk wordt getest met 
drie casestudies, van de havenclusters in Rotterdam, Durban en de ‘beneden Mississippi’. 
De resultaten van de studie zijn zowel relevant voor economen die zich met clusters 
bezighouden als voor economen gespecialiseerd in havens.  
Het onderzoek bestaat uit drie delen. In het eerste deel van het proefschrift (de 
hoofdstukken 1 tot en met 6) wordt het analytische raamwerk ontwikkeld, in het tweede deel 
(de hoofdstukken 7 tot en met 12) volgt de toepassing op zeehavens en het derde deel 
(hoofdstukken 13 tot en met 15) bevat de conclusies. 
Het theoretische deel 
De vraag ‘hoe kan worden bepaald welke activiteiten een onderdeel uitmaken van een 
cluster’ heeft tot dusver weinig aandacht gekregen in de economische literatuur. Meestal 
wordt volstaan met een grove afbakening van de cluster. Een nauwkeurige afbakening is om 
drie redenen relevant: ten eerste biedt het de basis voor een precieze analyse van de 
ontwikkeling van een cluster door de tijd, ten tweede maakt het een gedetailleerde 
vergelijking tussen clusters mogelijk en ten derde kan de invloed van specifieke 
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karakteristieken van een cluster, zoals de mate van internationalisatie van bedrijven in de 
cluster, de aantallen toe- en uittreders in een cluster en de heterogeniteit van de cluster 
beter worden onderzocht.  
In dit proefschrift is een methode ontwikkeld om clusters af te bakenen aan de hand van  
twee ‘grenzen’ van de cluster: de functionele en de geografische grens van een cluster. Het 
afbakenen van een cluster vind plaats in vier iteratieve stappen: 
1. Keuze van een breed gedefinieerde ‘kernspecialisatie’ en geografische schaal van de 
clusteranalyse. Zo kan bijvoorbeeld een clusteranalyse gemaakt worden voor ‘de 
scheepsbouwcluster in Noord-Nederland’ of ‘de tuinbouwcluster in het Westland’. Pas 
nadat deze keuze is gemaakt kan een cluster afgebakend worden.   
2. Identificatie van de set met cluster activiteiten, op basis van een analyse van relaties 
tussen economische activiteiten, met behulp van input-output analyse, een analyse van 
de ruimtelijke concentratie van verschillende economische activiteiten, een analyse van 
de structuur en het ledenbestand van collectieve belangenorganisaties en een analyse 
van relaties in waardeketens. Deze set geldt voor alle clusters met dezelfde 
kernspecialisatie. 
3. Het vaststellen van de relevante clusterregio, op basis van een analyse van de mate 
waarin clusteractiviteiten geconcentreerd zijn in gemeenten (of provincies). Gemeenten 
met een concentratie boven een bepaalde grens vormen een onderdeel van de 
relevante clusterregio. 
4. Identificatie van de bedrijven die gezamenlijk een cluster vormen. Deze bedrijven zijn 
zowel gevestigd in de relevante clusterregio als actief in één van de clusteractiviteiten. 
Variabelen voor de performance van clusters 
In dit proefschrift wordt beargumenteerd dat de toegevoegde waarde (TW) die gecreëerd 
wordt in een cluster de beste maatstaf is voor de cluster performance. Een voorspoedige 
ontwikkeling van de TW op de lange termijn geeft aan dat de cluster een goede 
performance kent. De TW van een cluster verandert door twee verschillende effecten: door 
veranderende toegevoegde waarde gecreëerd door de al aanwezige bedrijven in de cluster, 
en het ‘populatie effect’. Dit effect omvat de toegevoegde waarde die ontstaat door de komst 
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van nieuwe bedrijven en de toegevoegde waarde die verdwijnt doordat bedrijvigheid failliet 
gaat of zich verplaatst naar een locatie buiten de cluster.  
Er is geen breed geaccepteerde theorie over de variabelen die de performance van clusters 
bepalen. In dit proefschrift worden vier scholen onderscheiden waaruit relevante inzichten af 
te leiden zijn. De eerste school wordt de ‘Diamand School’ genoemd, vanwege de centrale 
plaats van Porter’s diamant raamwerk. Het raamwerk omvat veel relevante inzichten over de 
performance van clusters, maar is niet erg precies over welke variabelen de 
concurrentiekracht beïnvloeden en op welke manier. De tweede school is ‘New Economic 
Geography’. Belangrijke economen in deze school zijn Krugman en Fujita. De school houdt 
zich bezig met de vraag hoe concentratie van industrieën in bepaalde regio’s ontstaat.  
De derde school is de ‘Industrial District’ school, die is ontstaan uit onderzoek naar 
Italiaanse clusters die goed bleken te kunnen concurreren met multinationale 
conglomeraten. Deze school analyseert de voordelen van deze clusters.  De vierde school 
is ‘Population Ecology’. Deze school analyseert de ontwikkeling van populaties van 
bedrijven door de tijd. Deze school is relevant voor clusters omdat een cluster opgevat kan 
worden als een populatie van bedrijven. Deze populatie verandert in de loop van de tijd, 
door fusies, overnames, faillissementen en starters. Uit deze school komen relevante 
inzichten over factoren die de ontwikkeling van populaties beïnvloeden. 
Uit de bovenstaande scholen kunnen variabelen voor de cluster performance worden 
afgeleid. Daarbij wordt een onderscheid gemaakt tussen ‘structuur variabelen’ en 
‘governance variabelen’. Alle aan het gedrag van organisaties gerelateerde variabelen 
worden als ‘governance variabelen’ gekenmerkt, de variabelen waarvoor dat niet het geval 
is zijn de ‘structuur variabelen’. De volgende vier structuur variabelen worden 
onderscheiden: agglomeratie-effecten, interne concurrentie, clusterdrempels en cluster 
heterogeniteit. Daarnaast worden er vier governance variabelen onderscheiden: vertrouwen, 
‘leader firm gedrag’, tussenpersonen en ‘collectieve actie regimes’. Onderstaande tabellen 
vatten de effecten van de variabelen op de performance van clusters samen. 
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Tabel S1: Het effect van de vier structuurvariabelen op clusterperformance 
Structuur variabelen Effecten op cluster performance 
De aanwezigheid van arbeidskrachten trekt bedrijvigheid aan. 
De aanwezigheid van klanten en leveranciers trekt bedrijvigheid aan. 
De aanwezigheid van kennis trekt bedrijvigheid aan.  
Ruimteschaarste en hoge land/huurprijzen leidt tot het verdwijnen van bedrijvigheid 
uit de cluster. 
Agglomeratie effecten 
Congestie leidt tot het verdwijnen van bedrijvigheid uit de cluster. 
Interne concurrentie voorkomt (misbruik van) marktmacht. 
Interne concurrentie geeft prikkels voor specialisatie. Interne concurrentie 
Interne concurrentie geeft prikkels voor innovatie. 
Toetredingsdrempels en startersdrempels verkleinen de concurrentie-intensiteit en 
belemmeren de instroom van (menselijk) kapitaal. Cluster drempels 
Uittredingsdrempels reduceren de onzekerheid voor bedrijven in de cluster.  
Cluster heterogeniteit creëert kansen voor innovatie. 
Cluster heterogeniteit creëert kansen voor samenwerking. 
Cluster heterogeniteit reduceert de kwetsbaarheid voor ‘externe schokken’. 
Cluster heterogeniteit 
 
Tabel S2: Het effect van de vier governance variabelen op clusterperformance 
Governance variabelen Effecten op cluster performance 
Vertrouwen leidt tot lagere contract kosten en dus lagere transactiekosten. 
Vertrouwen  Vertrouwen leidt tot meer samenwerking, omdat  het risico van ‘opportunistisch 
gedrag’ afneemt. 
Tussenpersonen Tussenpersonen zijn gespecialiseerd in ‘afstemmen’: ze reduceren transactiekosten en vergroten de mate van afstemming. 
Leader firms Leader firms genereren positieve externe effecten voor andere bedrijven in de 
cluster omdat ze investeren (en middelen organiseren voor investeringen) in de 
onderwijs- en innovatie-infrastructuur en in de organisatorische infrastructuur in de 
cluster. 
Betere collectieve actie regimes verhogen de cluster performance. Deze regimes 
zijn beter naarmate er meer in geïnvesteerd wordt. Relevante factoren in dit 
opzicht zijn: vertrouwen, de organisatorische infrastructuur, de opstelling van 
leader firms, het gebruik van een ‘community argument’ en een actieve inbreng 
van bedrijven. 
Leader firms genereren positieve effecten voor bedrijven in hun netwerk, met 
name omdat ze innovatie en internationalisering bevorderen. 
Collectieve actie 
regimes 
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Het empirische deel 
Het empirische deel bestaat uit drie case studies van de havenclusters in Rotterdam, 
Durban en de beneden-Mississippi. Voor deze drie cases is gekozen omdat ze alledrie de 
grootste van hun continent zijn, een belangrijke doorvoerfunctie hebben en de regio 
gespecialiseerd is in havengerelateerde activiteiten. 
De empirische resultaten zijn gebaseerd op desk research en informatie verkregen van 
havenexperts die een vragenlijst hebben ingevuld en open vragen beantwoord. De 
vragenlijst is ingevuld tijdens de interviews, met waar nodig uitleg van de vragen. Daarom 
zijn de uitkomsten van de vragenlijst relatief betrouwbaar. In Rotterdam zijn 43 interviews 
gehouden en vragenlijst afgenomen, in Durban 34 en in de LMPC 31. Voor alle resultaten is 
geanalyseerd in hoeverre ze statistisch significant zijn en of er significante verschillen 
bestaan tussen de cases. 
In de vragenlijst staan de vier structuur en de vier governance variabelen centraal. De 
experts is gevraagd of zij de argumentatie voor de effecten van de variabelen 
onderschrijven, hoe belangrijk de variabelen zijn voor de performance en hoe elk van de 
drie clusters scoort ten opzichte van concurrerende havenclusters in de omgeving. In 
Rotterdam is een vergelijking gemaakt met Antwerpen en Hamburg, in Durban met 
Richard’s Bay  en in de LMPC met Houston. 
Het clusterperspectief is nauwelijks toegepast op zeehavens. De belangrijkste studies zijn 
die van Haezendonck (2001) naar de sterkten en zwakten van de Antwerpse havencluster, 
een studie van Van Klink (1995) over de ontwikkeling van havennetwerken en 
vestigingscondities in zeehavens en studies van Slack (1989), onder meer naar de binding 
van de maritieme ‘service industrie’ aan havens. Het empirische onderzoek in dit proefschrift 
verrijkt de bestaande literatuur onder meer op de volgende punten: expliciet aandacht voor 
de vraag welke activiteiten onderdeel uitmaken van havenclusters, toepassing van nieuwe 
clusterinzichten op de haven, aandacht voor ‘governance’ vraagstukken in zeehavens, 
vergelijking tussen drie havenclusters met één uniforme methode en een analyse van 
implicaties van het ‘clusterdenken’ voor beleid en management in havenclusters. 
De kernspecialisatie van havenclusters is de aankomst van zowel lading als schepen. Dit 
trekt verschillende economische activiteiten aan, die kunnen worden onderverdeeld in 5 
componenten. De eerste component is de overslag en omvat alle bedrijven die noodzakelijk 
zijn om overslag te laten plaatsvinden, zoals terminal operators, sleepdiensten en 
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loodsdiensten. De tweede component omvat alle goederentransportactiviteiten, zoals 
transporteurs, scheepvaartagenten, en transportondersteunende bedrijven. De derde 
component omvat alle logistieke bedrijven in een haven, zoals opslagbedrijven en logistieke 
consultants. De vierde component bestaat uit een aantal specifieke productieactiviteiten, 
waarvoor zeehavens aantrekkelijke locaties zijn. De vijfde component bestaat uit een 
specifieke set handelsbedrijven, namelijk bedrijven die handelen in de goederen die 
veelvuldig in de haven worden op- en overgeslagen. De havencluster omvat alle bedrijven 
die actief zijn in de bovenstaande componenten en die gevestigd zijn in de relevante 
havenregio.  
De Rotterdamse havencluster bestaat uit ongeveer 3.560 bedrijven, het merendeel is actief 
in transport (36%) en logistiek (45%). Dit is een lichte overschatting van de clusterpopulatie, 
omdat ook ‘lege BV’s’ geregistreerd worden in het gebruikte databestand. De ongeveer 90 
productiebedrijven die onderdeel uitmaken van de havencluster zijn wel veel groter en 
genereren wel een fors deel van de toegevoegde waarde in de cluster. De relevante 
clusterregio bestaat uit 16 gemeenten, waarvan Rotterdam en Dordrecht de meeste 
clusterbedrijven huisvesten. 
In Durban ontbreken precieze gegevens, waardoor de afbakening moet plaatsvinden op 
basis van expertgegevens en het Gouden Gids register. Daarom is er sprake van een lichte 
onderschatting van de bedrijven in de cluster. In Durban bestaat de havencluster uit 
ongeveer 680 bedrijven. In deze cluster zijn transportbedrijven (48%) dominant. De 
relevante regio in Durban bestaat uit 6 gemeenten, waarvan Durban verreweg de 
belangrijkste is. 
In de ‘Beneden Mississippi port cluster’(LMPC) zijn de beste cijfers voorhanden. De cluster 
bestaat uit 1.168 bedrijven. Transport is dominant en handel relatief sterk vertegenwoordigd 
(16%). De cluster bestaat uit 12 gemeenten.  
Uit de cases kan worden geconcludeerd dat het clusterconcept zinvol toegepast kan worden 
op zeehavens. Het theoretische raamwerk ontwikkeld in het theoretische deel wordt 
grotendeels gevalideerd in de cases. Uit de cases komen de onderstaande resultaten 
aangaande de acht variabelen voor clusterperformance. 
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Agglomeratie effecten 
• De aanwezigheid van klanten en toeleveranciers is in alledrie de havens een duidelijke 
concentratie-versterkende factor. Deze factor wordt ook in alle clusters als belangrijkste 
factor voor de performance van de cluster aangemerkt. 
• Ook de aanwezigheid van kennis en informatie werkt in alledrie de cases 
clusterversterkend. 
• De aanwezigheid van een arbeidsreservoir is in Rotterdam en de LMPC een 
clusterversterkende factor, maar in Durban niet. In Rotterdam geeft ongeveer de helft 
van de experts aan dat het hoge loonniveau in het nadeel van de Rotterdamse cluster 
werkt. 
• Congestie in en om zeehavens wordt niet beschouwd als ‘concentratie-verzwakkend’. 
Datzelfde geldt voor hoge landprijzen.  
Interne concurrentie 
Uit deze studie blijkt duidelijk dat de aanwezigheid van interne concurrentie (concurrentie 
tussen bedrijven in dezelfde havencluster) bijdraagt aan de performance van havenclusters, 
omdat het overstappen naar concurrenten eenvoudiger wordt (en machtsposities dus niet 
ontstaan) en omdat er prikkels ontstaan voor specialisatie en innovatie.  
In de overslag en de havendiensten, zoals sleepdiensten en loodsdiensten, is de interne 
concurrentie zeer beperkt. Dit is te verklaren vanuit de hoge vaste investeringen en de 
relatief beperkte marktomvang. Toch is het voor havens gunstig om te streven naar een 
arrangement dat concurrentie mogelijk maakt, bijvoorbeeld door de havenbeheerder relatief 
veel vaste investeringen te laten doen.   
Cluster drempels 
Uit de empirische resultaten blijkt duidelijk dat ‘toetredingsbarrières’ de performance van de 
cluster negatief beïnvloeden. Als relevante toetredingsbarrière wordt met name de 
ontoegankelijk van netwerken en kennis in havenclusters genoemd. De afwezigheid van 
‘lokaal kapitaal’ wordt in Rotterdam niet als een significante toetredingsdrempel gezien, in 
Durban en de LMPC wel. 
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Ook uittredingsdrempels, met name ’onverplaatsbare investeringen’, hebben volgens de 
experts een negatief effect op de performance van de cluster. Daarmee wordt de hypothese 
dat deze barrières juist gunstige effecten zouden hebben verworpen. Het is dus 
onverstandig te proberen bedrijven te ‘binden’ aan de haven.   
Heterogeniteit van de cluster 
De experts onderschrijven de hypothese dat de aanwezigheid van intermediairs bijdraagt 
aan de performance van havenclusters. Het belang van intermediairs is relatief gering: het is 
de minst belangrijke van de vier governance variabelen. De experts die werken bij grote 
bedrijven twijfelen relatief vaak aan het nut van intermediairs. De expediteur komt als 
belangrijkste intermediair naar voren. In Rotterdam geven de experts aan dat Rotterdam 
goed scoort op het gebied van intermediairs, Durban en de LMPC scoren slecht op dit 
gebied. 
De hypothese dat heterogeniteit van de cluster bijdraagt aan de performance ervan wordt 
bevestigd: heterogeniteit schept kansen voor samenwerking, het stimuleert innovatie en 
reduceert de kwetsbaarheid van de cluster voor externe schokken. Een heterogene mix van 
vestigingen van buitenlandse multinationals, hoofdkantoren van internationaal opererende 
bedrijven en lokaal opererende bedrijven en een mix van verschillende soorten 
economische activiteiten blijken van belang voor de performance. De LMPC blijkt in alle 
opzichten minder heterogeen dan beide andere clusters. 
Vertrouwen 
De bijdrage van vertrouwen aan de performance wordt breed onderkend. Vertrouwen wordt 
ook aangemerkt als belangrijkste ‘governance-variabele’. Zowel in Rotterdam als de LMPC 
geven de experts aan dat de havencluster minder goed scoort dan de omliggende haven(s). 
De experts in Durban geven juist aan dat Durban een relatief sterke cultuur van vertrouwen 
heeft ten opzichte van Richard’s Bay. 
Intermediairs 
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Leader firms 
Leader firms zijn bedrijven die zowel de prikkels als het vermogen hebben om investeringen 
te doen die positieve gevolgen hebben voor andere bedrijven in de cluster. Leader firms 
hebben in het algemeen een vooraanstaande marktpositie, zijn redelijk groot en 
bovengemiddeld innovatief. De aanwezigheid van deze bedrijven in een havencluster draagt 
sterk bij aan de performance ervan. De aanwezigheid van leader firms wordt na vertrouwen 
beschouwd als de belangrijkste governance variabele. In Rotterdam zijn relatief veel 
voorbeelden van leader firm gedrag te vinden, maar dat geldt ook voor de havenclusters van 
Antwerpen en Hamburg. Durban scoort beter dan Richard’s Bay, terwijl de LMPC juist veel 
minder leader firms heeft dan Houston.  
Collectieve actie regimes 
Collectieve actie regimes zijn nodig als er sprake is van een ‘collectief actie probleem’, het 
probleem dat gezamenlijke investeringen niet tot stand komen, doordat elk afzonderlijk 
bedrijf kan besluiten niet mee te investeren, zonder uitgesloten te kunnen worden van de 
voordelen van de investeringen. Een collectief actie regime omvat alle arrangementen om 
gezamenlijke investeringen te laten plaatsvinden.  
De experts geven aan dat dergelijke regimes in havenclusters nodig zijn op vijf gebieden: 
achterlandbereikbaarheid, innovatie, training en onderwijs, marketing en promotie van de 
haven, en internationalisering van het havenbedrijfsleven. Al deze regimes zijn belangrijk 
voor de performance van havenclusters. Over de kwaliteit van de regimes kunnen de 
volgende conclusies getrokken worden: 
• Het achterlandregime van Rotterdam is beter dan in Durban en de LMPC, met name 
vanwege de grote inbreng van leader firms en de rol van overheden (met name het 
gemeentelijk havenbedrijf). 
• Het marketing en promotie regime is in Durban slecht, met name vanwege de geringe 
inbreng van overheden en het bedrijfsleven. In Rotterdam is de organisatorische 
infrastructuur goed, terwijl in de LMPC juist publieke actoren een goede inbreng 
hebben. 
• Het onderwijs- en trainingsregime is in Rotterdam het beste en in de LMPC het slechtst. 
In de LMPC zijn er geen leader firms, in Rotterdam juist wel. Daarnaast is de 
organisatorische infrastructuur in Rotterdam goed. 
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• Het innovatie regime is in alle drie de havens matig. In Rotterdam is er vooral 
onvoldoende samenwerkingsgezindheid.  
• Het internationaliseringsregime is ook voor alledrie de havens matig.  
• Voor alle vijf regimes scoort Rotterdam bovengemiddeld op het gebied van leader firm 
betrokkenheid.  
• Alle vijftien regimes zijn relatief matig, overal zijn er duidelijke zwakten te onderkennen 
en is er ruimte om de kwaliteit van regimes te verbeteren. Eén cruciale kans die 
relevant is voor alle regimes is het vergaren van goede marktinformatie (market 
intelligence). Deze informatie is in veel gevallen onvoldoende aanwezig, maar cruciaal 
om kansen te identificeren om ladingpakketten en economische activiteiten aan te 
trekken.           
De vergelijking van de havens met de concurrenten 
Rotterdam heeft ten opzichte van Antwerpen drie zwaktes: de hoogte van grondprijzen, de 
kwaliteit van het arbeidsreservoir en de kwaliteit van collectieve actie regimes. Hamburg 
scoort alleen beter op het gebied van grondprijzen. Op het gebied van kennis scoort 
Rotterdam beter dan Antwerpen en Hamburg. Vergeleken met Hamburg is Rotterdam ook 
meer heterogeen en heeft het meer klanten en leveranciers in de cluster.  
In Rotterdam groeide de toegevoegde waarde over de afgelopen vijf jaar sneller dan in 
Antwerpen, terwijl de haven juist volume verloor aan Antwerpen. Deze ontwikkeling sluit aan 
bij de bovengenoemde sterktes en zwaktes: Rotterdam raakt lading kwijt omdat daar de 
grondprijzen en arbeidskosten dominant zijn. In de logistiek en industrie zijn deze minder 
doorslaggevend, met als gevolg dat Rotterdam daar wel meer toegevoegde waarde 
genereert. Het ladingverlies leidt daarom (nog) niet tot een evenredig verlies aan 
toegevoegde waarde. 
Durban’s havencluster scoort goed ten opzichte van Richard’s Bay: er is meer interne 
concurrentie, meer kennis, er heerst meer een cultuur van vertrouwen, er zijn meer klanten 
en toeleveranciers gevestigd en er is meer leader firm betrokkenheid. Nadelen zijn de hoge 
grondprijzen, de congestie en de geringe aanwezigheid van tussenpersonen. Deze sterktes 
en zwaktes maken duidelijk dat Durban een sterk cluster is, waar de agglomeratievoordelen 
dominant zijn. Deze conclusie sluit aan bij de overslaggegevens over Durban: op de 
kolenexport na blijft Durban de dominante haven, zonder marktaandeel te verliezen.  
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Het beeld van de LMPC is dat van een havencluster onder druk: alleen op het gebied van 
congestie scoort de haven beter dan Houston. De LMPC scoort slechter ten aanzien van de 
kwaliteit van collectieve actie regimes, de aanwezigheid van klanten, toeleveranciers en 
intermediairs, de cultuur van vertrouwen en de diversiteit van de cluster. 
De overslagcijfers ondersteunen deze conclusie: de LMPC verliest eigenlijk op alle markten 
marktaandeel. Juist de hoogwaardige bedrijven (zoals logistieke dienstverleners en olie 
traders) zijn maar zeer beperkt geconcentreerd in de havencluster.  
Vervolgonderzoek 
Uit de cases blijkt de havenbeheerder goed gepositioneerd te zijn om zich op te stellen als 
cluster manager. In Rotterdam gedraagt de havenbeheerder zich deels ook als cluster 
manager. Dit maakt de rol van de havenbeheerder interessant vanuit theoretisch oogpunt: in 
andere clusters bestaat er geen vergelijkbare actor die zich zo zal inzetten voor de 
performance van de cluster. Op dit punt biedt het huidige onderzoek een goede basis voor 
meer onderzoek. Uit het onderzoek blijkt bijvoorbeeld dat het maken van havenspecifieke 
investeringen een toetredingsdrempel is. Omdat de clustermanager een blijvende 
betrokkenheid heeft bij de havencluster is het voor deze partij geen probleem om 
clusterspecifieke investeringen te doen. Daarom kan een arrangement waarbij de 
havenbeheerder (eventueel in een joint venture met een bank of leasemaatschappij) 
investeringen doet in onverplaatsbare assets en deze marktconform least aan bedrijven 
bijdragen aan de performance van de havencluster. 
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The Performance of Seaport Clusters; a framework to
analyze cluster performance and an application to the seaport
clusters in Durban, Rotterdam and the lower Mississippi.
This PhD thesis deals with the performance of clusters. Even though
cluster studies are numerous, a coherent framework to analyze cluster
performance is lacking. In this thesis, such a framework is developed,
drawing from different schools that deal with clusters. Central in the
framework is a distinction to variables of cluster performance related
to the structure of a cluster and variables related to the governance
of a cluster. Four structure variables – agglomeration ands disagglo-
meration forces, internal competition, heterogeneity of the cluster
and the level of entry and exit barriers – and four governance related
variables – the presence of trust, the presence of intermediaries, the
presence of leader firms and the quality of collective action regimes
– are identified and discussed. The validity of these variables is
confirmed in the three case studies, of the port clusters of Rotterdam,
Durban, and the lower Mississippi. The strengths and weaknesses of
the three port clusters, the importance of the variables discussed
above and opportunities for policy and management to improve the
performance of clusters are discussed. 
The results of this study are relevant for cluster scholars and for
scholars specializing in port studies. The thesis is also relevant for
(port) cluster managers and for managers of firms in (port) clusters,
since implications of this study for policy and management in (port)
clusters are discussed.  
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